BB-57 U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA
War Diary and Action Reports November 1942,
BB57/TS133-1
U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, Calif.
From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Subject: War Diary November 1 - 30, 1942.
Reference: (a) Cominch ltr. FF1/A12-1. Serial 4182
of 7 July 1943.
Enclosures: (A) Action report, 14 - 15 November 1942, off
Savo Island. (2 copies)
L. D. McCORMICK
Sunday, 1 November 1942. (Zone -11).
Moored, Noumea, New Caledonia.
Transferred survivors of Porter. Vestal came alongside
to repair battle damage and damage resulting from collision
with Mahan.
Monday, 2 November 1942. (Zone -11).
At Noumea.
Tuesday, 3 November 1942. (Zone -11)
At Noumea.
Wednesday, 4 November 1942. (Zone -11)
At Noumea.
Thursday, 5 November 1942. (Zone -11)
At Noumea.
0900 Captain T.L. Gatch, U.S.N., removed from sick list
and having recovered from injuries received in battle assumed
command.
Friday, 6 November 1942. (Zone -11)
At Noumea.
Vestal completed repairs and left from alongside.
Fueled ship. In all respects ready for sea.
Monday, 7 November 1942. (Zone -11).
At Noumea.
Monday, 8 November 1942. (Zone -11).
At Noumea.
Monday, 9 November 1942. (Zone -11).
At Noumea.
Monday, 10 November 1942. (Zone -11).
At Noumea.
Monday, 11 November 1942. (Zone -11).
At Noumea. 0630 shifted berth to outer harbor.
1200 underway with Task Force 16 - Rear admiral Kincaid
in Enterprise, Washington (ComBatDiv 6 - Rear Admiral Lee),
South Dakota, Northampton, San Diego, Preston, Mustin, Walke,
Hughes, Morris, Anderson, Dale Clarke and Russell.
Cleared harbor formed CD #1 fleet axis 150° T, course
300°-T, South Dakota 2.5-225°- Zigzagging.
Set clocks ahead to Zone -12. aircraft operations.
2315 changed fleet course to 317° T, fleet speed 20 knots.
2000 Posit: Lat-22°-30.5'-00" S Long-165°-42-00" E
Thursday, 12 November 1942.
0630 changed fleet course to 305° T.
0824 changed fleet course to 330° T.
Pensacola, Gwin, Benham joined Task Force. Aircraft operations.
AA machine gun practice. 1807 changed fleet course to 352° T.
0800 Posit : Lat-20°-31'-00" S Long-163°-01'-OO" E
1200 Posit : Lat-19°-48'-00" S Long-162°-32'-OO" E
2000 Posit : Lat-17°-53'-OO" S Long-161°-44'-00" E
Friday, 13 November 1942.
Aircraft operations and submarine alerts.
1316 chanced fleet course to 000° T. Fleet speed 21 knots.
1521 chanced fleet course to 180° T.
1912 Task Group 16.3 left formation - Washington (ComBatDiv 6
Comdr. Task Force 16-3 - Rear Admiral Lee ), South Dakota,
Gwin, Benham Preston and Walke. Enterprise and remainder of
Task Force 16 came about to a southerly course.
Course 000° T, speed 24 knots. South Dakota station 3000 yds.
on starboard beam of Washington - DD's screening each BB.
2008 chanced formation speed to 26 knots.
2355 chanced formation speed to 20 knots. ceased zigzagging.
0800 Posit: Lat-14°-29'-00" S Long-161°-10'-OO" E
1200 Posit: Lat-13°-48'-OO" S Long-161°-34'-OO" E
2000 Posit: Lat-13°-57'-OO" S Long-162°-05'-OO" E
Saturday, 14 November 1942.
Steaming on various courses and at various speeds,
zigzagging, southeast of Guadalcanal Islands, Solomon Group
keeping 50 miles off coast, avoiding aircraft detection by
seeking rain squall and heavy cloud cover. Task Group 16.3
changed to Task Force 64, sane commander and same composition.
At 1800 proceeded toward Savo Island to intercept
Japanese force consisting of BB's CA's, CL's, DD's, and trans-
ports attempting to make a night, landing on Guadalcanal.
0800 Posit: Lat-10°-28'-00" S Long-159°-37'-00" E.
1200 Posit: Lat-10°-07'-00" S Long-159°-09'-00" E.
2000 Posit: Lat- Off Russel Island.
Sunday, 15 November 1942.
0018 engaged enemy. See:- "Action Report, Night Engagement
14-15 November 1942 with Japanese Naval units off Savo Island".,
attached. Preston and Walke were sunk in action. Lost contact
with Gwin and Benham.
Buried the dead.
1000 rejoined Washington.
2330 Stack, Lardner and Dale joined up.
Steering various courses to the southward.
0800 Posit: Lat-10°-59'-00" S Long-159°-33'-00" E.
1200 Posit: Lat-11°-19'-00" S Long-160°-50'-00" E.
2000 Posit: Lat-12°-48'-00" S Long-162°-45'-00" E.
Monday, 16 November 1942.
Retiring toward Noumea, New Caledonia.
Buried the dead.
0800 Posit: Lat-15°-53'-OO" S Long-164°-29'-00" E
1200 Posit: Lat-16°-30'-00" S Long-163°-02'-00" E
2000 Posit: Lat-19°-03'-00" S Long-162°-09'-00" E
Tuesday, 17 November 1942. (Zone -11).
1415 Moored, Great Harbor, Noumea, New Caledonia.
0800 Posit: Lat-22°-18'-00" S Long-165°-00'-00" E
Wednesday, 18 November 1942. (Zone -11)
At Noumea.
Held memorial services for those killed in action night
of' 11-15 November.
Thursday, 19 November 1942. (Zone -11)
At Noumea.
Transferred wounded to Mobi1e Hospital #5.
Prometheus cane alongside to repair battle damage.
Friday, 20 November 1942. (Zone -11)
At Noumea. ComSoPac (Vice Admiral Halsey) visited the ship.
At Noumea. ComSoPac (Vice Admiral Halsey) visited the ship.
Repairing batt1e damage Prometheus alongside.
Saturday, 21 November 1942. (Zone -11)
At Noumea.
Repairing batt1e damage Prometheus alongside.
Sunday, 22 November 1942. (Zone -11)
At Noumea.
Repairing batt1e damage Prometheus alongside.
Monday, 23 November 1942. (Zone -11)
At Noumea.
Repairing batt1e damage Prometheus alongside.
Tuesday, 24 November 1942. (Zone -11)
At Noumea.
Repairing batt1e damage Prometheus alongside.
Wednesday, 25 November 1942. (Zone -11)
At Noumea.
0750 cast off lines from Prometheus and got underway -
(ComSoPac 240532 of 24 November 1942). Task Group 66.2 -
South Dakota, Dale, Aylwin.
1000 cleared harbor and picked up escort.
1200 Posit: Lat-22°-57'-00" S Long-166°-39'-00" E
2000 Posit: Lat-23°-29'-00" S Long-169°-30'-00" E
Thursday, 26 November 1942. (Zone -12)
0800 Posit: Lat-23°-10'-OO" S Long-173°-49'-00" E
1200 Posit: Lat-22°-55'-00" S Long-175°-23'-00" E
2000 Posit: Lat-22°-16'-00" S Long-178°-34'-00" E
Friday, 27 November 1942. (Zone -12)
1345 anchored berth #23, Nukualofa, Tongatabu, Tong Islands.
Tanker W.C. YEAGER came alongside and commenced fueling ship.
0800 Posit: Lat-21°-15'-OO" S Long-176°-37'-00" W
Saturday, 28 November 1942. (Zone -12)
At Nukualofa, Tongatabu.
Tanker cleared side.
1330 Indiana, Columbia, Saufly and DeHaven entered harbor
and anchored.
Sunday, 29 November 1942. (Zone -12)
0800 Task Group 66.2 underway - South Dakota, Dale, Alywin,
proceeding out of harbor.
2000 Posit: Lat-20°-34'-OO" S Long-172°-23'-00" W.
Monday, 30 November 1942. (Zone plus) 11 (plus) 10).
Changed zone time at 0300.
0400 Dale, Alywin left formation and proceeded on duty
assigned.
0800 Posit: Lat-15°-59'-OO" S Long-160°-39'-00" W
1200 Posit: Lat-15°-27'-00" S Long-159°-15'-00" W
2000 Posit: Lat-14°-21'-00" S Long-156°-28'-00" W
U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA.
BB57/A16-3/(TS133)
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
From: Commanding Officer.
To : Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Task Force SIXTY FOUR.
(2) Commander South Pacific.
(3) Commander Pacific Fleet.
Subject: Action report, night engagement 11-15 November, 1942,
with Japanese naval units, off Savo Island.
Enclosures: (A) Reconstructed navigational track and
important events.
(B) Profile diagram of SOUTH DAKOTA, showing
location of hits sustained.
(C) Composite radio log.
(D) Detailed list of damage.
(F) Personnel casualties.
(G) Extracts - quartermaster's log.
(H) Extracts - engineers bell book.
1. Summary of outstanding events.
Task Force 64 consisting of WASHINGTON, SOUTH DAKOTA,
PRESTON, GUIN, BENHAM, and WALKE took its departure from Task Force
16 at about sunset on November 13, 1942, while south of Guadalcanal.
This task force was unable to cover Guadalcanal that evening and
protect it against the bombardment scheduled by the enemy. A point
about fifty miles south-by-west from Guadalcanal was reached during
late forenoon of 14 November. Most of the day was spent in this
area avoiding contact with enemy planes. The enemy did sight this
force and reported it as a force of possibly one battleship, one
cruiser and four destroyers.
Information from despatches indicated the presence
of three groups of enemy ships to the northwest of Guadalcanal. One
of these, a twenty-four ship convoy, had been subjected to heavy air
attacks during the day end had broken up into small groups on var-
ious courses when last seen about 1830. (All times reported herein
are zone minus twelve.) A second group, when sighted that morning,
was reported as composed of two battleships, one light cruiser,
and eleven destroyers. A third group of twelve ships in a convoy
trailed the battleship group when last reported that morning. Other
scattered units indicated the presence of possibly two heavy cruisers
three light cruisers, and twelve destroyers. Most of these latter
however were engaged in covering the retirement of damaged trans-
ports and other units. When at about 2330 it was learned that an
enemy convoy was corning through the passage off Savo Island some-
time between 0030 and 0230, the covering force was at once presumed
to consist chiefly of the battleship group reported earlier in the
day. An earlier report indicated the presence of an enemy light
cruiser and destroyer in a cove on Savo Island.
The approach to Savo Iland was made from the south
on course 020° T, leaving Savo about 18 miles abeam to starboard.
At 2210 course was changed to 090° T, leaving Savo about 11 miles
abeam to starboard. When the middle of Savo was abeam course was
changed to 150° T. On this leg the speed remained 17 knots. At
2353 course was changed to 270° T. A sharp lookout had been main-
tained on Savo for signs of the cruiser. Visibility was good,
a quarter moon showing, and some cloudiness casting shadows that made
excellent dark background patches. At 0008 three ships were observed
from the bridge visually, and checked by radar to bear 330° T, range
18,100 yards. The leading ship was large and is believed to have been
a heavy cruiser or a battleship. Astern of it were two smaller ships,
believed to be light cruisers, possibly one of them being a heavy
cruiser. Contact was reported by TBS to the task force commander, and
he very soon after this ordered "open fire when you are ready". At
0017 the WASHINGTON opened fire on the leading, or right hands ship.
Less than a minute later the SOUTH DAKOTA main battery opened fire on
the nearest ship at 15,700 yards, which at this time was overlapping
in deflection the more distant ship astern of the leader. Both
initial salvos started fires on the targets. At this instant Japanese
voice transmissions, which has been picked up on 2070-2080 kcs.
earlier at about 2130, became excited and very numerous. Some
thirteen different stations were on this frequency at one time. The
SOUTH DAKOTA salvo was spotted up 100 yards and right two miles to get
on the selected target although the other ship had been hit. Firing
was continued until the target had disappeared off the radar screen.
Observers on board substantiated the radar operators' statements
that the two leading targets were sunk. The third target, the last
ship in the open column, was last reported as an indistinct and
doubtful radar 'pip'. The main battery fire was then directed
against another target at an estimated range of 10,000 - 11,000
yards but the bearing of this target changed so rapidly that
divided fire was ordered when the forward turrets hit their train
limit stops. Turret three kept the target under fire, shooting over
our om stern and demolishing our planes. The target was observed
to break in two and sink. It was identified as a cruiser, During
this phase power troubles were experienced and at one time firing
the main battery by auxiliary had been ordered but not carried out.
During the latter part of this first phase the secondary battery
was firing at enemy ships close to shore in the direction of Savo
Island. These were tentatively identified as eight destroyers, of
which two were observed on fire. One of these exploded and the
fires soon stopped.
A short lull followed the sinking of the enemy cruiser
astern of the SOUTH DAKOTA. No hits had been repotted on the
ship although shorts and overs were heard and soon. Enemy fire on
the WASHINGTON was observed to be definitely over, only a few shorts
were observed. Gun flashes had blinded most of the personnel in the
conning tower as well as at other stations, temporarily, and it was
very difficult to see the WASHINGTON. A change of course had to be
made to maneuver clear of two of our destroyers which had been
damaged in the action this far.
The second phase began abruptly. Radar plot had
reported four enemy ships, just clear of the left tangent of
Savo Island, approaching from the starboard bow. The greatest con-
cern in Conn at this time was to avoid collision with our own
units leading the column. Radar plot had just finished reporting
the enemy bearing 070° relative, range 5,800 yards, when the
SOUTH DAKOTA was illuminated by four searchlights on the second
ship in the enemy column. These searchlights were in pairs, each
pair of lights having one light above the other. At the same instant
the WASHINGTON opened fire with her main battery On the leading ship
which was the largest of the four. It was vigorous fire that pre-
vented the enemy from inflicting more damage on the SOUTH DAKOTA .
The SOUTH DAKOTA was under triple or quadruple concentration when
the enemy opened fire about thirty seconds after illumination. The
SOUTH DAKOTA secondary battery opened fire simultaneously with the
enemy and the searchlights were extinguished at once. Our main
battery did not actually fire on the illuminating ship until just
after the lights went out. Two or three salvos were fired and all
The ship was broken in two and the 'pip' disappeared from the radar
screen. The WASHINGTON's target when last observed was seen to
pour out huge clouds of smoke. Some observers report seeing a deep
red glow from within the ship but not much credence has been given
to this observation. The third ship was put under fire both from
our secondary battery and our main battery. Data at this point is
not clear, but it; is believed that the WASHINGTON also shifted to
this target. When last seen, this ship, believed to be a cruiser,
was gushing volumes of black smoke. No information is available as
to whether the last ship was ever under fire, but it is believed
that several salvos were fired at it by the secondary battery. All
enemy ships were silenced because during the last two or three min-
utes of firing no gunfire was observed on the enemy ships. All
batteries ceased firing at 0110, shortly after turret three reported
training trouble because of a shell hit somewhere near its gas seal
ring. This hit was later identified as a fourteen inch shell hit
from fragments recovered in that area, and the size of the indentat-
ion in the barbette.
The location of the was not known. Radio
communication had failed. Radar plot had been demolished. Main
battery director II radar was the only radar functioning. Three
fire control radars had been damaged by shells, and number 4
secondary was inoperative due to electrical troubles. Many dead and
wounded had been reported by battle station two as well as sky
control. Turret three reported difficulty in train although it
believed that it could still fire. Reports of fires were coming in,
none serious, except that Conn believed the fire in the foremast
structure to be serious, which it was not. Damage control had re-
ported only minor damage to the hull and that we were shipping some
water on turns at high speed but reported nothing dangerous. It
was decided to withdraw to the 1000 rendezvous position assigned by
the task force commander prior to the engagement.
2. Preliminary operations.
An accurate estimate of the enemy forces involved
cannot be made. Officers who would have been the most reliable
observers were in no position to make careful observations or re-
cord data because of the numerous power failures and shifting of
fire control. Information of enemy forces has already been sum-
marized in the first section of this report. Exact analysis of
the enemy operations is not feasible, however the following is be-
lieved to be a fair estimate.
The enemy covering force preceded the convoy of
transports. It may be possible that he expected one of our battle-
ships, but did not expect to be engaged at the range at which this
force opened fire. The fact that the trailing ships in the first
group encountered were not in column and one ship's fire was masked
by another, indicates that the enemy was taken by surprise. How
ever, the resourcefulness of the enemy is apparent in that while we
engaged the vanguard, he sent a strong force, including one battle-
ship, around Savo Island to attack us from the flank or rear. Some-
how he had also placed destroyers close to shore in a good striking
position had this force changed course to leave Savo Island on our
port hand. Perhaps in his oriental fashion he had planned to repeat
the Quincy, Astoria, Vincennes crossing the T from astern. Main-
taining the course at about 300° T, we did not play up to the enemy's
expectations.
During our approach to Savo Island, ships in the task
force formed column. Four destroyers were stationed directly ahead
of the WASHINGTON, distance 4,000 yards. The SOUTH DAKOTA
was assigned station 1,500 yards astern of the WASHINGTON. Details
of the approach are shown in Enclosure (A) reconstructed from
navigational data recorded during the battle. DRT track is not,
available since the device did not function properly due to power
failures during the engagement and a fragment of a Jap shell went
through it.
The sea was calm, wind 2-6 knots, easterly and
southeasterly. There was a thin cloud layer covering nine tenths
of the sky, estimated altitude 10,000 feet. Some low clouds were
at 2,000 feet. The amount of upper clouds decreased, while the
lower clouds increased toward the end of the engagement, giving an
overcast by 0200. Surface visibility until the overcast was about
12 miles. The moon was in its first quarter intermittently obscured
by low clouds and casting dark shadows on the water forming excellent
dark background.
3. CHRONOLOGICAL LOC OF BATTLE. (Minus TWELVE time,
14-15 Nov.).
2100 General (Quarters. Base course 020° T, speed 23 knots
zig-zag.
2105 Radar contact, bearing 323° R, about 25,000 yds.
unidentified, but believed to be a rain squall.
2107 Ship manned and ready for general quarters.
2110 Ceased zig-zag, steadied on course 020° T.
Flashes of light broad on port bow, over the horizon,
possibly gunfire or burning ships exploding. Thought
to be enemy transports set on fire by our aircraft
during afternoon bombings.
2125 Changed standard speed to 20 knots.
2133 Glow in western sky, 270° R. Too far to see the fire.
2135 Changed speed to 24 knots to close up on WASHINGTON.
2145 Plane sighted 050° R, flashed recognition signal,
friendly.
2210 Changed course to 090° T, rounding Savo Island to
starboard.
2235 Friendly plane on the starboard bow flashing recog-
nition signal.
2245 Many Japanese voice transmissions heard on 2070-2080
kcs. Thought probably transports that were damaged
by our planes.
2247 Changed course to 150° T.
2312 Glow sighted near beach of Savo Island, bearing 280°
Tracked by computer giving speed zero. Identified
as a rock. Not the light cruiser and destroyer re-
ported to be present.
2317 CTF 64 talking with Cactus on 3785. Our force re-
ported as enemy by observers, probably MTB's. In-
formation useful to the enemy was passed by plain
language, our course and code name location.
2330 Changed speed to 17 knots.
Despatch received stating heavily escorted convoy
expected off Savo Island between 0030 and 0230.
2355 Changed course to 270°
0007 Sighted three ships to the right of Savo Island,
course 090° T.
0008 Three ships bearing 330° T, 18,300 yards, by radar.
0013 Comtaskfor 64 sent "You may open fire when are
ready".
0014 Fire control officer reported to Conn "Ready to
open fire". Target tracked by fire control radar,
solution based on radar ranges.
0015 Radar plot reported 345° T, distance 17,000 yards,
speed 21.
0017 WASHINGTON opened fire on the enemy.
0018 SOUTH DAKOTA opened fire on the enemy, left two
ships almost in line, apparently on revers courses,
straddled, and fires started. Range 15,700 yards.
Spot U-IOO, R02.
