U.S.S. WASHINGTON BB-56 Naval Battle off Guadalcanal November 12-15 1942

File NO. BB56/A12-1/ (TS133) lo-whp U.S.S. WASHINGTON c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, California 30 Dec 1942 From: The Commanding Officer. To: The Chief of Naval Operations, (Office of Naval Records and Library). Subject: (A) War Diary U.S.S. WASHINGTON, For Period from November 1, 1942 to December 1, 1942. 1. In accordance with Cominch File FF1/A12-1(7), Serial 291/A12-1 (420222) of February 22, 1942, enclosure (A) is forwarded herewith. G. B. DAVIS Copy to: COMBATDIV SIX W A R D I A R Y U. S. S. WASHINGTON From: 0000 November 1, 1942 To: 0000 December 1, 1942 WAR DIARY U.S.S. WASHINGTON c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, Calif. From: 0000 Sunday, November 1 to 2400 Tuesday, November 10. Zone: minus 11. Anchored in Dumbea Bay, Noumea, New Caledonia, protected by anti-torpedo net. Ships present ARGONNE (SOPA), WASHINGTON (COMMANDER BATTLESHIPS DIVISION SIX), SOUTH DAKOTA, ENTERPRISE (COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN), PENSACOLA, NORTHAMPTON, PORTLAND, JUNEAU SAN DIEGO, SAN JUAN, WHIPPLE, CUSHING, PRESTON, SMITH, MAHAN, STACK, HUGHES, ANDERSON, MUSTIN, RUSSELL, MORRIS, NICHOLAS, LANSDOWNE, WHITNEY, LASSEN, ALDEBARAN, SOLACE, VESTAL, ALHENA ANTARES, WILLIAM WARD BURROWS, ZEILIN, MC CAWLEY, WRIGHT, HOVEY, SABINE and other ships and craft. Fueled from CHESTER SUN on November 1 and 2. Went to General Quarters and prepared for emergency sortie morning of November 4 due to unidentified carrier sighted off Royalty Island. Unverified. Secured on orders from SOPA. WAR DIARY U.S.S. WASHINGTON c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, Calif. From: 0000 to 2400 Wednesday, November 11, 1942. Zone: minus 11. minus 12 after 1800. 2000: 22-26-00 S 165-47-30 E Course made good from 0800 November 11 to 0800 November 12 - 301° Speed made good from 0800 November 11 to 0800 November 12 - 9 kts. Anchored as before. Underway at 1210 and went to General Quarters for sortie with TASK FORCE SIXTEEN composed of U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN and OFFICER IN TACTICAL COMMAND), WASHINGTON (COMMANDER BAT- TLESHIPS DIVISION SIX), SOUTH DAKOTA, NORTHAMPTON, SAN DIEGO HUGHES, ANDERSON, MUSTIN, RUSSELL, WALKE, MORRIS, CLARK and BENHAM. WASHINGTON (COMMANDER BATTLESHIP DIVISION SIX), SOUTH DAKOTA and NORTHAMPTON designated Surface Attack Group 16.3. Standard speed 20 knots. Received the following visual from COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN "This force is proceeding west of Poppy to Latitude 14-00, Longitude 161-30, to arrive 0800 Friday to be in position to strike Guadalcanal area." WAR DIARY U.S.S. WASHINGTON c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, Calif. From: 0000 to 2400 Thursday, November 12, 1942. Zone: minus 12. 0800: 20-21-30 S 162-59-00 E 1200: 19-41-05 S 162-48-00 E 2000: 18-01-00 S 161-48-00 E Course made good from 0800 November 12 to 0800 November 13 - 345°. Speed made good from 0800 November 12 to 0800 November 13 - 16 kts. Steaming in formation with TASK FORCE SIXTEEN zigzagging according to plan during daylight hours. U.S.S. PENSACOLA, GWIN AND PRESTON joined the Task Force at 0940. Received the following message during the day: Visual 120145 - From COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN - "We will pass through enemy sub line tonight X Be especially alert" Visual 120205 - From COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN - "When under attack speed will be 25 or 27 knots and turn will be made with full rudder X It is probable full circle will be turned X All ships must be alert" WAR DIARY U.S.S. WASHINGTON c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, Calif. From: 0000 to 2400 Friday, November 13, 1942. Zone: minus 12. 0800: 14-21-30 S 161-17-30 E 1200: 13-52-00 S 161-39-00 E 2000: 13-59-00 S 161-52-00 E Course made good from 0800 November 13 to 0800 November 14 - 336°. Speed made good from 0800 November 13 to 0800 November 14 - 10 kts. Steaming as before. Held regular dawn General Quarters. At 1046 SOUTH DAKOTA reported torpedo wake. Ex- ecuted emergency turn left to 285(T) and increased speed to 25 knots. BENHAM left the formation to investigate but failed to make contact. Unidentified aircraft sighted at 1148 bearing 292(T) 15 miles. Disappeared at 1155. (See COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN visual 130230). At 1915 changed standard speed to 24 knots and COMMANDER BATTLE- SHIPS DIVISION SIX in WASHINGTON with SOUTH DAKOTA, WALKE, GWIN, BENHAM and PRESTON left TASK FORCE SIXTEEN in accord- ance with COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN's visual. COMMANDER BATTLESHIP DIVISION SIX designated COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTY FOUR. 130230 from COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN: We were sighted and reported by a seaplane which our VF shot down about noon. We are proceeding to cover our forces retiring from Cactus. 130654 from COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN to COM- MMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTY FOUR: Proceed north with both BBs and your four DDs at best speed. Proceed vicinity east of Savo Island only if directed by COMSOPAC. Rejoin at morning rendezvous if not otherwise directed. 132000 from COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTY FOUR to TASK FORCE SIXTY FOUR: This force designated TASK FORCE SIXTY FOUR is operating to southward of Solomons. Objective enemy transport force from Faisi or those encountered. Be alert for an attack. Our carrier to southeastward. WAR DIARY U.S.S. WASHINGTON c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, Calif. From: 0000 to 2400 Friday, November 14, 1942. Zone: minus 12. 0800: 10-41-30 S 159-35-30 E 1200: 10-29-00 S 159-17-30 E 2000: 09-45-00 S 159-22-00 E Course made good from 0800 November 14 to November 15 (0800) - 095°. Speed made good from 0800 November 14 to November 15 (0800) - 2.5 kts. Steaming with TASK FORCE SIXTY FOUR on course 000(T). Sky overcast to mainly cloudy with rainsqualls during day. Went to General Quarters at 0527. Sighted Guadalcanal 25 miles distant bearing 000(T) to 035(T) at 0625. Numerous radar unidentified plane contacts made during the day. TASK FORCE SIXTY FOUR give rendezvous for next morning in event of separation. Changed course at 1739 to 320° passing through channel between Russel Island and Guadalcanal. See Action Report, Night of November 14-15 (Enclosure a). WAR DIARY U.S.S. WASHINGTON c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, Calif. From: 0000 to 2400 Friday, November 15, 1942. Zone: minus 12. 