0019-15 Second salvo, range 15,800. Spot U-300,
Second ship in formation SOUTH DAKOTA's target.
0020 Increased speed to 23 knots.
Many Jap voice transmissions on 2070 heard. Several
stopped abruptly, weaker ones continuing.
0020-10 Third salvo, range 16,100. Spot U-400. Target
burning.
0020-42 Fourth salvo, range, 16,500. Spot D-100.
0021-40 Fifth salvo, range 17,000. Spot NC.
0022-15 Sixth salvo, range 17,600. Spot U-200.
0023-00 Seventh salvo, range 18,000. Spot U-400. WASHINGTON
target disappeared. Sunk. (WASHINGTON's target
identified by two lookouts as an enemy battleship,
ablaze from stem to stern.)
0024-18 Eighth salvo, range 18,000. Spot- none. Target
disappeared. Sunk.
0025 Changed course to 300° T.
0028 Main battery shifted to divide fire as all turrets
could not boar.
0030 Radar plot reports ships bearing 315° T, 13,000
yards, closing. Ninth salvo (turret III) range
10,800. Spot D-200.
0030-40 Tenth salvo (all turrets) range 10,700. Spot D-100.
0031-20 Eleventh salvo (all turrets) range 10,700. Spot NC.
0031-58 Twelfth salvo (turret III) range 10,500. Spot - non
0033 Thirteenth salvo (turret III) range 10,400. No
spot. Cheeked fire. Shifted to collective fire.
Lost all power, gyros and all electric fire control
equipment out. Circuit breakers on No. 4 switch-
board tripped out. Load shifted to No. 3 switch-
board. Bus transfer panel for No. 6 and 8 5" mounts
shifted to alternate source on No. 3 board, causing
No. 6 generator to trip out. Feeder circuit breaker
also tripped.
0033-30 Regained power in plotting room then lost, it
almost immediately.
0034 Two enemy ships rounding Savo Island to the eastward,
bearing 345° T. reported by radar plot. (No record of
range).
Enemy firing on our formation. Shorts few, overs many,
especially the WASHINGTON.
0035 No. 5 and 6 generators paralleled on boards 3 and 4.
Normal power supply retained. Circuits cut in one by
one isolate faulty one. Trouble found with mount 6 and
8 bus, feeder circuit breaker FE 0420 tripping out.
One of our destroyers (WALKE) EXPLODED AHED OF THE
Washington. Asked WASHINGTON on TBS if any damage.
Reply "We are okay".
PRESTON reported "Am okay, one hit in fireroom". Main
battery shifted to auxiliary but not fire. (Failure
due to shorts in Mount 6 and 8, tripped circuit
breakers on generators 5 and 6).
0036 Ship started turn to left to clear damaged destroyers
ahead, then sharply turned to starboard to clear and
again steadied on base course, 300° T.
Power back on again. Gyros had tripped out but cut in
again almost immediately. Mounts 6 and 8 still out.
0038 Passed one of our destroyers abeam to port. Lull in
firing enabled our men to hear survivors shouting for
help. Some men in the water using flashlights.
Small electric fire reported in compartment C-303L.
Repair 4 sent to investigate fire, also in Mount 8.
Changed course to 290° T.
0040 Changed course to 285°T, and speed to 26 knots.
0040-10 Main battery firing on target close to Savo Island,
fourteenth salvo, range 14,100. Spot D-300.
0041 Small fire in C-303L extinguished.
SG radar reported inoperative, gyros out.
0041-10 Fifteenth salvo, range 15,200. No spot D-500
applied.
0042-05 Turret three firing on Target astern set fire to
planes.
Sixteenth salvo, range 15,500. No spot.
0043 Salvo blew two planes overboard and extinguished most
of the fires started. Range 15,500. Spot NC.
Suspected hit received. Soundings taken on all flood
boards.
Repair parties 3 and 4 sent to scene of fire on stern.
0043-15 Eighteenth salvo, range 15,800. No spot.
0043-40 Nineteenth salvo, range 16,100. Spot D-200.
0045 Main battery ceased firing. Target astern exploded and
lost on radar screen.
0046 SG radar in commission again.
0047 Fire extinguished in vicinity of planes.
Main battery reported difficulty getting ranges and
requested secondary battery directors to track. Radars
in secondary directors 1 and 4 out, 2 and 3 doubtful.
Radar plot reported ships bearing 070° R, 5,800 yards.
One or two previous reports received at 7,000 yards,
but overlooked in Conn while directing fire control to
fire on target bearing 112° R.
0048 Enemy searchlights turned on SOUTH DAKOTA by second
ship of enemy column, range about 5,000 yards, slightly
forward of the beam. Four searchlights, closely
grouped in pairs, each pair arranged vertically.
WASHINGTON opened fire on leading target almost
immediately. Our secondary was delayed firing on
illumination ship until enemy opened fire about 30
seconds after illumination. Lights went out. Shifted
to primary collective, director 3 controlling main
battery. Third ship in enemy column illuminated us as
soon as second ship failed.
Main battery fired two or three salvos on illuminating
ship after light were extinguished. Estimated range of
9,800. Appeared to list, no data available, but
believed sunk, no target on radar screen. Large clouds
of black smoke issuing from leader; steam, fire seen
later. PRESTON and WALKE told to retire. No
acknowledgements heard.
0049 First hits sustained. (?) Probably 1.1" clipping room
in foremast structure.
Increased speed to 27 knots.
WASHINGTON asked "Are you alright", replied "Everything
seems okay".
0050 More hits felt, unable to locate them.
0051 Main battery director 2 radar ranging, solution on
target, range 6,500 yards. Main battery firing on
third ship in column, enemy course opposite to our own.
0053 Three enemy ships reported coming out of Savo Island.
Estimated range 11,000 yards.
Enemy hitting us, chiefly in foremast structure.
0055 Director 1 unable to train forward of 040°R, probably
shell hits.
Sky control designated target.
0056 Shell hit in 1.1" clipping room. Crew of Quad 1
killed, fires started in 1.1" clipping room. Flash
down ammunition hoist to engineering passageway set two
life jackets on fire. Some ammunition went off. Fire
fought by men present. Shell hit and detonation RDF2
loop.
0057 Slowed to 26 knots, searching for signs of WASHINGTON.
Secondary battery still firing on enemy ships.
Enemy hits in vicinity of radar plot. Shell through
radar plot immediately after this killed Ensign
Canfield. Steam line ruptured just outside of radar
plot by 6-inch shell which penetrated into radar plot
on port side and demolished it. Another shell very
near same place immediately followed.
Some confusion outside of Batt. TWO, three shells just
went through that space, men killed, some wounded,
several scalded by steam from steam whistle and siren
line.
Quieted down, and word sent for repair parties to
extinguish fires in RDF 2, and sent first aid for
wounded. Ladders damaged, access difficult. Life
jackets on deck in Batt. TWO catching fire.
0100 Secondary directors 1 and 3 tracking target.
Director 1 controlling mount 1 star-shell spread.
Two hits felt below decks.
Speed increased to 27 knots.
0102 Searchlight illumination from abaft beam, (?).
Sky control out. S.B. director 1 hit and out of
commission.
Engines ordered full speed.
Radio antennae shot away, shifted to others.
0104 More hits felt. Secondary battery still firing.
No communication with sky control.
Shell hit, glancing off Mount 5, through signal
storeroom, across the superstructure, into the after
end of Mount 4.
Shell did not explode, later found on deck, 8-inch
disposed of by throwing overboard.
0105 More hits felt. Power to Sky 1 secured.
Main radio directed to shift control 6390 kcs to
bridge.
Call to WASHINGTON useless. Antennae out
0108 Ceased firing. No targets, no fire from enemy.
WASHINGTON not in sight, no communication by TBS.
Later investigation showed all forward antennae shot
down.
0110 Engagement broken off, proceeding at full speed on
course 235°T. Ship's repair parties and personnel not
essential at damaged stations fighting fires, caring
for the wounded and estimating damage done.
Observed splashes on wake, 1000 yards astern. No enemy
ships observed firing. Possibly one of those left
burning.
0115 Attempting to raise WASHINGTON on 2620 kcs. All
efforts hopeless until antennae cleared.
0120 Set listening watch on 2280, 2620, 4205, 6390 kcs.
0124 Changed course to 215°T.
Three fires observed astern at scene of battle.
0130 Large explosion observed astern, no estimate of range
made at the time.
0155 All fires reported extinguished.
0213 Communication with WASHINGTON on 2620 kcs. answered
then observed radio silence.
4. Enemy forces.
(a) The number of enemy ships involved in this action totals
between fifteen and eighteen. Definite identification as to types is
not possible. Officers and petty officers considered best qualified
were too busy correcting casualties and power failures. Information
from sky control is denied us in that both officers at that station
were killed. A break-down of statements by lookouts and others about
the deck leads to the following estimates.
(1) Enemy group #1 - Leading ship, large, presumed to be
a heavy cruiser and identified by
at least three independent observers
as a battleship. Two trailing ships,
smaller in size, identified as light
cruisers, possible heavy.
(2) Enemy group 2 - Eight destroyers, close to shore of
Savo Island. Eight groups firing
were definitely accounted for. High
rate of fire fits identity of destroyers.
(3) Enemy group 3 - Column of four ships identified by
radar personnel. Leading ship much
larger than the others. One obser-
ver noticed ?collar" around a single
stack, tentatively identified it
as an ISE or FUSO. Second and third
consistent identification of last
ship in column, somewhat smaller,
might have been a light cruiser.
(4) Enemy group 4 - Column of three ships reported by
radar plot personnel, rounding Savo
Island toward end of engagement.
Statements not positive. Lookouts
inclined to believe they saw some
transports.
(b) During the afternoon proceeding the engagement, Japanese
voice transmissions were heard on 2675. This is believed an
aircraft frequency since it was most active during reported
enemy air operations. At about 2130 considerable Japanese code
heard in the radio spectrum between 2,000 - 4,000 kcs. No
record were kept, but believed to be inter-base communications.
At 2245 picked up Jap voice transmissions over a band 2070 -
2080 kilocycles. About thirteen different transmitters observed.
Signals generally all strong. Some of the voices very excited
one thought to be feminine. Several operators thought to be
talking very rapidly, making sounds like "ka-ki-ka-ga" reported
irregularly, presumed to be voice modulation to represent our
"dah-dit-dah" morse code transmission. One operator definitely
read numbers being sent this way. Frequency stability of trans-
mitters good, modulation I all cases only fair. Indications
that all transmitters were not crystal controlled.
Control station probably on shore has best signal, modulation, and
enunciation, least excited of all. As soon as we opened fire this
circuit was jammed with many voices, excited. Towards the end of
the engagement the number of voices decreased and none heard after
the engagement was broken off. At one time it was believed an effort
was made to jam our 3785 but this was not successful and only
lasted a few seconds at a time between our transmissions. Some
English words were used, but marked with a Japanese accent and turned
to Japanese towards the end of each transmission.
(c) There is no positive evidence that at any time during the
engagement did the enemy resort to smoke or camouflage. The presence
of the destroyers close to Savo Island was a natural employment of
dark background. Whether this was premeditated or accidental cannot
bedetermined. It may be that this destroyer group was sent around
the western side of the island when we first opened fire on the
leading ships at 16,000 yards. The second group engaged, coming
from around the western end of the island may have been an effort
to catch us from the rear had this task force turned north to close
the force to the northward of Savo Island.
(d) Enclosure B is a diagram showing the number and caliber of
hits made by the enemy on the SOUTH DAKOTA. In general the enemy
gunfire seemed very ineffective. Special note should be made as to
the poor quality of the ammunition employed. Only one hit, on RDF2
loop, of three possible explosions was of a high order of detonation.
Fragmentation of projectiles was chiefly due to impact rather than
explosion. The damage caused by enemy hits was very small compared
with what we would expect from high order explosives. Most
projectiles passed right through the ships structure. In one case an
eight inch shell penetrated the foundations and center column of
number I secondary director, two ready service boxes, and two
bulkwarks without exploding. In another case an eight inch shell
glanced off number 5 mount, pierced bulkheads from starboard to port
within the foremast structure on the second superstructure deck hit
the after side of number 4 mount and was found on deck. This shell
was thrown overboard as soon as discovered. There are many other
cases of similar penetration without explosion for six inch and eight
inch shells. A high rate of fire was attained by enemy destroyers
which appeared to be directed at destroyers. A hail of shells equal
in density to that which can be laid down by our secondary battery
was observed to fall ahead of the WASHINGTON when our destroyers were
hit. The enemy gunfire during then first phase was inaccurate in that
very few shorts were observed and many overs were reported. During
the second phase the number of high hits obtained on the foremast
structure indicates that the enemy gun range was in error on the high
side.
(e) Every enemy ship brought under fire was hit. The first
group of three ships was hit on the first salvos both from the
WASHINGTON and the SOUTH DAKOTA. One heavy cruiser, or battleship,
in this group was sunk, by the WASHINGTON. The second ship in
column, a heavy cruiser or possibly a light cruiser, was sunk by
the SOUTH DAKOTA. The third ship, probably a light cruiser, was
hit by the SOUTH DAKOTA first salvo and when last seen was still
burning. The eight destroyers close up to Savo Island were under
fire by the secondary batteries. Two of these ships, the extreme
left hand one and the extreme right hand on were quickly on fire.
The right hand ship was seen to explode and is believed sunk. Some
observers report at least two other of these on fire, but a
reasonable doubt exists in that only the extreme left hand ship was
definitely on fire when last observed. The column of four ships
which illuminated the SOUTH DAKOTA sustained heavy casualties. The
leading ship, presumed to be a battleship, was seriously damaged and
undoubtedly set on fire. It may be that this ship fired its last
gesture salvo at the SOUTH DAKOTA which scored a fourteen inch hit
on the barbette of turret III at the end of the action. The second
ship in column was definitely sunk, reported exploding in two. The
third ship in column was set on fire. The fourth ship in column is
doubtful. No reliable evidence is available as to damages inflicted.
5. Own forces.
Our forces were composed of units already described in section
1 of this report. Communications were by radio, TBS primary, 6390
kcs secondary and 2620 kcs alternate. Until battle damage caused
a temporary failure in communications, all communications were
satisfactory. No report of enemy radar was made by the radio
operator specifically assigned to search with an ARC-1 search
receiver. Enemy frequencies were searched with results enumerated
under section 4 of this report. Copies of TBS, search, and Cactus
control circuit, are appended as enclosure C. No smoke or
camouflage was used by our force. Our gunnery was effective as
indicated by results enumerated in section4 above. Amplification
of some of these points follows.
(a) Gunnery material failures were very few in number. All
equipment stood up well under gunfire and hits were secured on the
first salvo in almost every case. The most serious casualty was
early loss of power due to failures at switchboards in the
engineering spaces. This loss of power occurred repeatedly in the
main battery director. Power failures and ship maneuvers due to the
restricted sea room, necessitated an exceedingly large number of
control shifts, fourteen were counted. Because of the intensive
training in this particular type of procedure all shifts were made
expeditiously and correctly. Fire discipline was excellent.
Casualties were handled correctly, promptly, and efficiently. The
problem of communication during action awaits a satisfactory solution.
The number of reports coming to the fire control tower is enormous.
Talkers have a tendency to try to outshout each other in the belief
that their information is of utmost importance. This noise might be
eliminated by having the talker getting the fire control officers
attention by touching him in the shoulder then delivering the
information when the officer is ready to listen. This may eliminate
confusion resulting from several talkers attempting to deliver
information simultaneously.
(b) Ammunition expended during the action is listed:
16"/45 fired 115 rounds
5"/38 fired 305 rounds anti-aircraft,
83 rounds illuminating.
40 mm. fired 352 rounds. damaged by enemy gunfire.
1.1"/75 fired 600 rounds, damaged by enemy gunfire.
20 mm. fired 1950 rounds, damaged by enemy gunfire.
(c) Radar fire control was used throughout the engagement. Main
battery director II radar was in operation throughout the action
except for power failures which required restarting. Main battery
director I radar functioned properly until disabled by enemy hits.
Radar ranging and spotting was perfect. Opening salvos were
hitting. No difficulty was experienced in identifying our splashes
with respect to the target. On the opening salvo the radar operator
identified three targets, our splashes and the splashes made by
the WASHINGTON on her target. At no time during the action were
spots greater than pattern size needed or applied. The longest
range used during the engagement was 18,000 yards, but it is
believed that with real ships as targets radar spotting is reliable
at extreme ranges assuming that both target and splashes are above
the radars horizon. Training in radar ranging and spotting cannot
be over-emphasized, it is the only effective means of controlling
fire at night. Secondary battery radars performed equally as well
until deranged by enemy hits on antennae, and associated fittings.
(d) Pertinent comments.
(1) Engineering.
Power was lost on all navigational and fire control
circuits when the main power circuits breakers on the IC switchboard
tripped due to short circuits caused by enemy gunfire. It is
considered highly desirable to segregate the IC bus and the restricted
FC bus on the IC switchboard. This alteration would require
installation of a bank of single phase 440/117 volt, 30 KW
transformers with control equipment.
The ship's service telephone switchboard became badly
jammed due to destruction of type B telephones in areas exposed to
gun blast. It is recommended that such exposed telephones be
replaced with type C telephones.
A short circuit on the feeder cable energizing number 4
secondary battery director caused on overload. The power panel
AQB circuit breaker was looked in. The overload was thereby
transmitted to No. 4 switchboard causing No. 7 generator ACB breaker
to open with consequent loss of one half of the power on the
afterpart of the ship, including normal supply to 5-inch mounts
6 and 8, and alternate supply to turret III. No. 4 5-inch director
and mounts 6 and 8 were shifted to alternate power supply, causing
loss of power supply from No. 3 distribution board, including all
power on the after part of the ship. These casualties would have
been avoided had the AQB breaker to No. 4 5-inch director not been
locked in. It is recommended that in the future AQB breakers
should not be locked on.
(2) Medical.
The medical department activity proceeded according to
preconceived plans with remarkably little deviation. Officers and men
promptly and efficiently rendered first aid. The locations of
wounded were promptly reported and corpsman were dispatched to the
scenes to supervise their treatment and evacuation.
The wardroom had not been damaged and was light tight. It
was designated as the casualty collecting station and illumination
was provided by battle lanterns. Men not actively engaged were
supplied with stretchers and they brought in the wounded. Each case
was quickly examined and any necessary hemostasis, dressing, or
sedation was there accomplished. The more seriously wounded were
evacuated to the sickbay where intensive treatment for shock was
initiated. A search was then made in all damaged areas for any
wounded who might have been overlooked. The less seriously wounded
were retained in the wardroom under observation and later were
removed to a compartment near the sickbay. Minor injuries were
treated as they were found and slightly wounded were promptly
returned to their battle stations.
The hospital corpsman stationed in the upper part of the
foremast structure had been seriously wounded. Three corpsman sent
up there could not get through because of fires and Z-closures.
As soon as fires were under control the wounded on 07, 08 and 09
levels were evacuated through there was still no access to Sky Control
where many wounded had been reported. It was ascertained however,
that those wounded had received morphine syrette injections and that
all bleeding had been stopped. As soon as the jammed hatch to Sky
Control was freed a medical officer attended them until daylight
made possible the lowering of wounded by line and canvas stretchers.
The seriously wounded exhibited extreme degrees of surgical
shock. Four soon died in spite of energetic treatment and another
reacted only after several days and after having had much plasma and
four blood transfusions. One case of extensive abdominal visceral
injury died on the operating table. However, a case of ruptured
coecum in which operation was delayed some twelve hours because of
shock is apparently recovering.
Removal of the dead was slow and difficult, but all were
collected on the main deck, identified, and given a Christian burial
at sea.
The quiet uncomplaining and self sacrificing conduct of the
wounded was most impressive. There was no groaning or screaming.
One survivor of a recent naval disaster, who was seriously wounded,
became excited and developed an acute psychosis which was a
contributory cause of death. Only one case of hysteria was noted
and this was a quite conversation type. The remarkable absence of
psychic upset justifies the past policy of this ship in the elimination
of temperamentally unfit personnel.
(e) Summary of damage.
A detailed enumeration of damage is attached as enclosure D,
Photographs showing various damage with short description are attached
as enclosure E. Profile diagram of ship showing location of various
hits sustained is attached as enclosure B.
There were no serious fires during or following the action.
In general, fires were small and quickly extinguished, none spread
beyond the immediate vicinity of ignition. In view of the number
of hits and splinters, this is attributed to:
(1) Previous removal of paint and linoleum.
(2) General removal of mattresses from bunks above the
waterline and use of flame retardant bedding bags.
(3) Use of flame retardant canvas throughout the ship.
(4) Clothing, paper forms, etc. kept behind metal.
(5) Failure of enemy shells to explode, and if rare
explosions occurred, they were of low order.
(6) Smooth, rapid, and efficient functioning of repair parties.
Following is a list of fires which occurred:
1. Passage B-319T. Fire reported direct to Repair II as being
in 5" handling room. Passage was full of smoke with a red
glow. Investigation revealed two burning life jackets ignited
apparently by blast through ammunition hoist from clipping
room, B-0502M, which had an 8" shell pass through it with result-
ing explosion of 1.1" clips and fire.
Passage was sprayed with fog nozzle. When jackets were dis-
covered, they were extinguished with CO2.
This was a small fire, but potentially the most dangerous we
has as it entered into the armored spaces.
2. Airplane fire. Reported to Damaged Control as planes on fire.
Decontamination party under the overhang of turret #3, Repair
4, and Repair 4A all investigated and helped extinguish.
Apparently one salvo from turret #3 ignited the planes, the
next salvo blew two planes overboard and pretty well extin-
guished the fire in the third plane.
3. Life rafts under starboard catapult. Slightly later than
plane fire and apparently a by-product of it. Easily ex-
tinguished. Repair 4.
4. 40mm quads. 8 & 9. Slightly later than above and also by-
product of plane fire. Canvas cover and canvas ammunition
cover. Easily extinguished. Repair 4, Repair 4A.
5. B-206L. Passage between pay office and supply office. Fire
reported to Damage Control. There was a fragment that came
into this area from shell hole in fuel oil and ballast tank
beneath it. Penetration of stationary locker and clothing
locker caused small smoldering fire. Both Repair 2 and 3
worked on this fire. It was easily extinguished, but was
difficult to locate small burning fragments.
6. 40mm quad.#2. Repair 1. Canvas smoldering from splinters
extinguished by water.
7. 5" loading machine. Repair 1. Canvas smoldering from splin-
ters extinguished by hand.
8. #1 secondary battery director. Lifejackets and cable extin-
guished by Repair 1. CO2 and hose.
9. Clipping room, B-0502M. Repair 1. Fire was out when repair
party arrived. After shell passed through this clipping room,
several 1.1" clips exploded. Powder was burning in forward
port corner and life jackets of deceased and wounded men burn-
ing. JACOSEVICH, Stephen, S2c, entered clipping room with CO2
and extinguished the fire.
10. Radio direction finder room. Repair 1, 4 and decontamination.
This was our worst fire , it was directly under Batt. II where
men were trapped by the whistle line being carried away. The
nearest fire plug on the second superstructure had been hit
and broken. It was necessary to rig a hose from the first
superstructure and main deck for water. The superstructure
was filled with dead and wounded, ladders were carried away.
Also the passages were filled with machine gun crews who had
taken cover there on orders prior to firing. These men were
anxious and willing to help but a trained party of fire fight-
ers would start up and be lost in the crowd before reaching
the sixth level. The fire was largely electrical but included
one bedding bag and life jacket of a man who was sleeping at
his general quarters station. CO2 was not effective prior to
arrival of water. After water was obtained, fire was quickly
extinguished. CO2 put out electrical fire. Fire did not
spread outside of radio direction finder room.
11. Radar Plot. Repair 1 and 4. This fire was largely electrical
put out by same parties. Fire did not spread outside of Radar
plot.
12. Stack covers, base of stack. Repair 1 and 4. CO2 by Repair 1
would not put out this canvas but extinguished flames enough
to double ignited portion of canvas underneath until Repair 4
arrived with hose.
Paint on stock did not ignite.
13. #2 quad. 4omm. Repair 1. Repair 1 easily extinguished the
canvas and ammunition covers with water and hands.
14. A-206L. Bedding bag extinguished by Repair 4A. Splinter
shield from hit in starboard side quickly extinguished.
15. A-207L. Repair 4A. Clothes in 2 lockers, 1 bedding bag in
peacoat locker ignited from splinter from hit in starboard
side. Quickly extinguished.
16. Mount#7. Report received in Damage Control that upper
handling room was on fire. Repair 1 investigated; upper
handling room was found flooded. No fire was found in mount.
A piece of wood from deck was burning outside, also parts of a
life jacket and the mount bloomers. Those were quickly
extinguished. This mount received a direct hit and first
report was probably result.
17. Mount #3. Several reports were received at different times
that mount #3 was on fire. No fire was discovered near this
mount through at each report some small burning fragments
would be found on deck.
18. Starboard flag bag. This fire was extinguished largely by
signal force. Water was carried in helmets from superstruc-
ture after CO2 was not effective.
19. Flag Office. Fire reported to Damage Control. Radar 1 found
no flames but considerable smoke from hot cases.
20. 20mm mount, after starboard wing of bridge. Life jackets was
burning, quickly extinguished by Repair 1A.
21. Main battery radar transmitter room. Life jacket of Lieut(jg)
Krepps, deceased, burning. Extinguished by decontamination
personnel with water from deck in helmet.
22. Bloomers, Turret III ignited by hit in barbette. Extinguished
by decontamination party.
23. Numerous small fires on both first and second superstructure
decks on both sides mainly burring pieces of life jackets.
These re-occurred several times. Water would quickly extin-
guish but some small piece would flame up again.
The final damage from fire was negligible.
STABILITY
During the action, the ship listed very gradually about
3/4° to starboard. This list was corrected by the shifting of
fuel oil.
No voids were flooded.
All holes in the shell plating above the waterline were
plugged with mattresses, pillows, clothing, etc. Wooden plugs
were driven into smaller holes. After daylight following the
action, welding of plates over accessible holes was started and
continued until rough weather prevented further work. Electric
portable drain pumps were rigged and the water entering the hull
was at all times under control. Water accumulating from ruptured
lines in the wounded were gathered and treated, by forming a bucket
brigade from men in the decontamination party. Soundings were
promptly received from all stations when requested during the
action. Following the action, repair parties cleared wreckage,
acted as stretcher bearers and made a careful check as to the
extent of damage.
(f) Casualties to personnel.
The Senior Medical Officer's report to the Chief of the
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, copy of which is attached as
Enclosure F, lists in detail all casualties.
The first aid facilities were adequate and the performance
of non-medical personnel was very gratifying. All personnel,
medical and non-medical, had been carefully indoctrinated, by
instruction rather than drill, as to what could be expected. There
was little confusion and minimum of direction was required.
6. Commendations.
Aboard met to consider recommendations for awards and
commendations and rendered the following:-
Recommended for a Navy Cross:
Commander A.E. Uehlinger, U.S. Navy.
For extraordinary heroism in action above the
call of duty. During the night engagement with
Japanese naval units off Savo Island on November 15,
1942, apparently faced with certain death by
scalding, burning, and suffocation, he refused
to abandon his station. His coolness and fear-
lessness in the face of great danger steadied
the remaining personnel to such an extent that
Batt II remained efficiently manned and ready
for action throughout the battle.
Hodgen Othello Patrick, 341-91-03, Y1c, USN.
For extraordinary heroism in action above the
call of duty as talker in Sky Forward, during
the night engagement with Japanese naval units
off Savo Island on November 15, 1942. Although
severely wounded himself, he took charge in
Sky Control after all officers had been killed,
kept the Commanding Officer informed of the
existing situation on his station, cared for
the wounded and generally acted with good
judgement and intrepidity until relieved
several hours later.
Recommended for a Silver Star Medal:
Commander I. W. Gorton, (SC), U.S.N.
For distinguished service in action, Commander
I. W. Gorton, U.S.N., when his station was
badly damaged by enemy fire, remained in the
face of what was apparently certain death,
rendering assistance to the wounded, and keeping
the Executive Officer informed as to the extent
of damage. His calm and courageous action
served as an inspiration to the men under him,
helping rake possible the continued operations
of Batt. II.
James Monroe Boone, C.B.M., U.S.N. - 273-75-57
For gallantry and intrepidity in action as a
member of a topside repair party on the U.S.S.
SOUTH DAKOTA in the night action with Japanese
naval units off Savo Island on November 15, 1942.
Chief boatswains mate Boone, USN., by his
thorough knowledge, fearlessness, leadership
and devotion to duty made possible the rapid
control of all topside fires.
ANDERSON, Fred Allen S2c 634-11-33 V6, USNR
GATLIEFF, David Bruce RM3c 295-73-95 USN
JONES, Merle Jerome SM2c 295-78-74 USN
KEJWAN, Michael William Y1c 700-07-71 V6, USNR
PAGE, William Tom S1c 250-57-22 USN
ROBERTSON, Henry Matthews QM3c 402-97-63 01, USNR
RYAN, Robert James S2c 300-76-10 USN
WENKE, Bernard James S2c 608-08-20 V6, USNR
For courage and calm action over and above the
line of duty during the night engagement with
Japanese naval units off Savo Island on November
15, 1942, Fred Allen Anderson, S2c, USNR, David
Bruce Gatlieff, RM3c, USN, Merle Jerome Jones,
SM3c, USN, Michael William Kejwan, Y1c, USNR,
William Tom Page, S1c, USN, Henry Matthews
Robertson, QM3c, USNR, Robert James Ryan,
S2c, USN, and Bernard James Wenke, S2c, USNR.
Stationed in Batt II when the surrounding
area was hit and believing that unless the
station was immediately abandoned that curtain
death by scalding, burning and suffocation was
only a matter of a few minutes, they nevertheless
calmly remained at their duties and kept the
station ready for action until relieved from
general quarters, thereby proving themselves a
credit to their ship, the Navy, and the country
they are privileged to serve.
DELANEY, Joseph F3c 650-34-18 USNR
KNAAK, Stanley Roy F1c 633-88-99 USNR
JAROSEVICH, Stephen S2c 650-33-46 USNR
For courageous action over and above line of duty
during the night engagement with Japanese naval
units off Savo Island on November 15,1942, Joseph
Delaney, F3c, USNR, Stephen Jarosevich, S2c, USNR,
and Stanley Roy Knaak, F1c, USNR, by their coolness,
quick thinking and positive actions in extinguishing
a fire caused by a direct hit in the forward 1.1"
ammunition clipping room, the prevented a serious
explosion with the loss of many lives and
have proved themselves to be a credit to
their ship, the Navy, and the country they
are privileged to serve.
ROGERS, John Raymond S2c 612-15-56 USNR
For distinguished service in and above the line
of duty during the night engagement with Japanese
naval units off Savo Island on November 15, 1942.
Wounded himself, with dead and dying around him,
he acted with gallantry and cool courage, caring
for the wounded and obtaining medical assistance
until long after the action had ceased.
7. Lessons learned and recommendations.
(a) Gunnery.
In view of the natural difficulties encountered
during night action in restricted waters including gun flash,
frequent changes in the fire control set up imposed by multiplicity
of targets and radical ship maneuvers to avoid torpedoes, noise and
shock of gun fire and hits, power failures and poor visibility
through conning tower and fire control tower slits, the problem of
target designation and target selection was made extremely difficult.
The turrets were able to keep trained om the
targets at all times up to their limit of train in spite of the rapid
maneuver of the ship. At one time, during a lull, fire control
directors were used to search for the WASHINGTON in order to orient
ourselves with her and avoid opening fire on her. Aircraft flares
might have helped in getting a better visual knowledge of the
situation, but general illumination is not considered to be desirable
in view of the advantage we possess in our radar. An officer stationed
aloft with direct communication to the Gunnery Officer would have
been a great aid in designating new targets for the main battery, and
in clarifying the tactical situation. Sky control officers were fully
occupied in the control of the five inch battery up until the time
that station was hit and the control officers killed.
Radar plot was effective until that station was
destroyed. A ships track and target position tracks were maintained
in radar plot and the information was relayed to Conn, chart house
and fire control. This was, of course, of inestimable value to
the Gunnery Officer, but with all the distractions enumerated
above, the application of the information in the latter stages
of the engagement was particularly difficult. It is considered
absolutely essential for engagements of this type, many of which
may be expected in the future, that plan position indicators be
installed in flag plot, conning tower and fire control tower. The
Admiral, the Captain and the Gunnery Officer would then be able to
visualize the entire set-up at all times permitting new targets to
be selected in advance. A tremendous volume of oral communications,
with the possibility of errors in trans mission, would be eliminated.
Radar ranging and spotted are reliable, accurate and ef-
fective. Main battery director radars were reduced in efficiency
when hand train was resorted to . It cannot be too strongly empha-
sized that reliance and confidence must be placed in radars for
night action. Radar should be the primary method of control. Illum-
ination should be used only as a last resort in the event radar is
disabled. The use of artificial targets during training periods
fails to develop the trust and confidence necessary. During train-
ing, large pips obtained on splashes obliterate the small target
pip. When firing at a hip, this is not true. There was never any
doubt in the radar operators' mind as to the location of our
splashes with respect to the target. A well trained operator can
spot accurately without the use of spotting marker strips on the
face of the radar screen. The width of the notch automatically gives
him an accurate measure.
During the action, at least three salvos were fired from
director three in the fire control tower with fire control in aux-
iliary. Difficulty was had in getting ranges from other stations.
Due to the ease and rapidity with which this director can be used
and its comparative invulnerability, it is particularly well adapt-
ed to night firing. However, no means are available in the fire
control tower to obtain independent ranges. It is strongly desired
that a fire control radar be installed on this director. A small
antennae could easily be mounted on the spotting glass.
It is imperative that IFF be installed in all our ships.
Such installation during this action would have been of inestim-
able value. With a larger number of our ships engaged, friendly
identification by IFF should operate at the radio frequency employ-
ed by FC and FD radars so that fire control radar can distinguish
between friendly and enemy targets. The delay incident to relaying
the required information from radar plot may prove costly.
No specific comments are included here concerning the 5"
battery. This battery was effectively and efficiently handled,
opening fire quickly and maintaining rapid and accurate fire on
selected targets. Starshell illumination was not used during the
last part of the second phase. Sky forward was put out of commis-
sion and control effectively taken over by secondary battery plot.
Due to the fact that most of the sky forward control officers and
men were killed, no specific discussion can be attempted. Machine
guns were not used.
THE LESSONS LEARED MAY BE SUMMARIZED AS FOLLOWS:
1. Target designation:-
As was anticipated, with only two simple night training
practices since commissioning, the fighting of a night engage-
ment presented many difficulties in fire control, target desig-
nation and target identification. An officer with direct com-
munication should be stationed aloft to aid the Gunnery Officer
in target designation for the main battery. The present partial
installation of target designation for the main battery is not
considered to be of any value for night engagements.
2. Target identification:- IFF should be installed in all
ships without delay.
3. Fire control installations:-
Considered excellent and flexible. Power failures present-
ed numerous difficulties which delayed the main battery in getting
into action at the beginning of the last phase.
4. Ship maneuvers:-
Interfered to some extent with fire control, but did not
seriously reduce effective gun fire.
5. Search radar:-
Was extremely effective prior to and during the engage-
ment until radar plot was destroyed. The installation of a PPI
in flag conn, ship conn and fire control is considered to be
vitally important.
6. Fire control radar:-
Was of inestimable value eliminating the necessity for
illumination and providing 100% effective spots reliable at any
range encountered. It is believed that accurate spots can be ob-
tained at any range at which the target pip can be seen on the
screen. It is considered essential that a fire control radar be
installed on director three.
7. Armor:-
Fire control and conning tower have definitely proven
their worth. Further agitation for the removal of this weight is
definitely suspended. Control stations behind this armor should
be used much more frequently. Too much stress in the past has
been laid on the space restrictions at these stations. Had these
stations not been utilized during this engagement, control and
conn personnel would probably have been largely destroyed.
8. Blindness:-
Due to gun flash can be reduced by the installation of
main battery firing buzzers in ship's conn and flag conn.
(b) Navigation.
Remarks under gunnery regarding tactics, IFF, blindness,
armor, target designation, and super-abundance of unimportant
communications are repeated. The following additional remarks
should be considered:
The value of the fighting lights is doubtful. The globes
and light bulbs are easily shattered, rendering the whole
installation useless for the purpose intended. Proper employ-
ment of TBS and IFF will fill the need for proper indentifi-
cation of friendly forces.
Poor visibility made station keeping the most pressing
and engrossing concern of the commanding officer at conn.
Once the order is given to "commence firing" the fire control
officer and the executive officer should decide on most
appropriate targets. This delegation of authority had been
doctrine in the case of air attack. Allocation of certain
functions in the choice of targets must be part of ship's
doctrine to relieve the commanding officer of matters not
pertaining directly to his placing the ship in the most favor-
able position with respect to our own and enemy forces. The
value of a radar PPI in the conning tower under these cir-
cumstances is immeasurable.
The difficulty of making up this report is due to a
lack of adequate records, and the destruction of records made
in radar plot and Batt. 3. In the future, additional observers
will be used.
(c) Hull.
The following observations are considered worthy of
special mention:
(1) All time spent in the removal of paint and lin-
oleum returns 1,000 percent dividends.
(2) Flame retardant bedding bags are a good investment.
(3) Rescue breathing apparatus is effective only about
twenty-five minutes instead of the estimated hour.
(4) Kapok life jackets, even though flames retarded as
ours, were are the greatest source of fire hazard.
Smoldering jackets should be thrown over the side.
(5) Machine gun crews and other surplus personnel
should not be sent under cover, in the superstruc-
ture or passageways, where damage may be expected
to result in blocking repair parties proceeding
to scenes of fire or damage.
(6) Water should be kept up to fire plugs on all decks
as was done on this ship. The fire main was divi-
ded into four sections and no loss pressure oc-
curred with the loss of plugs or risers.
(d) Communications.
The duplication of radio direction finders in the 100
to 1500 kilocycle band is unnecessary. The installation of a
high frequency direction finder was requested of and refused
by the Bureau of Ships. Had this ship been equipped with a
radio direction finder to cover the 2,000-3,000 kcs. band,
Japanese transmissions could have been located much earlier
and would have been utilized to our advantage. The value of
a Japanese interpreter under these circumstances, as well as
during the action on October 26th, should not be disregarded.
The enemy utilizes much voice and coming as it does just prior
to action much valuable information is denied our forces.
There may be a real use for our loyal Japanese speaking people.
One such interpreter assigned to a ship in a task force would
be of great help.
TBS communications are stressed more and more as a primary
means of communication between ships in the same task force.
Provisions should be made to carry a standby TBS transmitter
which can be immediately put into service when the others fails.
The additional weight and wiring could be easily compensated by
the removal of one of the other transmitters so infrequently
used under prevailing conditions of radio silence.
Information regarding enemy frequencies, as listed in
PAC70, is no longer considered correct. Corrections should be
made and information should be disseminated to the fighting
forces as rapidly as possible. This information, together with
the services of a Japanese interpreter, should prove of great
value in every engagement with the enemy.
As soon as practicable one complete set of spare modulation,
indicator, receiver, etc. units should be made available for
each type of fire control radar equipment carried on board. The
ease with which these units can be replaced will reduce to a
minimum the ineffective periods when casualties occur in these
fire control installations.
The trust and faith in the search radar equipment is
amazing. After this ship lost both SG and SC equipment, the
psychological effect on the officers and crew was most
depressing. The absence of this gear gave all hands a feeling
of being blindfolded. Our inability to detect approaching
enemy planes and surface ships gave all hands a most helpless
feeling which was alleviated, in part only, by inclement weather
preventing the enemy from seeing us during our retirement.
T.L. GATCH.
Copies: Cominch, U.S. Fleet (2) Advance.
Cincpac (2) Advance.
Comsopac (5) Advance.
U.S.S. WASHINGTON (2)
U.S.S. NORTH CAROLINA (2)
COMBATSHIPS, Pacfor. (2)
Six - with original.