0800: 10-47-00 S 160-42-00 E 1200: 11-10-30 S 159-17-30 E 2000: 12-36-00 S 162-47-00 E Course made good from 0800 November 15 to 0800 November 16 - 141° 30". Speed made good from 0800 November 15 to 0800 November 16 - 15 kts. At 0016 engaged enemy (see Action Report, Night of November 14-15). Retired southward independently at 0216. Sky overcast all morning with rain beginning at noon and continuing all day. Wind up to 23 knots. Secured from General Quarters at 0649. Ordered by COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE to proceed toward Button to ren- dezvous with fully fueled destroyers and operate so as to reach Savo Island by 2200 love 15th At 0951 sighted the SOUTH DAKOTA bearing 2690(T) 17.5 miles. Received the visual: "We are not ef- fective. Turret 3 out X Fire control badly damaged X Only one radar operative X Fuel tank holed." At 1105 eight unidentified planes sighted on port beam 12 miles distant. Went to General Quarters. Five unidentified planes sighted fifteen minutes later. No further contacts made. Received orders from COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE to proceed directly to Noumea. At 2240 U.S.S. DALE, STACK and LARDNER joined the formation and formed anti-submarine screen. WAR DIARY U.S.S. WASHINGTON c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, Calif. From: 0000 to 2400 Friday, November 16, 1942. Zone: minus 12. after 1400 minus 11. 0800: 15-25-00 S 164-15-30 E 1200: 16-34-00 S 162-59-30 E 2000: 18-54-00 S 162-08-30 E Course made good from 0800 November 16 to 0800 November 17 - 174°. Speed made good from 0800 November 16 to 0800 November 17 - 17 kts. Steaming as before. Standard speed 24 kts. Sky mostly cloudy to overcast with winds up to 20 knots during the day. Held regular dawn and sunset General Quarters. Went to General Quarters at 1435 to unload 16" guns through the muzzle in offset firing practice on the SOUTH DAKOTA. Expended 9 rounds of 16" ammunition. WAR DIARY U.S.S. WASHINGTON c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, Calif. From: 0000 to 2400 Friday, November 17, 1942. Zone: minus 11. 0800: 22-13-S 164-58-E 1200: 22-33-00 S 166-15-30 E Course made good from 0800 November 17 to 0800 November 18 - 119° 30". Speed made good from 0800 November 17 to 0800 November 18 - 9.3 kts. Steaming as before. Held regular dawn General Quarters. Radar contacted New Caledonia 0200 bearing 090(T) at 56 miles. Made radar contacts with friendly planes dur- ing morning. Went to General Quarters for entrance and an- chored at 1420 in Dumbea Bay, Noumea, New Caledonia. Ships present: ARGONNE (SENIOR OFFICER PRESENT AFLOT), WASHINGTON (COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTY FOUR), ENTER- PRISE (COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN), SOUTH DAKOTA, SAN DIEGO, DALE, MAHAN, LAMON, CONYNGHAM, DUNLAP, STACK, HUGHES, GRAYSON, CLARKE, LARDNER, RUSSELL, VIERO, WHITNEY, WRIGHT, PROMETHEUS, VESTAL, ARD 2, BARNETT, HUNTER LIGGETT, KENMORE, MC KEAN, PLATTE, LACKAWANNA, ALCHEBE, ANTARES, LASSEN, ALDEBAAN, ROAMER, MATSONIA, E. J. HENRY, and other ships and craft. WAR DIARY U.S.S. WASHINGTON c/o Fleet Post Office San Francisco, Calif. From: 0000 November 18 to 2400 November 30, 1942. Zone: minus 11. Anchored as before with anti-torpedo net around ship. Received 16" and 5" ammunition from USS LASSEN on November 19. SOUTH DAKOTA, ALYWIN and DALE stood out on November 25.

CONFIDENTIAL U.S.S. WASHINGTON 11-JR BB56/A16-3(0133) c/o Fleet Post Office, San Francisco, California. November 27, 1942. From: The Commanding Officer. To : The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet. Via : The Commander Task Force 64 (ComBatDiv 6). Subject: Action Report, Night of November 14-15, 1942. Reference: (a) U.S.N.R., 1920 Article 712 and 874(6). (b) Pacflt conf. ltr. 24 CL-42. Enclosure: (A) Track Chart. (B) Report of Executive Officer. 1. Summary of outstanding; evens and general comment. (a) On the night of November 14-15 WASHINGTON was flagship of Commander Task Force 64 (Combatdiv 6). In column, with 4 DDs ahead and SOUTH DAKOTA astern, she stood north be- tween Russell and Guadalcanal, then east and southeast, pass- ing north of Savo, to a point 13.5 miles 116°t. from the south point of Savo. Standing west from this point, first radar contact was made at 0001 with enemy ships east of Savo. From 0016 to 0019 fired 42 rounds 16", opening at 18,500 yards, at large cruiser or BB which it is believed was sunk. From 0016 to 0017 fired. 100 rounds 5" at ranges 12 to 13,000 yards at enemy cruiser or large DD which was also engaged by SOUTH DAKOTA and was left burning. Standing on northwesterly courses fired 133 rounds 5" from 0025 to 0034 at ranges about 10,000 yards at light craft close to southeast shore of Savo which were engaging our DDs; all were silenced and one left burn- ing. From 0100 to 0107 fired 75 rounds 16" and 107 rounds 5" at ranges from 8,400 to 12,650 yards, at BB northwest of Savo which was firing at SOUTH DAKOTA. This BB was silenced. and was subsequently tracked by radar through a 500° turn. From 0100 to 0107 fired 120 rounds 5", at ranges from 7,400 to 9,500 yards, in succession at 3 enemy cruisers illuminating and engaging SOUTH DAKOTA and also under her fire; they were silenced. Sighted several torpedo wakes, presumably from MTBs, while retiring on southerly courses near east end of Russell. (b) By the time our 5" fire on light craft close to southeast shore of Savo had ceased, 1 of our DDS was sunk, 1 was hopelessly afire (he exploded and sank a few minutes later), and the other 2 were put out of action (they retired to southward). Subsequently, and before we opened fire on ships northwest of Savo, the SOUTH DAKOTA was seen to the eastward between this ship and Savo on a course to northward of WASHINGTON course. What appeared to be the SOUTH DAKOTA was seen at about 0121 at a considerable distance to the southeastward between this ship and Guadalcanal on a southerly course. (c) From radar tracking and visual observation of enemy ships, there were: (1) Fired upon by this ship and apparently sunk: 1 large cruiser or BB (WASH only). 2 large cruisers (S.D. plus WASH 5"). 1 DD (our DDs plus WASH. 5"). (2) Fired upon by this ship and apparently damaged: 1 14" BB silenced and out of control (WASH. only). 1 DD burning (WASH. 5"). 5-9 lightcraft silenced (our DDS plus WAS. 5" plus S.D.). (d) There was no melee. (e) This ship was undamaged. (f) Comment. The following comments are submitted: (1) Our radar is effective for accurate gun fire at long ranges at night. Japanese radar aboard ships present, if any, is not effective for surface targets. (2) Japanese are sufficiently familiar with radar and aware of our use of it to make full use of land cover both between them end ourselves and closely backing them up. (3) Our optical vision is superior to Japanese. (4) Our fire control and the effectiveness of our pro- jectiles meet or exceed our expectations. accordingly, (5) We should seek rather than avoid night action, opening at ranges as great as satisfactory solutions can be obtained. (6) Surface craft need an effective means of radar identification urgently. (7) For full effectiveness in night firing we need/ radar means of spotting in deflection. 2. Preliminary Operations. (a)(1) Enemy forces had shelled our positions in Guadalcanal on the previous night. The enemy was known to be making most strenuous efforts to reinforce his position in Guadalcanal. (2) Enemy forces as reported on November 14th: Time Position (Zone-12) Composition (Lat.S)(Long.E) Course-Speed Remarks 0355 Enemy Ships Vicinity Savo Island --- --= Operating _____________________________________________________________________ 0800 1 BB - 2 CA 150 mi. from Guadal- 120 15 * 4 DD - 1 CV canal Brg. 300_________________________ 0815 2 BB - 1 CL 300°150 mi. from 130 25 * 11 DD Guadalcanal____________________________ 0830 12 AP 07-55; 157-45 --- -- _____________________________________________________________________ 1010 1 CC - 1 DD Brg. 080 Marau Sound --- -- Unidenti- Guadalcanal fied_____ 1015(TOR) 4 CA - 3 DD 170 mi. from Guadal- --- 16 1 CA canal bearing 280 burning__ 1035 2 CL - 2 DD 08-00; 156-20 350 25 _____________________________________________________________________ 1036(TOR) 5 ships 07-00; 160-20 340 -- 1 ship damaged__ 1050 2 CV 08-16; 158-43 --- -- _____________________________________________________________________ 1104(TOR) 25 ships in- 08-15; 158-43 130 -- cluding 2 CV(?)____________________________________________ 1105 2 CB - 3 CC 09-00; 157-15 310 25 6 DD_______________________________________________________ 1600 12 AP plus sev- 80 mi. from Guadal- --- -- eral small canal bearing 311. vessels.___________________________________________________ 1600 1 CA - 1 CL 08-40; 159-00 --- -- No CV 6 DD - 4 AP observed_ 1700 11 AP - several 60 mi. NW Savo Milling 6 AP DD Island around seriously damaged__ 1700 4 CA - 1 CL 06-52; 160-00 165 17 10 DD._____________________________________________________ 1757 Enemy forces 60 mi. NW Savo --- -- Island_________________________________ 1835(TOR) 2 AP burning 70 mi. from Guadal- 305 -- 3 of the 5 5 AP underway canal smoking._ * Reported as possibly being same force. 1836 1 BB - 1 CC - 09-50; 159-30 350 10 Probably 4 DD our own force____ 1845 9 AP - DD - CC - 80 mi. Brg. 315 from 2 AP 3 AP dead 1 large unident- Guadalcanal Course N in water; ified. 2 AP 2 AP burn- course NE ing_ 1848 AP's - CL - DD 08-20; 159-10 --- -- _____________________________________________________________________ 1920 11 vessels in- 08-25; 158-15 --- -- Engaged in cluding 1 CL surface battle; 3 burning._ 2000 Position enemy (Refers to 1848 302 -- AP's unchanged; report) 1 CL, several DD's same posi- tion.______________________________________________________ 2010(TOR) 1 CL - 1 DD Cove in Savo --- 0 Island_________________________________ 2110 unknown 09-10; 158-45 --- -- Naval bat- tle in progress__ 0006 3 ships just rounded north --- -- of Savo headed west_____________________ (3) From contact reports, radar tracking, and visual observa- tions of enemy ships there were apparently present: 2 BB, 6 CA or CL, 5 large unidentified, 7-14 DD's and MTB's. (b) Our Operations. (Time Zone-12) (1) Approached on northerly course about nine (9) miles to the westward of Guadalcanal. (2) At 2100 in position Lat. 9-19-50 S, Long. 159-26-45E, on course 020°T, at 23 kts. (3) At 2135 TASK FORCE 64 was disposed in column, as follows: WALKE, BENHAM, PRESTON, GWIN, WASHINGTON, SOUTH DAKOTA. (4) At 2209 this ship changed course to 090, following DDs, and passed Northernmost point of Savo Island abeam to tar- board at 2245 distant 22,000 yards. (5) At 2249 this ship c/c to 150 degrees following DDS. (6) At 2330 changed formation speed to 17 knots. (7) At 2352 this ship c/ c to 270 degrees following DDS. (8) Track during remainder of approach, and during action and retirement shown on tracing (Enclosure "A") (9) Current: On approach to Guadalcanal in Coral Sea current of 1 Kt. to the eastward was noted. In passage between Florida and Savo Islands the current was westerly 1 Kt. (10) Piloting: No lighted navigational landmarks. No diffi- culty was experienced during moonlight. After moonset landmarks were obscure at distances greater than 5 miles. (c) Weather: (1) temperature 83 degrees. (2) Wind: From 170 (T) 7 kts. (3) Clouds: Scattered Cirrus Cumulus, tenths, none over- head. (4) Visibility: Prominent landmarks seen at distances as great as 25 miles during moonlight. After moonset prominent landmarks could be seen at 12 miles distance. (5) Sea: Flat, calm. (6) Moonset: 0058, 15 November 1942. 3. CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF BATTLE. TIME EVENT 2058 Message from plane to another, intercepted, that 1 cruiser and 1 destroyer were in a cove at Savo Island. About Many reports of gunfire over the horizon North and North- 2100 west of Russell I glands. Glows such as of ship afire, glows to flaring up such as by explosions. A large explosion on the 2318 Port beam reported during this period. 2125 Slowed to 20 knots. 2131 Something burning wag reported as 2 points forward of the port beam (about 310° T). 2135 Increased speed to 23 knots. 2145 Unidentified plane bearing 080, range 8,400, flashed sig- na1 appeared to be numeral "9" plane on southerly course. 2150 This force commenced a change of course in succession from the van to 090°T. 2202 A glow was reported at 270° relative (290°T). 2209 On course 090°T. 2215 Gunfire was reported at 202° relative (292°T). 2249 Changed course to 150°T. 2317 Dull light on eastern part of Savo Island about half way up hill. 2319 A red rocket wag reported at 10° relative. 2332 Changed speed to 17 knots. 2352 Changed course to 270° T, 0000 Light bearing 245 relative (115°T) range 19,600. 0001 Target bearing 340 degrees True, and range 18,000 yards picked up simultaneously by Radars 2 (SG) and 4 (FC). Main Battery Director 2 tracked for 2 minutes and then lost it because of land interference. In this location land signals were being received on the fire control and search (CXAM) radar screens at almost the game position on the screen as the target. Some of these echoes came from Santa Isabel, over a hundred thousand yards away ( the sweep frequency is such that a repeat is made every hun- dred thousand yards); others were Bide lobes from Savo Island. 