Combatdiv 4 (6)
U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA.
Compilation of radio logs:
T B S LOG________________________________________________________
___________________________TRANSMISSION______________Zone -12___TIME__
Bestard off to DE Gregorio for G.Q. 2100
Mike V William IX on receipt, turn ZED George.
Roger V Rodney
Butch V 16 16 Coming right astern.
16 V 33 Any particular orders.
33 V 16 Natural order.
Roger V 33
79 V 16 Take second section.
V 79 Wilco
16 V William Take distance 3000 acknowledge.
Roger V 16
Butch V 16 Stay well closed up going in.
16 V William Open out to 5000 and close your boys up.
V 16 Wilco
Andy V William IX on receipt white prep.
Roger V Rodney
Butch V 16 Close up.
Butch V William Take white hypo until you change your position
you are blocking our fire.
97 V 79 Aren't you 72.
97 & 33 V 79 I am easing into 3.
Roger V 97 & 33
Butch V William IX white ZED- - -16 Acknowledge.
Roger V 16
Butch V William IX_____white ZED- -16 Acknowledge.
Roger V 16
Butch V 16 Close into 300.
Andy V William IX receipt white ZED Rodney acknowledge.
Roger V Rodney
William V 33 Sopous Jig Easy to 080 8700.
V William Understood.
Rodney V William Did you give last contact.
William V Rodney Rodney Did not give last contact 33 gave last
contact bearing 172 going away.
Roger V William
William V 33 Sopous Jig to Tack 183 Tack 8300.
Roger V William
Bearing 140 1500 William
Understood William
William V 33 060 R. 8400 going left.
Roger V William
William V 33 Plane previously reported is friendly.
Roger V William
Mike V William IX 16 guide X From Van Red OSO---16 acknowledge.
Roger V 16
Mike V William IX___16 guide X From Van Red OSO---16 ask.
Mike V William There has been reported enemy CL and enemy
DD's in cove X Vicinity of Savo Island-
16 and Rodney acknowledge.
Roger V Rodney & 16
Lester V Rodney Do you have Cactus 160645.
V Lester Wait.
Rodney V William Affirmative.
Roger V Rodney
Mike V William IX from Van Red ZED Option--16 acknowledge.
Roger V 16
Mike V William IX___From Van Red ZED Option--16 acknowledge.
William V 16 Target on starboard beam seems to be a slight
glow of light on forward end X 16 is passing it
now.
Roger V William
William V 16 Following sent on Cactus con troll:- Two ships
coming through Gordonia.
16 V William We have it.
William V 33 Add to that last report they were heading on a
southeast course.
U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA.
Compilation of radio logs. (Con'd)
T B S LOG________________________________________________________
___________________________TRANSMISSION______________Zone -12___TIME__
Roger V William
Mike V William IX White dog - - -16 acknowledge.
Mike V William IX____White dog- - -16 acknowledge.
Mike V William IX Right from Van Red Baker Option- -16 ack.
Roger V 16
Mike V Willioam IX From Van Red Baker Option- -16 acknowledge.
Roger V 16
William V 16 Starboard life real passed by 16 close aboard.
port hand.
Roger William
William V Rodney Contact green love xray 18300 acknowledge.
V William Understood.
Mike V William IX from Van Red William King- -16 acknowledge.
Mike V William IX_____from Van Red William King.
Roger V 16
William V Rodney Green Love Tare Baker 17000 acknowledge.
Roger V William
Rodney V William You may open fire when you are ready 0011
Wilco V Rodney 0011
Mike V William IX White Zed 16 acknowledge.
Roger V 16
Mike V William IX_____White Zed- - -16 acknowledge.
Roger V 16
Roger V Rodney
William V 16 23° (degrees) starboard we are going to open up.
Roger V William
V 16 Target got around corner of island.
Roger V William
Mike V William IX White Option---16 acknowledge.
Roger V 16
Mike V William IX_____White Option---16 acknowledge.
Roger V 16
William V Rodney What is your red?
V William Wait.
Jasper V Rodney Are you okay?
Rodney V Jasper We are okay.
William V 97 Am okay one hit in fire room.
V William Okay.
Jasper V Rodney What is your red.
Rodney V William Red William Option Dog.
16 & Rodney v William My red is Queen Sail Option.
Butch V William Retire--16 & 97 acknowledge.
Roger V 33 (79 missing).
Butch V William I repeat retire 16 & 97 acknowledge.
(Ship received heavy jolt--) 0048
Rodney V William Are you alright?
William V Rodney Everything seems to be okay.
V William Roger With compliments.
Jasper V Rodney What is your red.
Rodney V Jasper My red is Queen Sail option.
Roger V Rodney
Rodney V William Close us.
Roger V Rodney
Jasper V Rodney Show us your identification lights so we can
follow you.
Jasper V Rodney Answer.
Jasper V Rodney What is your red?
Jasper V Rodney Testing 1 2 3 4 4 3 2 1 Answer.
(I received no answer on the TBS. Main radio got contact with
Jasper on 2620 kcs.)
Secured TBS ordered by Lt-Comdr. Berkley. 0711
U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA.
Compilation of radio logs. (Con'd)
T B S LOG________________________________________________________
___________________________TRANSMISSION_________________ TIME__
GCT
Dease off to Wilson 0848
Nothing heard tuning receiver, just heavy bursts of static 0920
V Cookie Roger. 1054
Did you get that message Cookie? Acknowledge
Affirm
Con V Jigger GA 1055
Jigger V Con 1100
Relay to U ?? (Too much static)
V Con receive you badly please repeat.
Cookie???West of ?? Until..ack.
?? V CAC CON (Reception poor)
U this Con Roger 1102
Cac Con V Roger (That's all sorry).
Con V Baker Tiger is Lee ack.
V Con Roger 1105
B V Con Answer
This is Baker GA
In this correct for your first XMSN I have station Cookie
in west of Gardenia etc. . . . .
Con V Baker Negative I will RPT UH I am station Cookie
and?? West of Gardenia until Lee passes
vicinity to tulip ack.
This Con Roger 1109
Very weak XMSNS ZS05
V Cookie fine hope.
Affirmative Con V Baker Relay 2 ships??? ack.
Binker V Cac Con Roger 1115
Brant V in Can you give me any further particulars of ships,
can you identify.
V Brant Roger wait 1115.5
Binker V Brant As yet Negat GA
Roger V Binker
It is definitely large ship GA (Cookie XMTING very weak)
This is Binker Roger.
Cac Con V Binker GA
Con V Binker ships are definitely warships that's all known at this
time. ACK.
Con Roger 1118
V Brant when last seen ships headed southeast GA
Cookie V Pinker what you sighted may be tiger acknowledge.
V Cookie 1120
CON V Binker ship reported proceeding towards Terry
Binker V Con Roger 1129
Cac Con V Lee believe ?? and Cookie are after me please give
me information you have.
Please report XMSN GA
Lee V Binker your identity established we are not after you ack 1132
Repeat last Signal please.
This is Binker Cookie is not after you. Acknowledge.
Binker V Lee Roger 1132.5
Cookie V Binker did you receive XMSN from Lee.
V Cookie Roger Affirm.
Have established identity of Cookie give me any info you have.
V Control wait. 1135
V Con Reap V Con this station has no info as to your identity GA
Cac Con V Reap e=refer your big boss about Chinglee Chinese
Catchee?
V Control Roger Wait. 1137
V Brant 3 ships went ?? GA 1139
Cookie V Brant did you receive my last XMSN GA
V Cookie Roger
U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA.
Compilation of radio logs. (Con'd)
_________________________________________________________________
___________________________TRANSMISSION_________________ TIME__
GCT
Lee V Pinger GA 1141
This Pinger 3 ships just rounded north of Savo stood 1202
out in channel now turning around headed
west.
Roger V Lee
Cookie V Pinger GA
Pinger V Cookie GA
3 ships just sighted rounding Savo to the north ack.
This is Cookie Roger 1203
Take a bearing on beach
V Cookie Roger 1215
V Lee GA 1219
Stay clear of firing area 1223
V Cac Con Answer 1235
Lee V Con Lee V Con Ans.
This is Lee GA
Lee V Con MSG follows do you have comgen Cactus 140955
1 Do you have Comgen Cactus 140955 ack.
This is Lee wait 1238
Cac Con V We do not have that msg ack
Pt V Con Roger Wait Wait 1245
V Control Ans. 1250
This is Lee GA
Following info as of 1900L 15 miles north Russell island
5 transport dead in water burning
4 damaged and smoking proceeding
slowly nowest several destroyers
proceeding that direction no
further information ack.
This is Lee Roger 1250
Reaper V Cookie
Cookie V Pinger did you get last msg from Lee Cac Con
V Cookie Roger
This is Pinger take station about 10 miles due north of Gardenia ack.
Roger V Cookie Wilco 1258
This is Lee wait 1302
This Lee GA
This is Lee over AGN PRT PSE
This is Lee Roger for your last XMSN 1307
Wilson off to Stewart 1329
This? Motor to boat started firing at us, I think
M.T.V. Ray stop firing at us This is Ray 1400
V Ray Roger 1403
RADIO SUPERVISOR'S LOG.
General Quarters
Usual Frequencies and search watch covered 0350
Jap voices very loud on 2675 kcs.
Channeled to bridge for information 0400
Reconnaissance frequency 3165 kcs. working TFC.
Secured from General Quarters 0410
General Quarters
Usual frequencies and search 0858
U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA.
Compilation of radio logs. (Con'd)
RADIO SUPERVISOR'S LOG. ______________________________________________________________________
___________________________TRANSMISSION_________________ TIME__
GCT
6390 kcs. quiet, not much action on 3785, intercepting urgent
messages on 4435 kcs., urgent TFC on both F skeds, 2620 kcs quiet.
8280 kcs. quiet. Transmitters set on TAJ 393, TBU 500, TAQ 355,
TBK 2620 TBM 6390, with control in local and outlying stations,
TBA 4205, TBA 0810 kcs.
Considerable Jap code, evidently interbase transmission,
throughout two to four thousand KC band. 0932
Continue to receive Jap voice transmissions on 2675 kcs.
Channeled to bridge for information.
Savo island now bearing 102' dist 17½ miles 0942
Receiving new Jap voices on 2080 kcs several stations
this now stronger than those on 2675 kcs and too were
channeled to bridge for information. 1045
Contact reports coming in on 2080 kcs (Cactus Control)
2 ships 1 definitely large ship-these warships-
heading southeast 1117
Increasing activity on 2070-80kcs Jap voices
(This would be an excellent opportunity for a Hi-Freq
direction finder) 1132
Standby to fire on ship starboard 1205
Target speed 21 knots range 16400 yds.
1216 fired first salvo, another. .Two ships stbd. 1216
By close observation of Jap voice transmission on 2080
kcs it was noted that some weaker or more distant voices
joined in transmissions and several of the stronger
stations ceased transmissions altogether 1220
SG Radar reported out, Gyros reported out… 1242
SG Back in operation 1246
Heavy gunfire now.. Antennas out on two receivers
shifted on coaxial board, all receivers OK. 1302
Bridge reports TBS out called for TBM on 6390 kcs,
Radio reports all transmitting antennas out, TBM on 6390 1304
channeled to bridge except for antenna and repair
party instructed to rig whip. 1310
All set on 6390 trying to raise the WASHINGTON 1315
cannot raise the WASHINGTON on 6390 now channeled
control of 2620nto bridge conn. control, calling the
WASHINGTON on CW. William V Rodney, No answer. 1320
Have listening watch for the WASHINGTON on 2280, 2620,
4205, 6390 kcs.
William now answers Rodney, working traffic on 2620 kcs. 1413
All circuits quieted down. No firing since 1315.
Working the WASHINGTON on 2620 kcs.
Jap voices still going on 2080 and 2675 kcs. 1630
Continuing search Japanese aircraft transmissions.
U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA.
Compilation of radio logs. (Con'd)
RADIO SUPERVISOR'S LOG. ______________________________________________________________________
___________________________TRANSMISSION_________________ TIME__
GTC
Jap voices transmissions on 2675 kcs. weak poorly modulated. 1750
Secured from General Quarters. 1850
General Quarters 2312
All frequencies up with search watch.
Received CW transmission from CTF-64 being attacked
by enemy aircraft.
Secured from General Quarters 0020
Add:
Notes on Jap voice transmissions:-
The Jap voice transmissions referred to above appear to be
vwry poorly modulated, and in many instances they used code
transmissions by voice. One station, however, was more power-
ful than the others, with very good modulation, and appeared
to be controlling the circuit.
HULL DAMAGE.
FIREMAIN
The fire main was in four sections with Fire and Flushing pumps
2, 3, 4, and 5 in B-1, B-2, B-3 and B-4 respectively on the line. All
fire plugs had water to them.
A. Section 1.
1. Damage.
(a) A 5' section of 4" riser in B-103L between deck
level of second superstructure and "T" 1' below
overhead of second superstructure shot away and
riddled with shrapnel, cutting off water to fire
plug 02-86-1, 02086-2 and 03-79.
(b) A 4' section of 2 ½" cross connection in B-103L
between "T" and flange 1' below overhead of
second superstructure shot away and riddled with
shrapnel cutting off water to riser cutouts 02-79
and fire plug 03-79.
2. Repairs.
(a) Ran jumper in B-103L from cutout 1-82-2 on first
superstructure to "T" on second superstructure.
(b) Ran jumper from "T" to elbow on second super-
structure.
B. Section 2 - No casualties.
C. Section 3 - No casualties.
D. Section 4.
1. Damage.
(a) One shrapnel hole in 2 ½" line just above fire
plug 2-119-1 in C-303L.
(b) Fire plug 1-132-2 and 1-132-4 shot away on main
deck aft.
2. Repairs.
(a) 2 ½" pipe leading from fire plug 2-119-1 in
C-303L removed at "T" in galley and bottom end
of "T" blanked off decommissioning fire plug,
2-119-1.
(b) Fire plug 1-132-4 blanked off.
(c) Fire plug 2-119-1 removed and used at 1-132-2.
A list of damage follows:
Forward inboard side 3/8" S.T.S. splinter shield of 40 MM quad 1
blown inboard, plating buckled, base of shield broken away from margin
strake of wood deck frame. All ready ammunition racks inside shield
torn and distorted beyond repair. Entire 40 MM quad and fittings
wrecked. Unserviceable. 10 lb. steel deck plating in circular
enclosure 40 40 MM quad 1 badly dished and buckled between
longitudinal and transverse frames. After section of splinter shield
of 40 MM quad 1 blown outboard and aft. Battle telephone box bent and
distorted and torn from blast shield. Unserviceable.
Section of wood deck planking and steel deck approximately 9'
transversal and 15' longitudinal between 72 and 76 starboard 1st
superstructure deck badly dished to a depth of approximately 4".
20 MM gun near locker torn from bulkhead, welded seams broken,
plating distorted. Doors and hinges distorted. Unserviceable.
Access ladder from 1st superstructure deck to Chief of Staff's
cabin torn and distorted beyond repair. Watertight door 02-74-3
torn from hinges, twisted and distorted beyond repair. Hinges torn
out of frame. Hole 3" in diameter on right side forward of frame.
Watertight door 01-70-2 access from 1st superstructure deck to B-
0105A (20 and 40 MM gun repair locker) badly distorted hinges broken,
gasket retainer strip torn. Door unserviceable.
20 MM mount, sector 1 group 4 gun 1, frame 76, 1st superstructure
deck starboard, protection shield braces distorted. Ready service box
for 20 MM ammunition stowage badly torn and distorted. Unserviceable.
Frame and expanded metal cover for hot case net on 5" mount #1
torn and broken, expanded metal blow out and overboard.
Control sprinkling valve 01-79-1. Metal box enclosure covering
valve broken and distorted beyond repair.
Watertight closure cover 1-58 for ventilation and exhaust 3-54.
Hinges broken and distorted. Quick closing device completely broken.
Unserviceable.
Quick closing watertight access door 1-53-1, access from main
deck (COD booth) to A-101L. Quick closing mechanism, dogs, braces and
gears completely broken. Inside protective shield blown overboard.
Unserviceable.
Sector 1, group 2, guns 1, 2 and 3, 3/8" S.T.S. blast shield and
gun installations blown inboard and torn loose from deck fittings.
Welded deck fastenings for above broken loose from deck at base of
shield. Blast shield stiffeners on 20 MM ready service ammunition
box torn loose from shield.
Watertight closure cover 1-51 from vent system 2-51 torn and
distorted. Quick closing mechanism broken beyond repair.
Side rails of access ladder, frame 58 starboard, from main deck to
first superstructure deck bent and distorted.
17 flat bar braces for protector shields on sector 1 group 2 guns
1, 2 and 3. 20 MM guns badly bent and distorted.
Supporting brackets to hot gun case for above 20 MM gun #2 torn
from fastening on splinter shield.
Watertight access door 1-58 leading rom main deck to A-103A, deck
gear locker, badly buckled and distorted beyond repair.
Battle telephone box on main deck frame 58 starboard badly bent
and distorted.
Quick closing door 1-62-5 badly bent and distorted. Quick
closing mechanism and dogs broken beyond repair.
NOTE:- Above items are believed to be result of blast and
concussion of turrets 1 and 2 firing a maximum to starboard.
Shell struck starboard side plate #1 turret approximately
Parallel passed through the 25 man life raft* and exploded on the
starboard sight port. Hinge on sight port bent and distorted.
Closing device on port inoperative.
7 strakes on wood deck planking badly splintered and gouged by
Shrapnel between frames 44 and 48 main deck 4' to 6' inboard of shell
plate. 8" shell sruck upper edge of bulkhead plating of spray shield
and Flag Bridge, frame 72 ½ starboard, resulting in following damage:
* Total of five (5) balsa wood life rafts destroyed, about the
ship.
(a) Shrapnel blew downward penetrating wood and steel deck on
1st superstructure deck starboard between frames 66 and 72,
Approximately 45 holes ranging in size from ½" to 5".
(b) Cover of watertight hatch 01-70-1. 11 small holes ranging
in size from ½" to 1 ½".
(c) 2 steel ladder rungs on longitudinal bulkhead frame 70
starboard, cut and broken.
(d) Light lock bracket to door 01-72 leading from 1st
superstructure to Captain's cabin broken off.
Senior staff officer's cabin. Starboard longitudinal structural
bulkhead and stiffners between frames 72 and 74 starboard, buckled
inboard approximately 3" over entire area. 2 aluminum battle ports,
frame 72-73, broken beyond repair. Metal book case 4' x 6' doors,
hinges and shelving distorted beyond economical repair. Supply
ventilation duct torn and crushed. Metal joiner door and frame to
linen locker broken. Metal joiner door access from passageway to
stateroom bent and distorted beyond repair. 3' x 6' panel of after
inboard divisional bulkhead blown out. Metal joiner door and frame
to Admiral's cabin blown out. Metal joiner door access to first
superstructure deck blown out. Metal joiner door and frame between
cabin and stateroom blown out. Transverse aluminum panel bulkhead
between cabin and stateroom blown out. Transverse aluminum panel
bulkhead between cabin and bath blown out. Senior staff officer's
stateroom. Metal joiner door with full length mirror distorted and
buckled. Confidential safe blown from bulkhead. Metal bookcase
distorted and blown from bulkhead. 6' section of 1 ½" voice tube
leading to flag plot broken off at joint. Door of 1 wardrobe locker
torn from hinges. Longitudinal aluminum panel divisional bulkhead
between stateroom and bath blown out. Aluminum panel divisional
bulkhead between bath and passage completely blown out. Drainage
valves to wash basin broken.
WRSR 0205. Salvo of 3 projectiles (believed to be 6") entered
longitudinal bulkhead at frame 84, approximately 3' above 2nd
superstructure deck resulting in the following damage:
Entire transverse aluminum divisional bulkhead between WRSR 0205
and locker used for stowage of forms completely blown out.
Inboard longitudinal structural bulkhead has hole 30" in diameter
approximately 3' above deck level.
Secretary desk completely demolished.
Confidential safe demolished.
Wash basin and cabinet demolished.
Overhead supporting deck beam frame 82 torn open 4" x 6".
Ventilation duct demolished.
Hot and cold water piping and drains completely demolished.
Metal joiner door to passage demolished.
Metal enclosure and binding strips of berth torn and distorted by
shrapnel.
10" hole approximately 32" above deck plate in out board
longitudinal structural bulkhead.
Unassigned compartment under starboard signal flag bag used for
stowage of Executive Officer's Office forms.
All shelving completely demolished by shrapnel.
Bottom of starboard signal bag blown open at seam approximately
4' x 2'.
3 outboard bulkheads stiffners on after transverse bulkhead
pierced by shell fragments, holes approximately 3" in diameter.
Welded seams torn.
Outboard longitudinal bulkhead pierced by shell fragments
approximately 8" in diameter, frame 85, 4' above deck level.
30" hole in inboard longitudinal structural bulkhead.
2" drainage line on inboard and outboard ends of signal bag torn
out.
Deck plating dished over 3 square feet area, 8' inboard of
longitudinal structural bulkhead.
Non-watertight door pierced by shrapnel. Unserviceable.
6" aluminum ventilation ducts demolished.
Ventilation terminal of supply ventilation system demolished.
WRSR 0207.
Frame 87½, battle port 2" hole.
Metal joiner door to passageway distorted.
Door frame pierced by shrapnel.
After transverse structural bulkhead pierced by 5 fragments
ranging from ¾" to 3" in diameter.
Passage B-0201L.
Door frame of metal joiner door access to B-103L pierced by
fragments.
Drian line for upper level staterooms pierced by 3 fragments
approximately 5' above deck level.
Exhaust ventilation system duct torn and blown open.
2" fresh water supply lines to 2nd and 3rd superstructure deck
staterooms severed 2' above deck level.
WRSR 0204.
Metal joiner door and frame blown out and distorted. Inboard
Longitudinal panel bulkhead blown out.
WRSR 0206.
Inboard longitudinal panel bulkhead demolished.
Metal joiner door and frame broken.
B-103L.
2nd superstructure deck. 25" x 8" T bars bulkhead stiffners on
starboard longitudinal structure bulkhead at frame 83 severed 2' above
deck level.
Access ladder and fittings to 3rd superstructure deck demolished.
Hot water tank (supply to system on 2nd superstructure deck)
demolished.
Cold fresh water supply to battle dressing station demolished.
Topping lift and big falls for starboard boat crane damaged.
Three 4 inch fuel hoses damaged. #1 MWB damaged. (26 small
shrapnel holes).
Electrical booster pump and all connections completely
demolished.
Longitudinal centerline structural bulkhead demolished at frame
84.
Ventilation supply and exhaust lines severed and demolished at
frame 82½ port.
1¼" compressed air line severed at frame 82.
First aid box and supports demolished.
4" fire main riser demolished.
Intake and exhaust ventilation ducts demolished, starboard.
Port longitudinal structural 30 pound bulkhead and stiffners
completely demolished.
Seams of fresh water gravity tanks leaking.
Stanchions on access ladder cut and broken.
Combing of access hatch to first superstructure deck bent and
distorted.
WRSR 0202. Metal joiner door and frame demolished.
Large ship's confidential safe demolished.
Secretarial desk demolished.
Built in metal berth demolished.
Wardrobe locker demolished.
Chiffenier locker demolished.
Sheathing and insulation torn out over entire area.
Wash basin and connections torn from fastenings.
Shaving cabinet broken.
FLAG BRIDGE LEVEL
Watertight access door 03-79, access to B-0305E, badly distorted.
6' section of exhaust vent duct, compartment B-0305E, completely
blown out.
1 section vent duct leading to preheater supply system 03-79-1,
blown out.
Sides, drawers and fastenings of signal bridge desk torn and
distorted beyond repair.
Hole 12" x 36" in outboard corner of starboard flag bag.
3" fragment hole 3' above bottom starboard end.
Light metal tissue blown out.
5' section of 4" drain line severed at frame 83, starboard.
2" drain line pierced and severed by shrapnel, frames 72 and 73
Starboard.
1 ½" voice tube, starboard alidade to conn, severed at frame 73.
6' square of wind and spray shield and stiffeners at frame 73
starboard demolished by salvo.
¼" S.T.S. splinter shield around starboard 40 MM director at
frame 74 demolished.
40MM director demolished.
5 square feet areas of wood deck planking and margin steaks
splintered and broken. Steal deck plating beneath wood deck in
this area penetrated by several pieces of shrapnel.
1 1/2" S.T.S. armored signal shelter bulkhead starboard, gouged
to a depth of ¾" over a 3" circular area.
Watertight access door, access from signal bridge to signal
shelter frame 71 starboard, pierced in 6 places by shrapnel.
Holes ranging from 3/4" to 4" to 4". 3/8" heat treated glass
panel blown out.
3 36" x 42" heat treated glass windows broken. Raising and
lowering mechanisms and enclosures broken and distorted.
Unserviceable. Frame 68 starboard.
Metal joiner door leading from signal shelter access to flag plot
blown inward and distorted. Frame 72, centerline.
Hood for starboard signal light blown from fastenings and broken.
Doors to signal locker desk broken and distorted. Frame 79,
centerline.
NAVIGATION BRIDG LEVEL
Wet and dry bulb thermometer casing demolished, frame 77 stbd.
4" hole in wind and spray shield 3' above deck level at frame 75,
starboard.
1 6" hole, 1 3" hole and 1 4" hole in deck from shrapnel at frame
75 starboard.
4" hole in spray shield 3' above deck t frame 75, starboard.
1 3" and 1 2" shrapnel hole in longitudinal structural bulkhead
1' above deck level at frame 75, starboard.
1 6" shrapnel hole in circular base of starboard alidade.
1 section 3' by 5' in spray shield between frames 70 and 71
starboard blown inboard and distorted.
Swivel base scat (mess stool) on spray shield at frame 72,
starboard demolished.
Watertight door access from pilot house to catwalk bent and
distorted at frame 71, starboard.
Pipe rail and fittings supporting canvas wind breaker around
catwalk port and starboard broken and unserviceable. Canvas
windbreaker blown out.
20" x 36" heat treated glass panel in watertight access doors
leading from catwalk to Navigation Bridge, port, blown out.
10" x 20" hole in deck overhead in upper section of longitudinal
structural bulkhead at frame port. (Chart House.)
6" x 8" panel of aluminum dividing bulkhead between Captain's sea
cabin and Navigator's sea cabin demolished.
1 section of longitudinal panel bulkhead in navigation washroom
and water closet blown out.
1 section of 4" ventilation duct broken off at the joint near
washroom and water closet.
Natural exhaust ventilation closure for chart house to atmosphere
at frame 77 port blown out.
1 4" shrapnel hole in wind and spray shield 4' above the deck
level at frame 74 port.
HOUSETOP LEVEL
Shrapnel hole 2" x 5" in 1/4" S.T.S. splinter shield 1' above
deck level at frame 69, starboard.
1 18" hole in 1/4" S.T.S. splinter shield at frame 73 starboard
2' above deck level.
1 36" x 48" hole in 1/4" S.T.S. splinter shield at frame 74
port3' above deck level.
1 20 MM ready service ammunition box and fastenings at frame
72 starboard completely demolished.
1 20 MM ready service ammunition box at frame 74 port demolished.
1 shell hole 10" x 16" through 1 1/2" S.T.S. circular foundation
plate of #1 5" director at frame 73 starboard.
1 12" shell hole through 1 1/2" S.T.S. circular base of #1 5"
battery director at frame 73 port, 6" above bottom level.
12" section, 25 pound bounding angle broken at base of #1 5"
battery director at frame 73 port.
Floor plates demolished inside base of #1 5" battery director.
Center column structure and bounding angle of #1 5" battery
director completely demolished.
2 small fragment holes at base of watertight casing around radio
direction finder #1.
10" hole in S.T.S. structural bulkhead in 1.1" magazine and
clipping room 6' above deck level, frame 78 starboard.
18"-24" shell hole in S.T.S. structural bulkhead in 1.1 magazine
and clipping room 6' above deck level, frame 78 port.
1-6", 3-7" and 1-4" shrapnel hole through 3/8" S.T.S. splinter
shield around 1.1" quad #4, frame 78 port.
6 shrapnel holes in steel deck plating within circular area of
1.1" quad #4. Average size of holes 4".
Battle telephone box for quad 4 demolished.
1.1" CLIPPING ROOM, B-0502M
3' section of longitudinal centerline deck overhead beam 6" x 12"
severed and demolished, frame 78-79.
All sheathing and insulation demolished.
5 sections of magazine stowage racks cut, distorted and
unserviceable.
3 sections of 3/4" pipe sprinkling system severed and demolished.
Bulkhead stiffeners and beams knee severed and demolished.
Bounding angle and deck overhead blown open. All rivets sheared.
1 1/2" shrapnel hole in flametight access door.
Vents ducts, supply for B-0601L crushed.
Vent ducts crushed and broken frame 81 port, B-103L.
1 2' square section of insulation sheathing torn from
longitudinal bulkhead at frame 82 port.
6TH LEVEL
1 10" shell hole through structural bulkhead and bulkhead
stiffener, 6' above deck level, frame 82 starboard.
Web of I beam frame 83 twisted and distorted 6' inboard of
starboard side.
10" x 8" hole in centerline structural bulkhead, frame 83.
Arch reinforcement twisted and broken.
Radar gas tube fractured.
Access ladder from 06 to 07 level demolished.
Vent duct exhaust peppered with small bits of shrapnel.
Coil spring tensioning device and brackets for watertight armored
hatch 07-84-1 demolished.
Natural vent exhaust duct through forward transversal structural
bulkhead in #1 radar storeroom demolished.
Supply vent duct demolished in B-103L, 06 level.
Access ladder from 06 to -7 level demolished.
Tensioning device and brackets for watertight armored hatch
07-84-2 twisted and inoperative.
3/4" circulating cooling water line pressure gage and booster
pump severed and demolished.
W.R.S.R. 0601. 2 1" holes in steel battle port.
10" hole 6' above deck level at frame 83 port.
1 bulkhead stiffener 8" torn and distorted throughout entire
length.
Shrapnel hole 10" x 3" at deck level.
Insulation and sheathing on port longitudinal bulkhead entirely
demolished
07 LEVEL
11 shrapnel holes ranging in size from 3" to 7 through forward
transverse structural bulkhead, frame 81, from deck level to
overhead, port.
1 bulkhead stiffener fractured frame 81 port, 3' inboard of
centerline. (R.D.F. #2).
1 8" hole through after side of structural bulkhead, frame 87.
1 10" hole through both sides housing tube for radar mast, frame
87. Lowering wire for foremast damaged.
1 4" hole through bulkhead platin g at frame 86 port.
Bulkhead stiffener frame 86 punctured, twisted and distorted.
5 panels of sheathing and insulation torn out.
2-3" shrapnel hole at base of bulkhead just above bounding
angles, frame 87 starboard.
3 shrapnel holes through medical locker. Doors distorted beyond
repair.
2" shrapnel hole through back of wash basin.
08 LEVEL
Watertight door and door frame 08-82-1 blown out.
1-10" and 1-12" shell hole through starboard longitudinal
bulkhead at frame 83. (25 pound S.T.S plate).
3 bulkhead stiffeners and supporting beams severed, twisted.
Frames 83-84 starboard.
1-36", 1-8" and 1-6" shell and shrapnel holes through
longitudinal centerline bulkhead.
1-4" x 6" shrapnel hole in deck plating, frame 84 centerline.
1-30" x 60" hole in transverse structural bulkhead #84.
4 bulkhead stiffeners and supporting beams on transverse bulkhead
severed.
All sheathing and insulation blown out.
Forward starboard yardarm and supporting brace cut.
1-18" hole through port longitudinal bulkhead at frame 84.
4" hole through watertight door at frame 84 starboard.
1-8" hole in structural bulkhead, starboard, 5' above deck level,
radar plot.
1 section of structural bulkhead 8' x 10' blown out between
frames 85-87, port, radar plot.
All sheathing, overhead and bulkheads torn by shrapnel, radar
plot.
Exhaust vent duct demolished, radar plot.
Access door passage B-103L and radar plot missing.
Starboard access ladder from 8th to 9th level demolished.
Entire longitudinal section of wind and spray shield and
stiffeners between frame 84 and 87 demolished.
Catwalk around Secondary Conn., 2-4" shrapnel holes through deck
plating, centerline.
9 protective casing around radio direction finder installation
under overhang of catwalk completely demolished.
Mark 45 1.1" director demolished.
3-3" shrapnel holes through after section wind and spray shield,
starboard.
2-3" shrapnel hole through stem.
09 LEVEL
Access ladder from 09 to 10 level demolished.
12" x 18" hole in deck plating starboard frame 84.
18" x 36" hole through deck plating frame 84 port. (Search Radar
Transmitter Room).
010 LEVEL
Lower supporting arm of starboard yard arm severed.
3" hole in deck plating of search light platform, frame 83
starboard.
6" hole upward in deck plating frame 83 port, searchlight
platform.
6" bulge in bulkhead 7' above deck level, frame 83 starboard.
011 LEVEL
Sky Control - 10" shell hole through 1¼" S.T.S. bulkhead at frame
83 starboard.
10" hole through 1¼" S.T.S. bulkhead frame 83½ port.
12" battle cover and battle port frame broken at frame 83
starboard.
All insulation blown out.
2-3" shrapnel holes through protection casing center column of
forward main battery director.
3/8" S.T.S. splinter shield around port target indicator is
demolished.
3 swivel seats and brackets demolished.
Forward centerline section of wind and spray shield around search
radar demolished. 3-17" holes.
S.C. Radar platform completely demolished.
AH-219L - WARD ROOM CIGAR MESS STORES
Exhaust system H2-33-1 - 16' ventilation duct blown out, seams
torn, all metal distorted.
Gaping hole 8' through 30 lb. plate extending from amin deck to
6' below main deck.
One section 4' x 8' of main deck blown upward 4".
One trans verse 6" x 14" I beam and beam knee severed and blown
out from shell plating starboard to a paint 8' inboard.
All intake and exhaust ventilation ducts demolished.
All expanded metal partitions, doors, boundary angles, shelving
and bias demolished.
One 3" x 4" shrapnel hole through longitudinal I beam deck
support frame 29½.
One section of deck plating 4' x 6' between frames 29 and 31
starboard badly distorted.
A-206L
16" X 24" hole.
14" X 14" hole.
10" x 12" hole.
All above in shell plating 5' above deck level between frames 29
and 31 starboard.
Top seam shell plating 1' above deck level frame 30½ blown open,
rivets sheared.
3 36" x 7' panels of sheathing and insulation blown out.
1¼" fuel ventilation line severed at shell plating.
A-207L
6' of lapped seam blown open and all rivets sheared 1' above
deck between frames 31 and 32.
1 12" x 12" hole and 1 10" hole 7' and 8' above deck level shell
plating frame 31½" starboard.
3' of lapped seam blown open and rivets sheared 8' above deck.
Upper section of watertight bulkhead 31 blown open leaving hole
9' x 6' from starboard shell plating to centerline.
2 4" x 5" T bar bulkhead stiffeners severed 9' above deck
plating.
Intake 36" circular ventilation deduct system demolished.
One 12' section of exhaust ventilation duct and watertight
closure demolished.
18' of 8" supply ventilation duct and brackets demolished.
One 8' section of 3/8" x 6" 10" I beam supporting deck overhead,
severed twisted, and distorted between frames 31 and 33
One 12' section of 2" fuel oil air escape piping twisted and
broken.
Pea coat locker demolished.
Longitudinal I beam supporting deck overhead fractured between
frames 32 and 33.
8" x 14" hole starboard longitudinal 10' inboard blower room,
bulkhead stiffener fractured 4' above deck level.
4 triple units type "C" clothing lockers blown open from
shrapnel.
STACK HOOD AT FRAME 88
Forward face - Shell hole 12" x 30" part of shell continued
through 4 partitions inside hood and out port side. All holes
approximately 15" in diameter. Part of shell broke off after entering
hood and went through 1 partition aft - hole about 23" x 14".
Shell entered 2" from starboard side hood 4' above 07 super deck.
There were also other holes in forward face of hood of the following
sizes: 6" diameter, 6" x a8", 2 holes 3" x 6", 4 holes about 2" in
diameter, 2 holes approximately 3" x 8". Also 10 dents about 1" deep
by 6" in diameter in forward face of hood.
Stack cover jack-stay on forward side carried away.
Deck in vicinity of frame 87 and 88, 07 superstructure deck has 9
dents.
S.B. Director #3
Radar elevation gear carried away. 2 bags of base carried away
on left hand side.
S.B. Director #2
Elevation gear supporting stand has five legs carried away on
right side. Lower edge of elevation arm has 4" x 6" hole on right
side. Elevating gear case on right side has hole 2" x 6". Radar
antenna has entire lower edge carried away 1' 0" high. Remainder of
antenna has 15 small holes and bad gash at top.
Starboard side of stack between frame 90 and 96 - 4 holes
approximately 4" x6" between 05 and 07 superstructures.
Forward steam exhaust escape frame 96 between 06 and 07
superstructure. 8 holes approximately 2" in diameter.
20 mm gun shield on 05 superstructure deck at frame 92 - 1 hole
2" in diameter near base.
Drainage line from Director #3 platform cut at frame 89 on the 04
level - hole 2" in diameter.
Athwartships bulkhead at frame 9-, 02 level - 5 holes
approximately 2" in diameter. Also 5 bad dents.
Ready service box 20mm frame 91, 02 level - 5 holes approximately
2" x 8".
Ready service box 20mm frame 92, 02 level - has hole 4" x 8".
Deck has 2 bad dents at frame 95 near stack - 02 level.
#1 Motor whaleboat has 15 shrapnel holes.
Boat Repair Shop at frame 97-99, 02 deck - 2 holes in overhead 1
3" in diameter and 1 4" x 10".
Heater steam lines and ventilation supply duct B-0203E - cut by
shrapnel, 4 holes.
Nitrogen antenna lines T-12, T-13, and T-9 cut by shrapnel.
Radio transmitter truck T-7-H - 2 shrapnel holes 2" in diameter.
Bulkhead 97 - 4 shrapnel holes in insulation and sheathing. 4
shrapnel dents in bulkhead.
W.T. Door 02-98 has 2 holes through door approximately 2" in
diameter.
Natural exhaust B-0205E at frame 100 has 2 2" holes.
Watertight door 02-100 to B-0205E (Battery Charging Room) has 3
holes, one 2" x 8", 1 2" x 1" near top of door; one 3" x 4" forward
edge near hinge.
B-0205E - hole in deck approximately 1" in diameter at frame 100.
Steam line pierced by shrapnel embedded in lagging or steam line,
frame 100.
Dents in deck and bulkhead and overhead in compartment B-0205E.
Brass drain line for 03 deck has hole approximately 1" in
diameter at frame 100.
Starboard Boat Crane
Cable cut by shrapnel, cable completely ruined. Cross braces of
crane cut in six places, and three others dented.
Lower inboard arm has hole 2" x 4", approximately in middle of
arm. Upper inboard arm has hole 3" x 4", in same section. Two
vertical braces have 1" diameter holes. One ladder rung carried away.
Shrapnel hole 3" x 4" in top of 20mm ready service box on 02
level at frame 97. 20mm ready service box at frame 98 has dented top.
03 Super-deck Starboard Side
Hole in deck at frame 97 starboard side next to stack. Hole at
frame 99.
After leg of main mast has three bad cuts, all about 2" x 3"
cuts.
Under side of 1.1" director platform aft has one wire cut.
01 Super-deck Starboard Side.
Heat shield on 20mm ready service box at frame 93 torn away.
Watertight door 01-93 warped badly. Ventilation supply B-011A has two
welled scams spilt through three feet.
Watertight door 01-99-3 has 5 holes approximately 1½" in
diameter. Armored door 01-95 has gasket retaining edge bent and cut.
Ventilation supply 4-100 has approximately 20 holes, bent and twisted.