0003 Reports of floating objects in the water ahead and smell of oil. 0005 S.B. Director 1 reported a radar contact 070 degrees rela- tive (340°T), range 19,600. There were probably 3 to 8 ships in the two groups East of Savo. 0006 Report received from Guadalcanal Control that 3 ships just rounded the North of Savo headed West. 0008 During this period Radar Plot was reporting two ships on the same bearing, 1 at 15,000 and 1 at 18,000 yards. Float- ing objects reported in water. 0010 Two radar targets reported by S.B., 18,000 and 18,400 (no bearing given). Full Condition ZED set; C02 on gasoline and paint stowages. Secondary Battery Director 3 reported as being on target. MB Plot shifted to Rangekeeper 1 to train from SB director in order to designate to the main battery directors. The train wag too erratic to be reliable. 0011 Shifted to M.B. Director 1 In train. 0012 M.B. Director 1 picked up the further target optically and checked it to be the one on which the radar wag ranging (described by all radars as the largest target). Described by Spot 1 as possibly a TENRYU class CL. A closer Ship was seen slightly to the left. 0013 Started getting Main Battery Radar ranges. 0014 SOUTH DAKOTA given permission by TBS to open fire. 0015 SOUTH DAKOTA reported by TBS a surface contact 345°T dis- tance 16,300 yards. 0016 Main Battery opened fire on target at a range of 18,500 yards. S.B. opened fire on closer targets possibly DDs, groups 1 and 3 firing (2 mounts each). Probably about 15,000 yards range, possibly less. S.B. Group 1 Officer stated that there appeared to be 3 DD in the group at which he fired. 0016 M.B. Spotters blinded by S.B. opening at time of splash. First salvo observed "over" by Radar 3 (FC), spotted "Down". Radar 3 lost target after the second salvo, but could still see splashes. Second salvo observed to be a straddle by Radar 4(FC). Radar operator reported "Following the second salvo the indication appeared to drop down and finally dis- appeared from the screen." M.B. Director lost target op- tically. Radar 2 (SG) Officer reported that the second or third salvo landed on the target which caused the signal to flicker. A sweep was made and then only a fuzzy flickering indication could be found, where previous indication had been. Previous signal was very strong; signal from other ships continued strong. 0017 SOUTH DAKOTA opened fire on target to the left and closer (near one of the S.B. targets). Heavy black smoke from M.B. target and a nearer vessel re- ported as obscuring the target, possibly a smoke screen. Results of S. B. fire undetermined. Three Secondary Battery Radars (FD's 7, 9 and 10) reported that the first M.B. salvo straddled the target. It is be- lieved that what they saw was the first salvo of the SOUTH DAKOTA. Second M.B. salvo was fired with radar train, re- mainder in generated. 0019 M.B. ceased firing as the result of losing the target. Changed course to 300°T. 0020 Reports of: Own DD's opening fire; own DD's bearing 020 relative (320°) have opened fire; green flare on starboard bow; enemy firing on us; SOUTH DAKOTA still firing Main Battery; white lights on port bow and beam. Changed speed to 23 knots. 0022 Green light reported bearing 115° relative (055°T). 0024 Report of: Being fired on from island (decided subsequently to be from ships this side of island); our DD's returning fire. 0025 Secondary Battery opened fire on "shore batteries" which were apparently ships. S.B. Director 3 in control of mounts 1,3,5, and 7. Group 3 fired at about 6 "shore batteries" (ships) in turn until each stopped firing. A fire was started on one at the right tangent of Savo which burned for a long time. 0026 WALKE reported opening fire on target 020° relative (320°T). M.B. ceased tracking and shifted to the end of Savo Island. Bridge reported a target broad on the starboard bow. M.B. Directors were so blinded by 5' fire that they could not find a point of aim. 0027 Radar (CXAM) picked up target bearing 040 relative (340°T), range 9,700. 0028 A ship reported by Radar plot as bearing 356°T moving around the end of the island. Other contacts following indicate that there were a number of other ships rimming the southern side of Savo (6 to 10 ships). 0029 Reports of: Ships on the starboard bow firing at us; fire started on beach (ship close to Savo); M.B. Director 1 on target, bearing 056° relative (356°T). 0031 3 excellent optical ranges were obtained on this burning ship at 10,200 yards by Range 1 (the coincidence range- finder in Turret 1.) 0032 Reports of target on starboard beam; one of our destroyers has been hit. 0033 Two of our destroyers were hit at about this time, the WALKE burned badly, the PRESTON exploded having possibly been hit by a torpedo. Reports of: men in water dead a- head; think 1 of DD's sinking; rafts ordered to be put over as we went by; all enemy fire ceased. 0034 "Cease firing" for 5" Battery given as a result of Mount 3 firing wild (Training motor kicked out and the pointers were not matched). It was feared the mount might endanger own destroyers. Explosions as of depth charges possibly from a DD of ours that had been hit. Changed speed to 26 knots. All S.B. targets lost. 0035 Changed course to 282°T. to place burning DD between us and the enemy. Radar (SC) reported 4 ships bearing 330 degrees true. Radar Plot coached the Main Battery on to one reported to be larger than the others. These targets had been obscured by Savo up to this time. M.B. started tracking. Reports of vibration starboard side, frame 95; we may have hit some submerged wreckage. PRESTON wag passed about 200 yards abeam submerged but with stack showing. 0041 Passed wreckage of burning DD (WALKE). Launched two life rafts. 0044 BENHAM reported she was O.K., 1 hit in fireroom. 0046 Burning enemy ship bearing 150 relative (072°T) sank - reported by 2 sources as a cruiser but was probably a DD. 0048 Van Destroyers ordered to retire. 0050 Course 290°T. 0054 TF 64 received a report from the SOUTH DAKOTA that she was O.K. SOUTH DAKOTA reported as shearing to starboard. Enemy ship that the Main Battery wag tracking started a change of course to the right, reversal completed by 0057. 0058 Moon set. 0059 "Transports" were reported on the starboard bow (evidently the ships already being tracked). Enemy ship on starboard beam opened search lights. 0100 "Open Fire". Main Battery opened fire bearing 008°T, range 8,400 yards on target, apparently BB. S.B. opened fire. Director 1 with Mounts 1 and 3 on M.B. target. Director 3 with mounts 5 and 7 firing on ship (probably a CA) with searchlights trained on SOUTH DAKOTA. Director 4 provided starshell illumination with Mount 9 for the main battery. The Main Battery hit the Battleship with at least 3 salvos with projectiles exploding. 0102 Green light reported on port beam. Group 3 hit the ship that had searchlights on SOUTH DAKOTA until the lights went out, then shifted to 2 others in turn until their lights were out. Fires were started on ship which SOUTH DAKOTA was hitting. 0102½ "Cease Firing". Given by Control on receipt of erroneous report that target was sunk. 0103 Reports that enemy was still firing at us apparently with 3 turrets. Believed to have fired 2 salvos in the minute and a half during which fire was ceased. 0104 Bridge, "If you can see anything to shoot at, go ahead". Main Battery resumed fire. Salvo 2 reported as a short straddle. More hits obtained. Jap BB continued fire with only 1 turret (aft). Warning given to keep a good look- out for enemy DD's on both bows. 0107 Green light reported on port bow. Control reported that the forward group was getting to its limit of train (148)". The Main Battery target was burning, and heading away. Enemy BB ceased firing. The Main Battery continued to track the burning ship for ten minutes. During this time she made a turn of at least 500°. 0114 A report was made by Spot 1 "Looks like someone opening fire on us on the starboard quarter". Order to train turrets 150° relative. 0117 Main Battery shifted to track new target bearing 120 rela- tive (049°T), 13,800 yards. The target tracked was the leading vessel of a group of 5. Its type was unrecognized. The other ships were reported as freighters but they made 26 to 29 knots during the 22 minutes the leading ship was tracked by the Main Battery. They are all believed to have been DDs. At the time of shifting, the previous target (BB) appeared to be steading on a Westerly course, speed about 18 knots. 0119 Firing reported on the starboard quarter. Doubt existed as to location of South Dakota. 0120 Changed course to 340°T. 0121 Control reported a good solution on the target Main Battery was tracking bearing 068 relative (048°T). Targets re- ported at 326°T and also at 147°T, 13,000 yards. 0123 Sky Control reported flares on starboard quarter. 0127 Radar reports 4 targets bearing 260 relative (Russell ls.?). 0132 Leading ship that Main Battery was tracking lad smoke screen that laid well. 0133 Changed course to right to 180°. Slowed to 20 knots. 0137 Heavy explosion at 245 relative (095°T). 0140 Changing course to 210°T. 0142 Sky Control reported green light on port quarter. Increased speed to 26 knots. 0144 Sky Control reported a ship signaling on port quarter. Control reported someone firing from dead astern. A splash 150 to 200 feet high landed about 200 yards astern 190° relative. Bridge reported a target ahead. Dull flashes were seen in this direction. 0145 Bridge ordered Turrets train 020 relative. Turrets 1 and 2 were trained 020 relative. The main battery continued to track the 5 unidentified vessels with director 2. 0147 Reports of flashing light on port quarter believed to be firing. 0148 Torpedo reported on port quarter. From this time until 0219 seventeen torpedoes were reported; some reports were of course duplications; some were actually light streaks from stars; from 3 to 5 are believed to have been torpedoes, all fired from abaft the beam. 0152 Report of light bearing 200 relative. 0154 Several reports were received of motor torpedo boats for some time. At least most of these were undoubtedly false. Control reported two targets 040 degrees T, 16,000. 0155 Making full power. 0157 Main Battery shifted control between Directors 1 and 2 during maneuvers to avoid torpedoes. 0208 S.B. Director 4 reported high speed targets 237 relative, 1600 yards and 194 relative, 2600 yards. Cannot see target. NOTE:- Such targets as these were probably our own bow wakes and stern waves meeting during maneuvers. 0220 Radar contact on large target 165°T, 16,000 yards. 0222 Main Battery Ceased tracking the 5 unidentified vessels to the North. M.B. started tracking large target, 165°T by radar. 0228 Report that the above Radar target appeared to be SOUTH DAKOTA, speed 27 knots. It may have been the GWIN. 0235 S.B. Director 3 tracked target bearing 320°T, 13,300 yards. 0236 Radar 2 (SG) reported 3 faint targets approaching from a- stern bearing 305°T, 10,750 yards, probably the targets that S.B. Director 3 had. For 10 minutes these targets appeared to maneuver back and forth across our wake at high speed. The closest ranges were about 9,000 yards. These are be- lieved to have been phantoms. 0240 (About) - Three explosions as of depth charges were felt, be- lieved to have been torpedoes detonating at end of run. 0244 On course 180°T. 0245 S.B. Director 3 and Radar 2 both lost the 3 targets. The large target (SOUTH DAKOTA or GWIN) was tracked for a long period of time; at 0340 it was at 060°T, 25,000 yards. 0247 Fire by the end of Guadalcanal wag reported as bursting into flame. For a long period of time during the retirement a strong glow, flaring up as by explosions was seen by many observers over the Northwestern tip of Guadalcanal. Some observers thought that there may have been some gunfire flashes. 4. Special Comments on Enemy Forces. (a) Number, types. tactics - Ships and planes. (1) No enemy aircraft were involved in the engagement. (2) Contact reports November 13-14 indicated the probable proximity of the following: 3 BB, 8-10 cruisers, 12 or more DD, 4 AK and 5 transports. Study of reports of visual and radar observations; sizes of guns as indi- cated by gun flashes, explosions and splashes; target speeds; and density of fire indicated the following: (a) East of Savo Island:- 5-8 ships. Probably 1 BB, 2-3 CA(CL), 3-4 DD. (b) Southwest of Savo Island:- 6-10 ships, - DDs and possibly large MTBs. (c) West of Savo Island:- 9 ships. Some could have been east of Savo during first phase. Probable types were 1 BB, 3 CA(CL), 5 large unidentified. (3) A recapitulation of the above indicates that there were present at the scene of the action the following: from 20 to 27 ships, 2 BB, 6 CA-CL, 5 large unidentified, and 7-14 DDs and MTBs; of these possibly 4 ships, first observed east of Savo, may have later joined the force west of the Island. This would make the total 16 to 23 Ships. (4) No MTBs were actually identified although the wake of MTBs were reported by several observers. Automatic fire from south of Savo on many bearings from which no larger caliber fire was observed indicates that large MTBs may have been in this area. It appears clearly established that there were 3-5 fast small vessels in our vicinity during retirement. (5) During the approach to the scene of battle, fires and explosions and possibly gun fire were sighted northwest of Russell Islands over the horizon. They may have come from transports set afire by planes earlier in the day; Japanese forces from North and South of Georgia may have engaged each other in