Wooden deck at frame 100 torn up and splintered in an area 3' x
4'. Deck (01) at frame 100 hs 5 holes of the following sizes: 10" x
12", 2" x 3", 2 holes 2" in diameter, 3" x 4", one hole frame 101 3" x
1½".
Right hand side of Mount #7 - Deck has been dished in 2" over a
20" area. Center of area 2' from after edge and 1½' from lower edge
of plate. Seam out after right corner of mount opened 3/8". Shows
signs of intense heat. Armor is 2" thick.
WRSR 0117 - Has holes in starboard panel bulkhead. One safe
pierced by shrapnel on both sides. 2 holes in 02 deck at frame 98
inboard. Holes 1" x 2" and 3/4" in diameter. Ventilation supply
duct split in J.O. Bunkroom by heater 88-R
B-0105L - Frame 100, one wire cut. Two sets of lockers pierced
and torn by shrapnel. One hole in supply system trunk 4-100.
Insulation sheeting torn by shrapnel.
Supply Office - Shell struck top of fuel oil and ballast tank,
B-39F, at frame 87 starboard (6½" hole). Shell exploded inside tank
blowing hole in compartment B-207L (hole 10" x 18") piercing 2
lockers.
One 5" hole through skin of ship at frame 113, 3' above
waterline.
One 14" hole in ship's side at frame 72 starboard, 5 feet above
waterline. Dented in over a 6' diameter area.
One 8" hole in ship's side at frame 82 starboard, 8 feet above
waterline.
B-4 ventilator supply pierced by shrapnel, 1 hole in 01 deck and
4" hole starboard side, frame 107, 5' above main deck.
All sound powered telephones at frame 107 and all cables between
frame 106 and 108 are cut and broken by shrapnel.
20MM ready service box at frame 108 has one hole in the side.
20MM gun shield at frame 109 has 3" hole, 10 above deck, also several
dents.
W.T. door 1-108 has fifteen holes 2" and smaller. Gasket cut.
Air escape for C-1F and C-31F at frame 109 pierced by shrapnel
5', 7' and 9' above main deck.
Many dents in bulkhead TS133 frames 105 and 110 starboard.
Seams on empty case chute on quad 7 split by blast.
Deck radio antenna at frame 110 starboard broken by shrapnel.
Three life rafts at frame 110 cut by shrapnel.
Uptake exhaust lip at frame 110 has two 2" shrapnel holes.
Empty case bin of quad 7 has one small hole and seven dents.
Deck and starboard side of turret #3 between frames 121 and 130,
8' out from turret, are bent down next to the turret. Hole beside
turret in this area is 3' wide, 10'. Center of hole about frame 123.
Hatch coaming on hatch 1-122 has a semi-circular cut on both
sides 15" deep.
Ventilation intake for system 3-126 has screen blown in.
Deck between frames 110 and 134 are splintered by shrapnel.
Starboard side #3 barbette has plating dished in 1½" over area
15" in diameter aft of seam. Circular cracks extending over this
area. Vertical cracks extend aft 8' around barbette.
Davit holder beside hatch 1-128 bent and twisted.
Hatch coaming around hatch 1-128 is torn, twisted and cut by many
pieces of shrapnel.
Gas seal on turret #3 torn and twisted for 30' on front of
turret.
Guns 3 slide pitted by shrapnel.
Two ladders torn off turret base.
Ammunition boxes aft of turret 3 and by starboard 20MM gun
shields pierced by shrapnel. All bent and twisted.
Midships splinter shield has 4 holes 4" in diameter. One hole
12" x 14" and one hole 10" x 10".
Fire plug 1-133-2 sheared off at plug.
30 caliber airplane ready ammunition box at frame 133 completely
wrecked.
Starboard aft 20MM gun wrecked. Spare barrel holders toe\rn off
shield. Ammunition boxes torn and twisted.
Recovery boom and vertical brace cut by shrapnel.
40MM deck plates badly warped and buckled, port and starboard.
Hatch 1-139-1 and scuttle badly wrapped and twisted.
CATAPULTS
Starboard catapult cable cut by shrapnel. Shrapnel holes through
placing. Cable cut by shrapnel. Shives damaged by shrapnel. Track
badly damaged. Ready boxes damaged. Magazine damaged by shrapnel.
SECOND DECK
Watertight door 2-136-1, hole 2" by 1", 6" from bottom. 1" hole
2' from top through sheeting.
3" x 1" hole 2' to port of door 2-136-1, 3" from deck. Bad dent
1' above "I" beam, dented just above deck. Bad dent 4" in diameter 1"
deep beside door, 3' above deck, wire cable cut above door next to
overboard. Also hole 4" x 1½".
Ventilation supply C-322L pierced by shrapnel. 2 holes in line
with door, 6" x 10" in diameter. Another small hole in duct 6' above
deck.
2 bad dents in supporting stanchion at frame 134 starboard, at
edge of scullery.
Air deflector broken by small piece of shrapnel, starboard side
aft of galley.
10" x 2" hole after starboard corner of scullery just above deck.
Steam line through starboard side of compartment has several holes in
lagging, also may be in the lines.
Stanchion at frame 131, starboard side f scullery has two dents
1½ above deck. 4 holes in scullery, 19" by 3", 2 1" holes and 1½" by
4" hole.
4 steam lines carried away, 2 temporarily repaired. Large hole
starboard side of door 2-129-1, 26" by 38". 11 other holes at this
side of door in same area, 10' x 4' from deck.
Watertight door 2-129-1 bent and cut. Damaged beyond repair.
Door frame 2-129-1 bent. Bulkhead and 1 side of door frame
dished aft 6". 2 holes near deck 3' starboard of door, 12" x 4", 10"
x 3".
Inboard table leg in scullery at frame 129 cut and bent.
2 steam lines by coffee urn damaged. Coffee urn has 2 small
holes 1" x ½" and also many small holes.
Lagging on large steam lines on overhead torn at frame 128.
2 "I" frames starboard side of door 2-129-1 badly cut and dented.
One pushed against bulkhead.
Air escape for C-917V bent and distorted, almost flattened in
some spots.
Lagging on large steam lines on overhead torn at frame 128.
3 "I" frames on port side of door. One slightly dented, one
badly dented and bent to port side. The other badly cut and bent.
Several electrical cables cut just above deck at frame 129 and
cable cut 7" above deck and above hatch 2-128. 1 steam and one fresh
water line cut in this area.
4" x 2' and 1" diameter holes in 440 power panel (2-128-1). Hole
in back of panel and dent in bulkhead. 2 electrical cables cut beside
hole.
20' of exhaust C-414T carried away. The remainder pierced by
numerous pieces of shrapnel.
Exhaust system 3-126, 10' carried away between deck and overhead
beside turret. Remainder badly bent and cut, 15' area.
Supply duct C-201L pierced in 2 places. One hole 10" x 12".
One hole 2" in diameter.
Frame 127. Motor blown off one power shell hoist. Hoist half
way off track. Roller track badly bent and out of line.
20' of mess table around barbette missing. Also angle iron
supports missing.
Hatch 2-128-2 retaining edge for gasket badly distorted and cut
on starboard side.
Curved "I" beam around barbette. 10' carried away from frame 123
to frame 125. Distorted and bent and cut 20' forward and 10' aft.
Armored deck bent down 4' into compartment. Hole beside barbette
2½ x 12'.
Bounding bar cut and bent 20'. (1" x 3").
Two (2) degaussing cables badly cut and torn.
Drain line beside hatch 1-122 cur in two places by shrapnel.
Wire cage pierced in 10 places around ladder. Switch box on cage
broken.
Supply vent C-603E, 1 1" diameter hole. Supply vent to C-609E
badly bent, also ripped near overhead.
Firemain above plug 2-119-1 pierced by shrapnel. Hole 2" x 1".
Nozzle and bracket bent by shrapnel.
Hole in galley bulkhead at frame 119, 7' above deck, hole 6"x4".
Rivets on deck at seam 6' from barbette leak.
Frame 114, centerline 3rd deck, 1 electrical cable cut by fire.
Frame 113, overhead starboard side hatch 3-113-2 - 2 electrical
cable cut by fire.
Circular cracks area 6" below main deck, frame 122.
Water seal above main deck dented and pulled away from rivets 4'
at frame 125 starboard side of barbette.
Athwartship "I" beams - frame 123 and 126, beam damaged 8" from
barbette at frame 125, bent and twisted 4' x 6' more slightly bent
down from deck.
Vent motor at frame 121 damaged.
Scuttlebutt damaged at frame 122, several holes in top. Small
pieces shrapnel hit motor and compressor below.
FLOODED TANKS
The following tanks are flooded.
A-11F B-31F
A-21F B-39F
A-23F B-71F
A-33F B-75V
A-39F B-77F
A-11F B-79F
B-23F
DRIVER'S REPORT
Starboard side.
Six feet down seam opened up from frame 46 to frame 58.
Fifteen feet down seam opened up from frame 43 to frame 58.
Twenty-five feet down seam opened up from frame 52 to frame 93.
Slight leas between frame 93 and 117. Seam opened up about 2 feet in
length at frame 118.
Bad opening in seams on bottom at frame 56.
Hole 12" in diameter at frame 46, 2½" down.
GUNNERY DAMAGE.
1. Main Battery.
(a) Director #1.
Electric cables cut to the following:-
Pointer's firing key.
Salvo light.
Battle order indicator.
Range transmitter.
Ships course input to director.
Train designation transmission.
"Bearing on" light.
2JD8 telephone.
Selector switch - spot one.
Radar inoperative. Screen damaged, frame cracked,
transmission unit shot away.
(b) Director #2.
Brake solenoid burned out, causing loss of power.
"Bearing on" light inoperative.
(c) Turret One.
Rollers and rollerpath show excessive gouging.
(d) Turret #3.
Received hit by 14" projectile in armor about 17"
from top of barbette starboard side. Turret was
trained in this direction. Projectile was deflected
downward through deck. Fragments caused damaged as
follows:-
Gas seal and water shed disrupted.
Sleeve was removed to make gun serviceable.
Gun hoop received shallow indentation through
sleeve.
Center gun sleeve gouged but still serviceable.
Must be removed when available.
Right and center guns - securing strips for
bucklers damaged.
2. Secondary Battery.
(a) Sky forward (air defense station).
This station received three direct hits, two 8"
and one 6", none of which exploded.
Damage as follows:-
JY selector switch inoperative.
20MC AND 21MC speakers destroyed.
Five telephone cable out to Director #1.
Director tube pierced cutting 23 cables.
Battle ports carried away.
Electric heater destroyed.
Port target designator damaged.
Numerous cables cut, lookout seats damaged.
(b) Secondary Battery Group #1.
Secondary Battery Director #1 was struck by an 8"
projectile which entered foundation about one foot
from deck, starboard side, passing through center
column and out port side. All cables were out.
Roller path believed to be completely out of
alignment.
Instruments were damaged as follows:-
Train receiver regulator pierced by fragments.
Train controller unit - bent out of shape.
Cross-level controller unit - bent out of shape.
Cross-level gear unit - struck by fragments.
Possible internal damage.
Gas seal torn by fragments.
Mount #1 - Trainer's telescope port shutter sprung.
Mount #3 - Periscope shot away. Mount shield top
and rear sprung and seams opened by projectile hit.
(c) Secondary Battery Group #2.
Secondary Battery Director #2.
Stuck glancing blow by projectile, damage as follows:-
Radar supports badly damaged.
Holding down bolts turn out.
Coaxial cables out.
Mount #2 was struck by 6.1" projectile which had
passed through superstructure from starboard side.
This projectile did not explode. The projectile
struck the door to the left hot case shute, then up
to rear plate of shield. The rear armor plate is
pushed in and broken loose from top, sides and
bottom plates. The angle beam is cut. Oil reservoir
tank of left shell hoist punctured.
(d) Secondary Battery Group #3.
Secondary Battery Director # was hit by fragments
of projectile, damage was as follows:-
End windows shattered on rangefinder,
Radar damaged as in in Director #2.
Mount #5 - Fragments gouged left gun, not serious,
Armor sprung and minor structural damage inside
mount from glancing hit.
Mount #7 - Numerous gouges in both guns from
fragments. Upper handling room door damaged.
(e) Secondary Battery Group #4.
Mount #8 - 4" hole in periscope and periscope cover.
Gas escaped. Optics not damaged.
3. Machine Gun Battery.
(a) 40mm Quad #1.
Blast from turret #2 damaged mount beyond repair.
Requires replacement.
(b) 1.1" Quad #4 and Director.
Mark 45 director received direct hit through center
of director. (Three cheers)
Quad #4 was struck by fragments which exploded
ready service ammunition in shield. Mount and
shield destroyed, should be replaced.
(c) 1.1" Clipping room 3 and 4.
One and possibly two projectiles passed through
forward end of clipping room, causing extensive
structural damage. Sprinkling lines were out
and 75 clips destroyed.
(d) 20mm Guns and clipping rooms.
Damage to 20mm battery is as follows:-
Magazines 32 destroyed & 83 damaged
Ready service boxes 13 destroyed & 10 damaged
Mounts 2 destroyed
Gun covers 15 destroyed
Shoulder bar assemblies 9 destroyed
Sight assemblies 8 destroyed
Cartridge collecting bags 13 destroyed
Complete gun 1 destroyed
Barrels 1 destroyed
Cradles 1 destroyed
Tool kit 5 lost
Barrel spring housing 1 lost
Spare part boxes 4 lost
Loading frames 6 lost
Splinter shields 2 damaged
Spare barrel housing 13 need rewelding to bulwark
Telephone jack boxes 5 need rewelding to bulwark
Sight rings (fwd) 2 lost
Mark 51 directors 1 destroyed
4. Catapults.
Starboard catapult requires new saddle and cable. Spares
are aboard.
Port catapult struck by projectile should be replaced as
inboard track is bent beyond repair. Cable and sheave
destroyed also.
5. Planes.
All planes were destroyed. Two planes handling trucks
destroyed.
6. Searchlights.
Searchlight #3 - pierced by projectile passing through
lens, shutter and reflector.
Searchlight #5 - pierced by fragment passing through
elevation unit.
ENGINEERIN DAMAGE:
INTERIOR COMMUNICATION CIRCUITS.
Circuit Damaged Length
_______ cable. ______
M C-M10 MHFA30 325 ft.
1MB-2MB C-MB MHEA30 310 ft.
L&N C-LN15 MHFA22 30 ft.
L.B. C-LB10 DHFA-14 350 ft.
W C-W13 DMFA4 55 ft.
W C-W15 DMFA4 10 ft.
W C-W14 DMFA4 55 ft.
W C-W16 DMFA4 10 ft.
HD & HE C-HD12 MHFA14 70 ft.
HD & HE C-HD13 MHFA14 70 ft.
LD-C 20MC28 FHFA-3 10 ft.
C20MC27 TTHFA30 75 ft.
C 20MC25 DHFA30 75 ft.
C 20MC26 TTHFA30 20 ft.
C 20MC24 FHFA3 10 ft.
C 20MC2 DHFA3 200 ft.
C 20MC6 TTHFA40 200 ft.
LD-C 21MC31 FHFA3 10 ft.
21MC15 DHGA3 120 ft.
21MC12 TTHFA40 220 ft.
E-203 DHFA3 50 ft.
E-208 MHFA7 50 ft.
E-277 DHFA3 25 ft.
E-237 DHFA3 40 ft.
E-276 DHFA3 25 ft.
E-278 DHFA3 25 ft.
E-419 MHFA7 25 ft.
E-421 MHFA7 35 ft.
G-JA276 TTHFA10 25 ft.
Circuit Damaged Length
_______ cable. ______
G-JA277 TTHFA3 40 ft.
G-JA278 TTHFA3 40 ft.
G-JF15 TTHFA3 20 ft.
G-JS12 TTHFA3 35 ft.
G-JA279 TTHFA5 40 ft.
G-JA342 TTHFA3 40 ft.
G-JA315 TTHFA3 15 ft.
G-JA314 TTHFA3 15 ft.
G-JA311 TTHFA5 15 ft.
G-X2JQ TTHFA3 30 ft.
G-X3J9 TTHFA3 25 ft.
G-JF17 TTHFA3 25 ft.
JY24 TTHFA3 50 ft.
JA-238 TTHFA3 30 ft.
JA-201 TTHFA3 50 ft.
X19J
JS-14
JF-
C-XJX21 (XJX6 box) 20 ft.
(B0x)x19J3 DHFA3 60 ft.
2JY5 DHFA3 100 ft.
5JY
C-LC99 MHFA10 40 ft.
C-LC98 MHFA10 40 ft.
C-LC101 MHFA7 40 ft.
C-LC100 MHFA7 50 ft.
C-LC96 MHFA7 40 ft.
C-LC107 MHF10 40 ft.
C-LC94 MHFA10 40 ft.
C-LC95 MHFA10 40 ft.
c-lc71 MHFA44 130 ft.
C-LC70 MHFA44 140 ft.
C-LC84 MHFA10 60 ft.
C-LC86 MHFA7 75 ft.
LD-C1MC 206 FHFA3 55 ft.
LD-C17MC 24 GICF7 45 ft.
LD-C17MC 23 MCS2 45 ft.
LD-C1MC Speaker forward of walkway DHFA2
LD-C1MC 212 DHFA3 60 ft.
LD-C1MC 211 DHFA3 40 ft.
LD-CJ 282 TTHFA3 85 ft.
LD-CJ 281 TTHFA5 60 ft.
LD-CJ Phone 711 not on print. Recheck.
LD-CJ Phone 0203 check on No. and Ld.
LD-CJ 323 GICF2 40 ft.
This list is not complete a much more
extensive survey must be made when time id available. It was
impossible to identify some of the circuits as tags are missing
and leads must be traced.
MAIN BATTERY:
Ord.Lead No. BuShips No. Ord.Lead No. BuShip No.
2000 9 GE256
2604 11 GE258
2801 JA310 12 GE263
2802 JA311 14 GE365
2902 JA314 17 GE252
3101 X2JD24 18 GE249
3103 X2JD26 19 GE250
3702 20 GE254
4101 21 GE253
G.S.193 24
G.S.194 26
G.T.18 33
G.T.83 35
P.D.66 37 GEP69
P.D.97 38 GEP70
P.D.87 39
P.D.40 40
P.D.41 28 JA308
P.D.38 31 X2JD21
P.D.100 47
P.D.68 1003
P.D.60 1004
P.D.70 1005
P.D.39 1101
2 1R145 1301
4 1PA154 1501
7 1PA152 1601
8 GE255
SECONDARY BATTERY
Ord,No. Buship No. Cable
14 G-GS187 G1CF-7
15 G-GS192 G1CF-7
16 Spare cable G1CF-14
17 Spare cable DCP-4
18 G-GS186 G1CF-10
19 G-GS191 G1CF-10
21 2FE111-1 DCP-6
22 G-JA255 TPTF-10
23 G-XJP68 TPTF-3
24 C-J328 G1CF-2
25 C-17MC24 G1CF-7
SECONDARY BATTERY
Ord,No. Buship No. Cable Length
26 C-17MC23 MGS-2
27 G-GS190 G1CF-26
28 G-GS254 G1CF-14
29 4GSP1101 TO 1103 TGP-9
G-GS124 MHFA7
G-GS125 MHFA7
G-FS91 MHFA26
2-GS92 MHFA26
G-JA292 TTHFA10 40 ft.
G-JA300 TTHFA20 40 ft.
JP Selector switch air defense fwd. punctured.
CJA242 TTHFA 35 ft.
G4U25 65 ft.
G-4U9 20 ft.
C-17MC35 DCP4 50 ft.
G-X17J23 DCP4 50 ft.
G-2PA-69 MHFA4 40 Ft.
G-XJP-53 DHFA3 50 ft.
GJP183 TTHFA-3 50 ft.
(Flexible cable)
1 FE551 TOP-40
2 2-GSP1101 to 1103 TCP-9
3 C-CS197 G1CF-10
4 5-GSP1101 to 1103 T.C.P.9
5 G-GS195 G1CF-19
6 G-GS253 G1CF-14
7 1-FE551 TCP-4
8 G-2PA98 G1CF-19
9 G-GS189 G1CF-37
10 G-GS196 G1CF-37
11 G-GS194 G1CF-37
12 G-GS193 G1CF-37
13 G-GS188 G1CF-10
The following equipment was damaged or destroyed by gun fire:
3 - Teletalk amplifiers, 20-21 MC.
3 - Gyro repeaters.
3 - Gyro bearing pelorus stands.
1 - D.R.T. table
6 - Cease firing gongs and horns.
1 - HD-HE transmitter (damage unknown).
2 - Starting panels, #1 Sec.Bat. director (damage not determined)
The depression stops on #3 turret were moved out of position
by shell fire, therefore the D.S. circuit in #3 turret
was made inoperative.
POWER
Power panel 2-128-1 - Holes in face cover.
Power panel 2-155-2 - Starting and heating outlets #2 shattered.
Power panel 2-117-2 - Portable hoist #6, cable cut.
Power panel 2-128-1 - Feeder from galley load center pinched and
armor cut.
Portable amm. hoist #3 - Flying metal hit hoist and completely
wrecked controller, smashing in end of
hoist.
Portable amm. hoist #2 - End bell on gear rotor and destroyed.
Vent system 2-121 - Bed plate and connection block sheared off.
F-532 - Armor cut.
4-FB-473 - Port hoist outlet box damaged and cable cut.
8-FB-745 - Foremast winch, direction circuits, control circuit
and supply circuit cut.
14-FB-745 - Exhaust blower - supply circuit severed.
DEGAUSSING GEAR
S coil shattered. (D-S14, D-S-19, D-S-20)
(D-S-5, D-S-7, D-S-8)
Connection box in Compt. C-201, Fr.127 shot
away.
M coil - This coil is open but unable to locate where it is broker
Believe it is on 3rd deck fwd, in voids outside of armor.
LIGHTING
Feeder
5FB-125-1 5FB-125-B2 5FB-125-C5 6F-109-A1
5FB-125-A1 5FB-125-B2 5FB-125-C6 6F-109-A1
5FB-125-A2 5FB-125-C1 5FB-125-C7 6F-109-A6
5FB-125-A2 5FB-125-C1 5FB-125-C7 6F-109-A6
5FB-125-A3 5FB-125-C2 5FB-125-C8 1F-125-F1
5FB-125-A4 5FB-125-03 5FB-125-C9 3FB-125
5FB-125-B1 5FB-125-C4 5FB-125-C10 3FB-125-A2
3FB-125-A5 2F-125-D7 2F-125-1 3F-125-F1B
3FB-125-A6 2F-125-D1 2F-125-G 3F-125-F1C
3FB-125-D1 2F-125-D2 4FB-125-A4 3F-125-F1D
3FB-125-C 2F-125-D3 2FB-125-D10 3F-125-B
3FB-125-J 2F-125-D4 3F-125-F2A 1FB-123-A
2F-125-D 2F-125-D5 3F-125-F1A 1FE-130-A7D
Blinker light cable, port yard arm.
Blinker control, signal bridge.
The following material was destroyed:
1 6X box, W.T. 6 Double S&R (bakelite)
1 6X box, N.W.T. 12 Overhead fixtures.
1 Signal key, W.T. 6 Snap switches (10 amp)
1 Windshield wiper, complete. Truck lights.
Globes for recognition lights
MISCELLANEOUS ELECTRICAL DAMAGE
Scuttlebutt - Compt. C-201, stbd. Feeder No. 11-F-38 - End bell
broken. Pressure switch shattered.
#1 MNB - Cable cut by shrapnel. Preheater damaged.
#3 36" searchlight - Badly damaged. Small or large pieces of
shrapnel entered rear door and went out
front.
#4 36" searchlight - Dome glass broken, iris shutter beat, minor
damages.
#1 24" searchlight - Dome glass broken, shutter blown in.
#2 24" searchlight - Dome glass broken, shutter blown in. A few
shrapnel hits.
#3 24" searchlight - Shrapnel hole in drum. Cables cut. Rectifier
for this light hit by shrapnel.
#4 24" searchlight - hit by shrapnel.
MISCELLANEOUS DAMAGE IN ENGINEER DEPARTMENT
#1 M.W.B. - Air filter, governor (fuel pump).
Siren and whistle: Broken spring on 150 DV Operating lever.
Drain from 150 DV whistle, 4th level.
Separator drain, 150 C DV whistle - 4th level.
Steam and drains, 575 DV - 3rd level.
150 DV whistle steam and drains, 3rd level.
150 DV whistle steam and drain, B-201L.
Constant steam: Admiral's heater (FW), steam, drains and heater.
Line 1st. superstructure dk up to Adm. FW heater
Steam to port coffee kettle Fr.129 stbd.
Line drain (const. & int) Fr.129S., Comtp. C-201.
Intermittent steam:
2nd super dk, boat shop, heater No. 78R coils,
drain, steam lines.
2nd super dk - Fr. 81, stbd.
Passageway, B-0201L, port & stbd.
Heater No. 29 - WRSR 0202 - drains.
Steam to heater No. 34R - WRSR 0203
Heater No. 68R - B-102LB - steam line.
Heater No. 60R - WRSR 107 - steam line.
Heater No. 56R - WRSR 109 - steam line.
Heater No. 214R - FR. 129 - drains.
Vent heater supply in compt. C-322L broken
in C-201L, Fr. 129.
RADARS:
(1) SC-1 Radar.
Antenna and mount shot away complete.
Transmitter chassis sprung, wiring deranged. Repairable.
Receiver and indicator, several shrapnel holes.
damaged by fire. Inoperative.
(2) SG-Radar.
Waveguide ruptured by shell fragments.
Receiver and indicator unit, superficial damage to
case. Operative.
Transmitter indamaged.
BB57 U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA.
TS133/rkb C/O Postmaster
San Francisco, California
November 23, 1942.
From: The Senior Medical Officer.
To: The Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery,
Navy Department, Washington, D.C.
Via: The Commanding Officer.
Subject: Report of casualties.
Reference: (a) Chapter 23, paragraph 3518, Manual of the
Medical Department, 1942.
1. In accordance with above reference (a), Report
of casualties inflicted during an engagement with enemy surface
vessels on November 15, 1942 is forwarded herewith.
FATAL
(A) Killed in action, Details not known #2545. Remains buried
at sea.
BURKE, John Edward Lt. Comdr., USN
PAVLIC, Milton Frank Lt. Comdr., USN
KREPPS, Raymond Miley, Jr. Lt.(jg), USN
CANFIELD, Leon William Ensign, D-V(G), USNR
NICHOLS, Charles Benjamin, Jr. Ensign, D-V(G), USNR
ADAMS, Milledge "R" Matt3c, USN
CARMITCHEL, John Beers Mus1c, USNR
CONNER, Olen Dale Sea2c, USRN
EBEL, John Andrew CY(AA), USNR
ENGHOLM, Russell Kenneth FC2c, USN
ERWIN, Lawrence Hedrick MM2c, USNR
FOX, Arthur Robert F3c, USNR
BREENHAW, Will Bailey Sea2c, USNR
HENDERSON, Melvin Martin Sea2c, USN
HESSER, Willard Anthony Sea2c, USNR
HEUSZEL, Lewis Guinther Sea2c, USNR
HOLMES, James Alfred F2c, USNR
HORTON, Frank Edward GM3c, USN
Iven, George Nickolish Sea2c, USN
JENSEN, Martin Sanuel Bug1e, USNR
JOHNSON, Alfred (None) Sea1c, USNR
KEANE, John Joseph Sea1c, USN
KELLY, Leo James Sea2c, USNR
MARSDEN, Nelson Adolf Sea1c, USNR
McCALISTER, William Derdinand RM3c, USNR
McINTOSH, James (None) Sea2c, USNR
MOREY, Kenneth James Sea1c, USN
LAHEY, Leonard Edward Sea2c, USN
PATTERSON, James Lindsay, Jr. Matt1c, USN
PFLY, Werner Floyd FC2c, USN
PRITCHETT, Merton Leon Sea1c, USNR
QUARTEMONT, Lloyd Alphonse Sea1c, USNR
VANCE, Victor DeWitt Sea2c, USNR
WILKE, Theodore Herman, Jr. Sea1c, USNR
ZUPKO, George Judy Cpl., USMC
(B) Died of wounds - Remains buried at sea.
CURRER, David McMilla Lt.(jg), USN
INJURIES, MULTIPLE, EXTREME #2542
CORRIERI, Giovanni Anthony MDA3c USNR
INJURIES, MULTIPLE, EXTRRME #2542
HARTMAN, Albert (None) Sea2c, USNR
INJURIES, MULTIPLE, EXTRRME #2542
HINDERSON, Alfred Delano OS3c, USN
BURNS, FACE, UPPER AND LOWER EXTREMITIES, CHEST, AND BACK #2508
KNOP, Aron Arthur Sea1c, USNR
INJURIES, MULTIPLE, EXTRRME #2542
SERIOUS
(A) Transferred as patients to U.S. Naval Mobile Hospital #5,
Noumea, New Caledonia.
WHITE, Everett Floyd Lt. (jg), USNR
WOUND, PUNCTURED, LEFT SHOULDER #2565
BAKER, Leland Sherlock Sea1c, USN
WOUNDS, MULTIPLE #2564
BEATTLE, Carl Wilfred Mus1c, USN
WOUNDS, MULTIPLE #2564
BERTI, Paul Robert Sk2c, USNR
FRACTURE, COMPOUND, LEFT HUMBERUS #2529
CAMPELL, Clinton Alonzo Sea2c, USNR
WOUND, PUNCTURED, LEFT FOOT #2565
CLARK, George Roland 1st Mus., USN
BURNS, 1st and 2nd DEGREE #2508
GRAMMENS, Paul (None) Sea2c, USNR
WOUND, PUNCTURED, RIGHT FOOT #2565
ISKIN, Jack (None) ARM3c, USN
WOUNDS, MULTIPLE #2564
JONES, Merle Jerome SM3c, USN
WOUNDS, MULTIPLE #2564
JONES, Samuel Eugene Sea2c, USN
BURN, STEM, FACE AND UPPER EXTREMITIES #2508
KAUFMAN, Jess (None) SK3c, USNR
FRACTURE, COMPOUND, LEFT HUMERUS #2529
KIDD, Leslie Alexander Y3c, USNR
WOUND, PUNCTURED, GLOBUS OCULI, RIGHT #2565
KOLINSKY, Alvin Georgr Sea2c, USNR
WOUNDS, MULTIPLE #2564
KURTZ, Ernest Ford Sea1c, USN
FRACTURE, COMPOUND, RIGHT RADIUS #2529
LONG, Jack Harland Sea2c, USN
FRACTURE, COMPOUND, FRONTAL BONE, RIGHT #2529
MEYER, Thomas William Sea2c USNR
WOUNDS, MULTIPLE #2564
PAGLIA, Louis (None) Sea2c, USNR
WOUNDS, MULTIPLE #2564
PATRICK, Hodgen Othello, Jr. Y1c, USN
FRACTURE, COMPOUND, PATELLA, RIGHT #2529
(B) Retained on board on the Sick List.
MULDERRIG, Martin Joseph, Jr. Lieut., USN
WOUNDS, MULTIPLE #2564
CANTRELL, James Edger PhM2c, USN
INJURIES, MULTIPLE, EXTREME #2542
FITZGERALD, Eugene Harrison CRM(AA), USN
FRACTURE, COMPOUND, MANDIBLE, LEFT #2529
HENRY, Davis True Sea2c, USN
BURNS, 1st and 2nd DEGREE, FACE, BOTH HANDS AND FOREARMS, PHARYNX AND
LARYNX #2508
FAVORABLE
(A) Transferred to U.S. Naval Mobile Hospital # 5, Noumea,
New Caledonia, as patients.
DENNIS, Fred Russel, Jr. Sea2c, USNR
WOUNDS, MULTIPLE #2564
GIBSON, Willis Irvin Sea2c, USNR
WOUND, PUNCTERED, LEFT FOOT #2565
JINES, Clesson LEIGH Sea2c, USNR
WOUND, PUNCTERED, LEFT FOOT #2565
THOMPSON, Orlow Kermit Y1c, USNR
BURNS, 1st and 2nd DREGREE, HANDS #2508
TAYLOR, Richard Franklin Sea2c, USNR
WOUNDS, MULTIPLE #2564
(B) Retained on board on the Sick List.
WARD, William Alan 1st. Lt., USMC
WOUND, LACERATED, RIGHT BUTTOCK #2563
JULIAN, Robert Jerome Sea1c, USNR
BURNS, BOTH ARMS #2508
BRADY, William Joseph SK3c, USNR
WOUND, PUNCTURED, LEFT UPPER ARM #2565
INGEMI. Dominic (None) Sea2C, USNR
BURN, RIGHT HAND #2508
LOMAX, Earl Dean Sea2c, USNR
CONTUSION, RIGHT TESTICLE #2512
DIGIORGIO, Louis (None) GM3c, USN
CONTUSION, LEFT EYE #2512
CAPPS, Burel Egene Sea2c, USNR
WOUND, PUNCTURED, LEFT SHOULDER #2565
SIERVO, Genon (None) Mus1c USN
BURNS, RIGHT ARM #2508
ROBINSON, Arthur (None) Sea2c, USNR
BURNS, BOTH HANDS #2508
GARDNER, Gernice Bora, Jr. Sea1c, USNR
WOUNDS, MULTIPLE #2564
LUNDH, Raymond Gustaf Sea1c, USNR
WOUND, PUNCTURED, RIGHT LOWER THIGH #2565
CHRISTINO, JOSEPTH (None) GM2c, USNR
FRACTURE, COMPOUND, RIGHT ULNA #2529
COCKERELL, David Shreve Sea1c, USNR
BURN, LEFT FOREARM #2508
HILDERBRANT, Emery Vernon Sea2c, USNR
WOUNDS, MULTIPLE #2564
LOHMAN, John Arthur, Jr. Sea2c, USNR
BURN, LEFT HAND #2508
HOLEMAN, Johnie Squire Sea2c, USNR
WOUND, PUNCTURED, RIGHT ANKLE #2565
MURPHY, Francis Thomas Sea1c, USNR
BURN, LEFT HAND #2508
LUECK, Leonard Francis Sea1c, USNR
FRACTURE, COMPOUND, MANDIBLE, RIGHT #2529
WAKEMAN, William Frank Sea2c, USNR
WOUND, PUNCTURED, RIGHT PAROTID #2565
ALDERSON, Fred Allen Sea1c, USNR
HOBART, William Lester Sea2c, USNR
WOUND, PUNCTURED, RIGHT FOOT #2565
HODGEN, Goerge William Sea2c, USNR
WOUND, PUNCTURED, LEFT FOOT #2565
GAIDANOWICZ, John William Sea1c, USNR
WOUND, PUNCTURED, RIGHT HAND #2565
LARSEN, John Henry Sea1c, USN
WOUND, PUNCTURED, SCALP #2565
MARTELL, Thomas Anthony Sea2c, USN
WOUND, PUNCTURED, RIGHT ARM #2565
2. In addition to the above, there were about twentyfive
minor injuries, mostly shrapnel wounds and slight burns, not serious
enough for admission to the sick list. These were given first aid
treatment and returned to duty.
W. H. HARRELL.
U.S.S. SOUTH DAKOTA.
Extract from Quartermaster's Log:
1800 Pit Log 20138.8 Lat. 10° 16'S Long. 159° 36' E.
1809 Ceased Zig-zagging and resumed base course 320 pgc
speed 18 knots.
1812 C/S to 138 R.P.M. 23.5 knots.
1815 Commenced zig-zagging according to plan as designated by
O.T.C.
1830 Radar (SG) temporarily out of commission for tuning.
1856 Ceased zig-zagging and resumed base course 320 pgc.
1900 Pit Log 20160.9
1901 C/C t9 346, steering 343 pgc.
1902 All engines ahead full 151 R.P.M.
1904 Commenced zig-zagging.
1907 All engines flank speed, 167 R.P.M. Maneuvering to
regain position.
1914 Twenty planes bearing 010 reported by radar.
1916 All engines ahead full 151 R.P.M.
1918 Resumed standard speed 23 knots, 138 R.P.M.
1920 Darkened ship.
1925 Observed sunset.
2000 Pit Log 20185.1
2009 Commenced turning left to shift position.
2010 Right 10 degrees rudder
2012 All engines ahead full speed, 25 knots.
2014 All engines ahead flank speed, 26.5 knots.
2015 Steady on course 005 pgc and T.
2018 C/C to 345 pgc and T.
2020 All engines ahead full, 25 knots
2022 C/C to 005 pgc and T.
2025 C/C to 022 pgc and T. Base course 020 pgc and T.
2028 C/C to 020 pgc and T.
2041 C/s TO 23 KNOTS, 138 P.P.M.
2042 Commenced zig-zagging according to plan designated by O.T.C.
2100 Pit Log 20209.6
2100 Sound General Quarters.
2107 Ship manned and ready for General Quarters.
2110 Ceased zig-zagging returned to base course 020 pgc and T.
2111 C/C to 018 pgc and T.
2118 C/C to 020 pgc and T.
2125 C/S TO 20 knots, 113 R.P.M.
2126 c/c to 018 pgc and T.
2126 C/S 19 knots, 108 R.P.M.
2135 C/S 24 knots, 140 R.P.M.
2200 Pit Log 20232.9.
2210 C/C to 090 pgc and T.
2210 C/C 095 pgc and T.
2213 C/C to 092 pgc and T.
2215 C/S to 24 knots, 145 R.P.M.
2216 C/C to 090 pgc and T.
2235 Plane reported 050 R. Distance 5000 yds.
2247 C/C to 150 pgc and T.
2242 C/S to 24 knots, 140 R.P.M.
2300 Pit Log 20259.4
2330 C/S to 17 knots, 95 R.P.M.
2355 C/C to 270 pgc and T.
2400 Pit Log 20287.6
Extract from Quartermaster's Log:
0008 Three ships sighted bearing 330 T.
0014 Target bears 345 T. Distance 17000 speed 21 knots.
0017 WASHINGTON open fire off starboard bow.
0018 Opened fire on target with 16".
0020 C/S to 23 knots. 134 R.P.M.
0020 Fired second salvo. Increased speed from 17 to 23 knots.
0021 Fired third and fourth salvo.
0023 C/C to 300 pgc and T.
0032 Forward gyro of commission. We have fired 10 salvoes.
0034 Both gyro out.
0035 After gyro out in.
0035 Ships being fired on.
0036 C/S top 26 knots.
0037 Forward gyro out in. Another of our DD's hit on stern.
0038 C/C to 290 pgc and T. First of our DD's hit sunk.
0040 C/C to 285 pgc and T.
0044 Hit on port quarter.
0045 Explosion on destroyer on port bow. Sunk rapidly stern
first.
0046 C/C to 300 pgc and T. to avoid sinking DD. Fire on our ste
0047 We were illuminated by searchlight.
0048 Enemy commenced firing on us.
0050 We commenced firing.
0057 Zig-zagging. During time interval main battery put out
of commission.
0057 Using various courses leaving scene of battle, ship was
hit, several fires started. Hit on stern.
0057 Steered on course 215 T. and G.
0102 Opened fire 5" battery.
0110 Firing over. Retiring.
---- Ship's force fighting fires in upper level section.
0140 Pulled all electrical switches out of Batt. II.
0150 All fires under control and practically out. Director I out.
0324 Fire was reported in No. 7 Mount.
0325 Damage control reported fire out in No. 7 Mount.
0415 Fire reported in upper handling room of No. 3 Mount.
0420 Fire out No. 3 Mount.
0450 Stationed machine gun battery.
0500 C/C to 095 T. and G.
0500 C/S TO 25 KNOTS.
0500 Pit Log 20412.6
0520 C/C to 180 T.
0535 C/C to 13544 base course.
0537 Commenced zig-zagging in accordance to Plan 8, 98%.
0640 Shout aft reports a light at 185 R.
0630 C/C to 080. New base course zig-zagging accordance to
Plan 8.