error; Japanese may have been sinking abandoned ships which had been damaged November 14. (6) Fires and explosions observed over the northwestern tip of Guadalcanal during retirement may have been burning ships left in that area and abandoned ships being destroyed. Again it is possib1e that some Japanese ships fought among themselves as a result of confusion. Tactics (7) The four heavy ships Northwest of Savo Island may have been covering the 4 auxiliaries which were beached on Guadalcanal about 0330, November 15, and which may have remained north of Savo during the action. (8) Japanese ships were probably using Savo Island to prevent detection by radar or silhouette effect. During the approach and initial phase of the engage- ment the radars were unable to resolve the ships on the Southeast side of Savo. These ships could not be seen until they moved away from Savo. (9) Searchlights were used by the enemy 3 times but were left on for only short periods. The Illumination apparently wag effective. No Javanese starshells were observed. (10) Except for the initial movements of the groups East of Savo and the vessels rimming Savo, all vessels tracked made at least 26 knots. (b) Communication, homing. PDF. No Comment. (c) (1) Use of smoke, camouflage, deception. Twice during the entire engagement the Japanese used smoke screens. These screens were rapidly laid, and effectively hid sub- sequent movements of the ships screened from visual observation. No difficulty was found in tracking the obscured ships by Radar. From our viewpoint the chief effectiveness of the use of smoke lay in preventing pos- itive identification of enemy vessels and damage inflicted. (2) Camouflage. None observed. (3) Deception. None observed. (d) Effectiveness of Gunnery. (1) This ship was fired on only sporadically. She was not Illuminated. No hits were sustained and the nearest miss noted was the splash apparently of a major caliber shell about 200 yards on the port quarter. Observers who wit- nessed other ships of our force under concentrated fire reported the Japanese gunnery to be accurate. Enemy ships close to Savo fired automatic weapons accurately not our DDs. The Japanese ships were apparently not equipped with Radar. Their searchlights provided excellent illum- ination of the SOUTH DAKOTA but attracted our fire and provided a point of aim. (2) The flashes of the Japanese guns appeared smaller and less bright than would have been expected without some form of flash retardant or flash hider. (3) No torpedoes were seen to explode and no wakes were seen until some time after the gun action. Wakes seen during retirement were not accompanied by explosions, but explosions wore felt about 20 minutes later. (e) Estimated material and personnel casualties. (1) Material. Fired upon by this ship and apparently sunk: 1 large cruiser or BB (WASH. only) 2 large cruisers (S.D. plus WAS. 5") 1 DD (our DDs plus WAS. 5") Fired upon by this ship and apparently damaged: 1 14" BB silenced and out of control (WASH. only) 1 DD Burning (WASH. 5") 5-9 light craft silenced (our DDs plus WASH. "5 plus S.D.) (2) Personnel. No estimate. 5. Special Comments on Own Forces. (a)(1) 90 minutes before engaging, a friendly plane was sighted to the eastward on a southerly course. (2) Night contact scouting from a small plane where the duties of observer, navigator, pilot, and radio operator cannot be performed by 4 separate individuals is a difficult task. Re- ports from such scouting might be more misleading than help- ful. On the other hand, it is believed that the experience and skill of our aviation personnel permits dependable night contact scouting in a large plane where these 4 functions can be separately performed by well qualified individuals. Even without radar such a plane, could, it is believed scout effectively in the excellent visibility conditions which ob- tained shortly before and during this action. No use of flares is contemplated. If such procedure is practicable the information obtained would be invaluable under conditions similar to this action. (b) Communications, homing RDF. No comment. (c) Use of, smoke, camouflage, deception. No comment. (d) Effectiveness of Gunnery. (1) Main Battery. (a) This ship's gunnery appeared highly effective. Fire was opened with a gun range of 18,500 yards initially by this vessel using radar ranges and optical train and hits were definitely obtained by the third salvo. It is believed target wag stopped and sinking after third salvo. 42 rounds were fired. (b) In second phase target had been tracked by radar ranges and bearing and later by optical train. Fire was opened at 8,400 yards and a hit was probably obtained on firs salvo and certainly on the second. Fire was rapid, on one turret ready light, for about 2 minutes 39 seconds, firing about 39 rounds. It was interrupted for 1½ minutes due to an erroneous report that target was sunk, and resumed for 2 minutes and 45 seconds, during which time 36 rounds were fired. A total of 75 rounds were fired on this target which was believed to be an old type battle- ship. Starshell illumination was used on this phase after about the second salvo, 62 rounds being fired. (c) According to the best date available overall SPGPM was 1.30 and 5 guns had 1.8 average. Fire discipline was excellent. (d) The normal fire control set-up of this vessel was used throughout, namely: - Collective Fire, Director one controlling in train. Group one controlling in Plot. Director 4 (Stable Vertical 1) controlling in continuous level and cross level. Director 4 controlling firing circuit (Plot). Radar ranges by indicating and voice. (e) Turret pointers were matched during phases in which the director was being trained on the visual tar- get. During the times when the visual target was obscured, whether training by radar or generated, a turret spread in deflection wag fired. (f) The selected train firing key was used in plot to insure that the firing pointer could see the light that indicates when the director train is on target. It has been standard practice for this vessel to use that key at night when visual or radar train indications are accurate, shifting to generated bearing only in case of poor train indication or obscured target. (g) Against the first main battery target, 18,500 yards, radar range was used in conjunction with visual train. The target became obscured after the second salvo. The target wag lost by all radars after this salvo. As a result the last salvos went out in what amounted to gener- ated. That is, the present range wag let ride and the director being in automatic remained on the generated train. (h) On the second main battery target the tracking was done entirely by radar for at least 5 minutes. When the target finally carne into view optically, checks given by the pointer indicated that the radar was exactly on. In this connection it is noted that a consider- able period of time is taken to adopt the trainer's eyes to the telescope at either night or day after looking at the radar scope (train indicator). The reverse is also true. As a result of this difficulty, Main Battery Director 2 found it desirable to let the trainer keep track by radar and the pointer observe by telescope. Such a system is made possible by the fact that the director is trained automatically by generated bearing. Therefore small corrections only are necessary and such corrections can be made by coaching from a pointer's station. (i) Radar spots were used against the first target while the target echo wag pre gent. It is of interest to note that against the second target (BB) "overs" as well as "shorts" could be seen optically. Salvos were walked back and forth across the target. (j) The fire control switchboards on this ship provide for a secondary battery director to furnish target bearing to a main battery range keeper. Thus, it can also be used to designate to a main battery director. At the time of first contact both main batter directors lost the target and the shift was made for designation, but the SB director had not yet settled down and its designation was not used. In the meantime, M.B. Director 1 had again picked up the target and target bearing was shifted back to it. (2) Secondary Battery (a) Secondary Battery fire control used radar ranges throughout. During Phase 1 radar train wag used. In Phases IA and 2 optical train was used. Level for the basis of gun elevation order was obtained from the Stable Element with dip-range being set on the synchronized elevation knob in accordance with advance range. Firing circuits were controlled by director pointers. Group 1 used rapid continuous fire. On the other hand, Group 3 soon shifted to salvo fire, 4 second interval, to facilitate spotting. (b) In the first phase the effectiveness of the Secondary Battery was undetermined. Group 1 and Group 3 each controlled 2 mounts in firing at surface targets at ranges between 13,000 and 15,000 yards. The control of the groups was by radar, range and training. Group 3 used 400 yard rocking ladder in 200 yard steps. No radar spots were obtained and there was no observation of the fall of shot. (c) Phage 1A consisted of shooting at what at first appeared to be shore batteries on Savo Island but later identified as surface craft. Initially both groups opened fire on these targets. In view of the fact that Group 1 appeared to be shooting "over", Mounts 1 and 3 were switched over to Director 3 which continued the fire. Group 3 opened fire initially at the target near the right tangent of the island, aiming at the gun flashes, using a 200 yard rocking ladder based on the closest radar range with target speed set on zero. The first target was set on fire, many observers reporting that a stream of 5" tracers poured into the target which immediately burst into flames. A range of 10,200 yards on the burning ship from the Main Battery coincidence rangefinder was within 100 yards of the range set on the computer. Fire was shifted successively to the left using gunfire flashes as points of aim, and was continued against gunfire flashes until each gun ceased firing. Apparently another target on bearing near the center of Savo Island was set on fire. These targets may have been DD's) or large MTB's. (d) In Phase 2 (the third Secondary Battery Phase) the Secondary Battery again opened with divided fire. Group 1 fired on Main Battery target and Group 3 on target whose searchlights were illuminating the SOUTH DAKOTA. Twice during the firing group 1 was hitting, apparently starting fires in the upper works. When search- lights on another ship were seen to be turned on, Secondary Battery Director 3 used them as a point of aim. On this target, which was apparently a heavy cruiser, also engaged by the SOUTH DAKOTA's 5", Group 3 fired with a 200-yard rocking ladder. The first salvo landed short and was spotted "up 400". Fires were started. At about the fourth salvo the searchlights went out. Director 3 continued with about eight or ten more salvos, at which time another group of searchlights was seen to come on. The point of aim was shifted to these searchlights and fire continued until they went out. Another set of searchlights came on and fire was again shifted to them. The last searchlights were turned off about the time of cease firing. No hits were definitely observed on the last two targets. (e) In only one cage was fire discipline less than desired. Mount 3 had a training casualty apparently as the result of the training motor kicking out. Fire ghoul d have been ceased immediately but it appears that the mount trainer failed to note that his pointers were not matched. He may have been looking through the telescope and blinded go that dial observation wag difficult. As long as the primary system is functioning properly the pointer and trainer should observe their dials to see that they are continuously matched. Observation of the target can be made by means of the Mount Captain's periscope. (3) Starshell Illumination (a) Starshell Illumination was employed against the Main Battery Target in Phage 2. It was not initiated until Main battery had opened fire but was of assistance when established. Fires started on the opposing battleship during the first or second salvo gave illumination that would have been sufficient In itself. Director 4 was used for control or the starshell Illumination using Mount 9. The director was uncertain as to which target the Main Battery was trained on. As a result a 2-degree spread was used. Director 4 was blinded to a considerable extent by the flash of Main and Secondary Battery gun fire. The starshells came short of the target about two salvos after the Main Battery resumed fire. This may have been caused by failure to allow properly for the range rate of the target. The Main Battery spotters were blinded for about two salvos but it is believed the short stars had no effect on the fir- ing since the Main Battery salvos were hitting both before and after this incident. It is possible that after fires were started on the enemy vessel, Mount 9 could have been used more properly to fire common projectiles at Japanese ship. It is evident that more star- shell training is needed. The only night practices fired by this vessel were Night Spotting and Night Battle Practices, fired last January. (e) Summary of Ammunition Expended (1) Main Battery Phase 1 - 42 rounds Phase 2 - _75 rounds TOTAL -- 117 (2) Secondary Battery Phase 