0640 Set Condition YOKE.
0655 Set condition III Section II.
Readings from Engineers Bell Book
2100 Nov. 14 until 0300 Nov. 15
November 14 2331 - 95
2100 - Counter 2400 - Counter
2125 - 113 November 15
2127 - 108 0020 - 134
2133 - 113 0031 - 139
2135 - 134 0040 - 162
2153 - 138 0049 - 170
2200 - Counter 0049 - 172
2200 - 140 0057 - 162
2214 - 142 0100 - Counter
2215 - 145 0101 - 172
2241 - 140 0102 - Full
2250 - 145 0200 - Counter
2256 - 141 0300 - Counter
2300 - Counter
South Dakota story of the Battle off Savo Island
14-15 November 1942
On the evening of November 13, 1942, Task Force 64-centered around the
battleships USS Washington and USS South Dakota and screened by four
destroyers-broke away from Task Force 16 south of Guadalcanal. Their
mission was urgent: intercept and destroy a heavily escorted Japanese
convoy attempting to reinforce the island.
By late morning on November 14, the force had reached a position
roughly fifty miles south-by-west of Guadalcanal. Throughout the day,
they maneuvered cautiously, avoiding enemy aircraft. Though sighted
and misreported as a smaller formation, their presence was known.
Intelligence indicated multiple Japanese naval groups northwest of
Guadalcanal-damaged transports, heavy covering forces including
battleships, cruisers, and destroyers-all converging toward the
contested waters near Savo Island.
The Approach
Shortly after nightfall, Task Force 64 advanced toward Savo Island.
The sea was calm, the sky mostly overcast, and a quarter moon cast
shifting shadows across the water-ideal conditions for night combat.
At 0008 on November 15, radar and visual lookouts detected three enemy
ships bearing 330° at 18,100 yards. The leading vessel appeared large-
possibly a battleship or heavy cruiser-with two smaller cruisers
trailing. Moments later came the order:
"Open fire when ready."
At 0017, Washington fired first. Less than a minute later, South
Dakota's 16-inch guns roared to life.
The first salvos struck home. Fires erupted on enemy decks. Japanese
radio transmissions-already active-suddenly intensified in urgency and
volume. Within minutes, two of the three leading ships disappeared
from radar screens, burning and sinking into the darkness.
The third ship attempted to maneuver away, but concentrated gunfire
broke it apart. It sank soon after.
Destroyers in the Shadows
Even as the first enemy group was destroyed, radar contacts revealed
additional ships hugging the shoreline of Savo Island. Likely
destroyers, they unleashed rapid, concentrated fire.
South Dakota's secondary batteries answered. Two enemy destroyers were
observed ablaze. One exploded violently; another burned until its
fires suddenly ceased. Then came a brief, uneasy lull.
The Second Phase - Illumination and Fury
At approximately 0048, radar reported four new enemy ships approaching
from the starboard bow at only 5,800 yards.
Without warning, South Dakota was suddenly bathed in blinding white
light-four Japanese searchlights had locked onto her hull. Thirty
seconds later, enemy guns opened fire in triple and quadruple
concentration.
Shells struck the foremast structure. Power failed. Radar plots went
dark. Communications faltered. Men were killed at their battle
stations. Steam lines ruptured. Fires ignited in ammunition handling
rooms. Yet the ship fought on.
At that critical moment, Washington engaged the lead Japanese ship
with devastating accuracy. Her heavy guns tore into what was believed
to be an enemy battleship. Observers saw thick smoke and a deep red
glow within the hull. The vessel was heavily damaged and likely
crippled.
Meanwhile, South Dakota's guns found the illuminating cruiser. After
two or three salvos, the enemy ship broke in two and vanished from
radar-destroyed.
A third cruiser was set ablaze, pouring thick black smoke into the
night. The final ship in the column faded into darkness under
secondary fire.
By 0110, enemy fire ceased entirely. The night fell silent except for
the crackle of onboard fires and the cries of wounded sailors.
Damage and Withdrawal
South Dakota had taken numerous hits-primarily 6- and 8-inch shells.
Many enemy projectiles failed to detonate, passing through structures
without exploding. Though the foremast was heavily damaged and radar
systems crippled, the ship's hull remained largely intact.
Power had failed repeatedly during combat, forcing rapid and frequent
shifts in fire control. Yet radar-directed gunnery proved decisive.
Nearly every opening salvo struck its mark.
With communications disrupted and destroyers damaged or sunk ahead,
the decision was made to withdraw to the prearranged rendezvous.
As the battleship turned southward at high speed, burning enemy ships
could be seen astern. At 0130, a massive explosion illuminated the
horizon-likely the final death of one of the crippled enemy vessels.
At 0213, radio contact was briefly reestablished with Washington. The
engagement was over.
The Outcome
Between fifteen and eighteen Japanese ships were believed engaged
during the action. Confirmed or probable results included:
" One battleship or heavy cruiser sunk by Washington
" One cruiser sunk by South Dakota
" Another cruiser sunk or left burning
" At least one destroyer destroyed, others damaged
" A second enemy battleship heavily damaged
Despite sustaining multiple hits and severe system failures, South
Dakota fired:
" 115 rounds of 16-inch ammunition
" Over 300 rounds of 5-inch
" Hundreds of 40mm and 1.1-inch rounds
" Nearly 2,000 rounds of 20mm
Radar fire control was decisive. Opening salvos hit at ranges up to
18,000 yards-demonstrating the overwhelming advantage of American
night radar gunnery.
Dictionary of Fighting Ships
South Dakota BB-57
The second South Dakota (BB-57) was laid down on 5 July 1939 at Camden,
N.J., by the New York Shipbuilding Corp.; launched on 7 June 1941;
sponsored by Mrs. Harlan J. Bushfield; and commissioned on 20 March 1942,
Capt. Thomas L. Gatch in command.
After fitting out at Philadelphia, South Dakota held shakedown training
from 3 June to 26 July. She stood out of Philadelphia Navy Yard on 16
August and headed for Panama. The battleship transited the Panama
Canal on 21 August and set course for the Tonga Islands, arriving at
Nukualofa, Tongatabu, on 4 September. Two days later, she struck an
uncharted coral pinnacle in Lahai Passage and suffered extensive damage to
her hull. On 12 September, the ship sailed for the Pearl Harbor Navy
Yard and repairs.
South Dakota was ready for sea again on 12 October and began training
with Task; Force (TF) 16 which was built around aircraft carrier
Enterprise (CV-6). The task force sortied from Pearl Harbor on 16
October to join TF 17, which was centered on carrier Hornet (CV-8),
northeast of Espiritu Santo. The rendezvous was made on the 24th; and the
combined force, now operating as TF 61 under Rear Admiral T. C. Kinkaid,
was ordered to make a sweep of the Santa Cruz Islands and then move
southwest to block any Japanese forces approaching Guadalcanal.
"Catalina" patrol bombers sighted a Japanese carrier force at noon on
the 25th, and TF 61 steamed northwest to intercept it. Early the next
morning, when all carrier forces were within striking range, a Japanese
snooper spotted the American force, triggering the Battle of Santa Cruz.
South Dakota and the Enterprise group were approximately 10 miles from
the Hornet group when the air battle began.
The first enemy attack was concentrated against Hornet. At 1045, South
Dakota was operating near Enterprise to provide protective fire from her
numerous antiaircraft guns when their group was attacked by dive
bombers. Approximately an hour later, about 40 torpedo planes struck at
the two ships. A third aerial assault, made by dive bombers and torpedo
planes, came in at 1230. South Dakota sustained a 500-pound bomb hit on
top of her number one turret. When the action was broken off that
evening, the American forces retired toward Noumea, New Caledonia, with
the battleship credited with downing 26 enemy planes.
At 0414 on 30 October, while avoiding a submarine contact, South Dakota and
Mahan (DD-364) collided, causing damage to both ships. Mahan's bow was
turned to port and crumpled to frame 14, and a fire, soon brought under
control, started in her forward hold. Both ships continued to Noumea
where Vestal (AR-4) repaired South Dakota's collision and battle damage.
On 11 November, South Dakota, as part of TF 16, sortied from Noumea for
Guadalcanal. On 13 November, she joined battleship Washington (BB-56) and
destroyers Preston (DD-379), Walke (DD-418), Benham (DD-397), and Gwin
(DD-433) to form TF 64 under command of Rear Admiral W. A. Lee. The next
evening at 2330, the force was operating 50 miles southwest of Guadalcanal
when Lee learned that an enemy convoy was coming through the passage off
Savo sometime between 0030 and 0230. This was Admiral Kondo's
bombardment group consisting of battleship Kirishima; heavy cruisers
Takao and Atago; and a destroyer screen.
Admiral Kondo's forces were divided into three sections: the bombardment
group; a close screen of cruiser Nagara and six destroyers; and a
distant screen of cruiser Sendai and three destroyers in the van of the
other forces. A quarter moon assured good visibility. Three ships were
visually sighted from the bridge of South Dakota, range 18,100 yards.
Washington fired on the leading ship, thought to be a battleship or heavy
cruiser; and, a minute later, South Dakota's main battery opened on the
ship nearest to her. Both initial salvos started fires on the targets.
South Dakota then fired on another target and continued firing until it
disappeared from her radar screen. Turret No. 3-firing over her stern and
demolishing her own planes in the process-opened on another target and
continued firing until the target was thought to sink. Her secondary
batteries were firing at eight destroyers close to the shore of Savo
Island.
A short lull followed after which radar plot showed four enemy ships,
just clear of the left tangent of Savo, approaching from the starboard
bow; range 5,800 yards. Searchlights from the second ship in the enemy
column illuminated South Dakota. Washington opened with her main battery
on the leading, and largest, Japanese ship. South Dakota's secondary
batteries put out the lights; and she shifted all batteries to bear on
the third ship, believed to be a cruiser, which soon gushed smoke. South
Dakota, which had been under fire from at least three of the ships, had
taken 42 hits which caused considerable damage. Her radio communications
failed; radar plot was demolished; three fire control radars were damaged;
there was a fire in her foremast; and she had lost track of Washington.
As she was no longer receiving enemy fire and there were no remaining
targets, she withdrew; met Washington at a prearranged rendezvous; and
proceeded to Noumea. Of the American destroyers, only Gwin returned to
port. The other three had been severely damaged early in the engagement.
Walke and Preston were sunk. Benham had part of her bow blown off by a
torpedo and, while en route to Noumea with the damaged Gwin as her
escort, had to be abandoned. Gwin then sank her by gunfire. On the enemy
side, hits had been scored on Takao and Atago; Kirishima and destroyer
Ayanami, severely damaged by gunfire, were abandoned and scuttled.
Prometheus (AR-3) repaired some of the damage inflicted on South Dakota at
Noumea, enabling the battleship to sail on the 25th for Tongatabu and
thence for home. South Dakota arrived at New York on 18 December 1942 for
an overhaul and the completion of repairs to her battle damage. She was
back at sea on 25 February 1943 and, following sea trials, operated with
Ranger (CV-4) in the North Atlantic until mid-April.
The battleship next operated with the British Home Fleet, based at Scapa
Flow, until 1 August when she returned to- Norfolk. On 21 August, South
Dakota stood out of Norfolk en route to Efate Island, arriving at
Havannah Harbor on 14 September. She moved to Fiji on 7 November and
sortied from there four days later with Battleship Divisions (BatDiv) 8
and 9 in support of Task Group (TG) 50.1, the Carrier Interceptor Group
for Operation "Galvanic," the Gilbert Islands assault. The carriers
launched attacks against Jaluit and Mili atolls, Marshall Islands, on 19
November, to neutralize enemy airfields there. The force then provided air
support for the amphibious landings on Makin and Tarawa, Gilbert Islands.
South Dakota, with five other battleships, formed another task group on 6
December to bombard Nauru Island. A joint aerial attack and shore
bombardment severely damaged enemy shore installations and airfields
there. South Dakota retired to Efate on 12 December 1943 for upkeep and
rearming. Her next action occurred on 29 January 1944 when the carriers
launched attacks against Roi and Namur, Marshall Islands. The next day,
the battleship moved in to shell enemy positions on Roi and Namur and then
rejoined the carriers as they provided air support for the amphibious
landings on Kwajalein, Majuro, Roi, and Namur.
South Dakota departed the Marshall Islands on 12 February with the Truk
striking force which launched attacks against that Japanese stronghold on
17 and 18 February. Six days later, she was in the screen for the
carriers which launched the first air attacks against the Marianas. The
force was under constant enemy air attack, and South Dakota splashed
four Japanese planes. She returned to Majuro from 26 February until 22
March when she sailed with the fast carrier forces of the of the 5th
Fleet. Air strikes were delivered from 30 March until 1 April against
Palau, Yap, Woleai, and Ulithi in the Western Caroline Islands.
South Dakota returned to Majuro on 6 April and sailed the following week,
again accompanying the fast carriers. On 21 April, strikes were launched
against Hpllandia, New Guinea, and the following day against Aitape,
Tanahmerah, and Humboldt Bays to support the Army landings. On 29 and 30
April, the carriers, with South Dakota, still in the screen, returned
to Truk and bombed that base. The next day, the battleship was part of a
surface bombardment group that shelled Ponape Island in the Carolines.
She returned to Majuro for upkeep from 4 May to 5 June when she got
underway with TF 58 to participate in Operation "Forager," the landings
on Saipan and Tinian. The carriers began launching attacks on the llth
against enemy installations throughout the islands. On the 13th, South
Dakota and six other battleships were detached from the fast carrier
groups to bombard Saipan and Tinian. South Dakota shelled the northwest
coast of Tanapag Harbor, Saipan, for over six hours with both her
primary and secondary batteries.
On the evening of the 15th, 8 to 12 enemy fighters and bombers broke
through the combat air patrol and attacked the task group. South Dakota
fired at four and splashed one; and the remaining 11 were shot down by
fire from other ships. On 19 June, the battleship was again operating
with the fast carriers. It was known that a major Japanese force was
approaching from the west, and the American capital ships were placed so
that they could continue to support the ground forces on Saipan and also
intercept this enemy force.
At 1012, a large group of bogies was reported coming in from the west.
At 1049, a "Judy" dropped a 500-pound bomb on South Dakota's main deck
where it blew a large hole, cut wiring and piping, but inflicted no
other serious material damage. However, personnel losses were heavy: 24
killed and 27 wounded. The ship continued to fight throughout the day as
air attacks were continuous. This was the first day of the Battle of the
Philippine Sea and was called the "Marianas Turkey Shoot" as the Japanese
lost over 300 aircraft. The air battle continued throughout the 20th.
When it ended, the badly mauled Japanese fleet no longer posed a threat
to the American conquest of the Marianas. The task group returned to
Ulithi on 27 June, and South Dakota sailed via Pearl Harbor to the west
coast, arriving at Puget Sound on 10 July.
The battleship was overhauled at the navy yard there; and, after sea
trials, sailed on 26 August for Pearl Harbor. South Dakota was routed to
Ulithi and, upon her arrival, was attached to TG 38.3; one of four task
groups of formed Task Force 38, the Fast Carrier Task Force. The task
force sortied on 6 October and, four days later, launched air attacks
against Okinawa. On the 12th and 13th, attacks were flown against
shipping and installations in Formosa. Three of the groups, including
South Dakota's, retired and operated east of the Phillippine Islands
until 24 December. During the operation, carriers of the group flew
strikes against targets on Manila and Luzon to support the landings on
Mindoro. From 30 December 1944 through 26 January 1945, the fast carriers
alternated strikes between Formosa on 3, 4, 9, 15, and 21 January; Luzon
on the 6th and 7th; Cape San Jacques and Camranh Bay on the 12th; Hong
Kong and Hainan on the 16th; and against Okinawa on 22 January.
South Dakota operated with the fast carriers in their strikes against
the Tokyo area on 17 February and against Iwo Jima on the 19th and 20th
in support of amphibious landings there. Tokyo again was the target on
the 25th, and Okinawa's turn came on 1 March. After rearming at
Ulithi, the task groups sailed toward Japan again and pounded targets in
the Kobe, Kure, and Kyushu areas on 18 and 19 March. They launched
strikes against Okinawa on the 23d; and, on the 24th, the battleship
joined a bombardment group which shelled southeastern Okinawa. She
rejoined her task group which, after bombing Okinawa, struck enemy
airfields in southern Kyushu on the 29th and then, from 31 March through
3 April, again pounded targets on Okinawa. On 7 April, all fast
carriers launched attacks against an enemy fleet off southwest Kyushu,
sinking Japan's fast super battleship Yamato, two cruisers, and four
destroyers.
South Dakota once more participated in shore bombardment on southeastern
Okinawa on 19 April in support of an all-out offensive by the XXIV Army
Corps against enemy lines.
While rearming from Wrangell (AE-12) on 6 May, a tank of 16-inch high
capacity powder exploded, causing a fire and exploding four more tanks.
Turret No. 2 magazines were flooded and the fires put out. The ship lost
three men killed instantly; eight more died of injuries; and 24 others
suffered non-fatal wounds. The ship retired to Guam from 11 to 29 May
when she sailed for Leyte, arriving on 1 June.
South Dakota departed Leyte on 1 July, supporting the carriers of TG 38.1
which attacked the Tokyo area on the 10th. On 14 July, as part of a
bombardment group, she participated in the shelling of the Kamaishi Steel
Works, Kamaishi, Honshu, Japan. This was the first gunfire attack on the
Japanese home islands by heavy warships. From 15 through 28 March, South
Dakota again supported the carriers as they launched strikes against
Honshu and Hokkaido. On the night of 29 and 30 July, she participated in
the shore bombardment of Hamamatsu, Honshu, and, on the 9th, again shelled
Kamaishi. The battleship supported the carriers in strikes against
northern Honshu on 10 August, and in the Tokyo area on the 13th and
15th. The latter was the last strike of the war for, later that day,
Japan capitulated.
She anchored in Sagami Wan, Honshu, on 27 August and entered Tokyo Bay
on the 29th. South Dakota steamed out of Tokyo Bay on 20 September and
proceeded, via Okinawa and Pearl Harbor, to the west coast of the United
States. On 29 October, she moved down the coast from San Francisco to
San Pedro. She sailed from the west coast on 3 January 1946 for
Philadelphia and a yard overhaul. In Jun% she was attached to the
Atlantic Reserve Fleet. On 31 January 1947, she was placed in reserve, out
of commission. The battleship remained in that status until she was
struck from the Navy list on 1 June 1962. On 25 October 1962, she was
sold to Lipsett Division, Luria Bros, and Co., Inc., for scrap.
South Dakota received 13 battle stars for World War II service.
South Dakota Class
BB-57 South Dakota
BB-58 Indiana
BB-59 Massachusetts
BB-60 Alabama
Dimensions:
Displacement: 35,000 tons (stand)
44,700 tons (Mean War Service)
Length: 680' (oa)
Beam: 108'
Draft: 36' (max)
Armament:
9 16"/45
20 5"/38 DP (South Dakota 16)
14 40 mm quads (South Dakota 17
Massachusetts 18)
38-76 20 mm
Propulsion:
Speed: 27 knots (max)
Max. cruising
radius: 6,400 miles @ 25 knots
17,000 miles @ 15 knots
Horsepower: 130,000 (shaft)
Drive: 4 screws; geared turbines
Fuel: 6,825 tons oil (max)
Aircraft:
3 SC-1
Remarks:
Improved and more compact versions of the North Carolina design, the
SOUTH DAKOTA Class of four units represents probably the maximum in
combat effectiveness for its displacement among the world's newer
battleship. Their somewhat shorter length makes them extremely maneuverable
ships. Mounted a deck level higher, their secondary batteries are in drier
positions than in the NORTH CAROLINA. In the SOUTH DAKOTA herself,
one pair of twin 5"-gun turrets is omitted to make room for additional flag
accommodations.
Fairing of the single broad stack into the tower foremast structure has
resulted in a pyramidal superstructure. This appearance feature renders
difficult the estimation of target angles by visual means. The general
superstructure arrangement was followed in the reconstruction of the older
TENNESSE Class and WEST VIRGINIA.
To learn more about the U.S.S. South Dakota Please visit these
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U.S.S. South Dakota Home
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