1 - A.A. Com. 100 rounds Phase 1A - A.A. Com. 133 rounds Phase 2 - A.A. Com. 227 rounds TOTAL -- 460 rounds Phase 2 - Illum. _62 rounds GRAND TOTAL -- 522 rounds (f) Radar Search (1) Radar searching was mainly accomplished by the SG radar (Radar 2). The Radar Plot Officer was located so that he could observe the Plan Position Indicator of this radar. In accordance with the doctrine of this vessel Radar Plot Officer vas wearing the JR phone which was tied into 2JD-2JE phone so that he could give a description of the appearance of the screen to the Gunnery Officer and the Main Battery Plotting Room. Since the director trainers are also on this circuit, target designation is made quite easy. This is made possible by the true bearing dials of the Main Battery Directors. Against the first Main Battery target this system placed the Main Battery on the largest enemy vessel. During Phase 1A the Main Battery was placed on the correct bearing of a target pulling out from Savo Island but the Main Battery director was unable to distinguish the radar signal from land echoes, and was so blinded that targets could not be picked out visually. (2) The four vessels north of Savo Island were picked up as soon as they ceased being obscured by the island. The appearance has been described by the Radar Plot Officer as that of a part of the island being pulled out and then separating into "drops" similar to the effect of planes taking off from a carrier. The Main Battery was promptly placed on the largest target because the SG radar could distinguish its size. This radar kept accurate track of own destroyers in the screen but could not keep track of the SOUTH DAKOTA because the foremast structure blanks off this radar through a sector of about 60 degrees astern. (3) The CXAM was not particularly effective because innumerable land echoes were present from land over 100 thousand yards away and there also were many confusing side lobes from nearby land and from ships. The fire control radars were not used for general search, but were used for the examination of certain areas. (4) Since it had been reported by Guadalcanal that a cruiser and a destroyer were lurking in a cove off Savo Island, particularly close examination was made of it by the fire control radars. The after Main Battery radar picked up the initial contact at about the game time as the SG radar. (5) The necessity of a navigational plot on a chart in Radar Plot is very apparent when a night action is fought in restricted waters. It is possible that if such a plot had been maintained in the Radar Plotting Room the ship control stations could have been given a more satisfactory picture of the situation. At present, space for a navigation plot is not available in Radar Plot. (6) During the first Main Battery phase the fall of shot could be observed by both fire control radars and the SG. However, the SG was used primarily for search since other targets were expected. During the second phage no splashes were observed by the FC operators even though a particular attempt was made to do so. The reason for this is not known. It may have been that the battleship signal was so strong that receiver sensitivity had been cut too low to see the splashes. On the other hand, the other near-by targets may have confused the signals. (g)(1) Engineering. (a) The Main Propulsion Plant functioned perfectly through out the action. There were no casualties of any descrip- tion. (b) The speed during the greater part of the action was 26 knots. From O135 to 0302, it was increased to emer- gency full power, which proved to be 26.6 knots by Pito- meter Log. This speed, with throttles wide open, could not be exceeded. The temperature of the Injection was 87°, and the tonnage of the ship was 44,500, (c) Personnel performed excellently throughout, in spite of the high temperature (112 at the Main Control throttle Station) in which the men had to work for the twenty- nine hours that they were at their battle stations before and after the action. Drinking water, furnished contin- uously to the engine rooms by periodically pumping up the second deck pressure tanks, proved necessary in quantities far beyond the capacity of portable fountains provided. These unprotected tanks might be shot away or become con- taminated. Recommendation: That tanks be provided in each machinery space for supplying the regular machinery space scuttle- butts during General Quarters. (2) Damage Control. (a) Personnel at below deck repair stations and at battle dressing stations were given 10 minutes ventilation at intervals of about 90 minutes during the 19 hours at Con- dition I before the engagement. These stations were divi- ded into 3 groups for this purpose. With the limited personnel available it required 15 minutes to open up the ventilation for a group and 5 minutes to insure shutting the ventilation to a group. Each of these stations should be equipped for independent ventilation capable of being shut completely within one minute by controls and reach- rods at that station. (b) While meals were served in shifts in certain messing compartments during condition one, only sufficient access was kept open to permit the shift eating to man its sta- tions quickly. Heads adjacent to messing compartments were opened while each shift ate. (3) Supply Department. (a) The cafeteria system lends itself well to serving meals to the crew in shifts from Condition 1 stations. During the 19 consecutive hours at Condition 1 before the en- gagement, three regular hot meals were served in certain messing compartments with at least 2/3 of the ship always fully manned, with all stations fully manned after each shift had eaten. Three main shifts and a small fourth shift were used. Overall time per meal about 3 hours. (4) Medical Department. (a) The 10 minutes ventilation supplied every 90 minutes to personnel at repair stations and battle dressing sta- tions was inadequate to maintain at a satisfactory level the alertness and energy of personnel at those stations. (b) It is believed that the 19 hours at Condition I before the engagement would have left the ships company below par to an important degree had meals been carried to sta- tions. Serving the guns for 117 rounds of 16" and 522 rounds of 5" resulted in only 1 injury, a minor skin abrasion. The accurate, unhurried rapidity with which the ships company functioned is believed to confirm the soundness of using regular messing compartments to serve hot meals to the crew in shifts from Condition I stations when circumstances permit. (h) Summary of Damage. (1) No Damage by enemy. (2) Damage from blast of own guns. (a) Bulkhead from frame 65 to 68, starboard, pushed in. O.O.D. booth and stateroom A-101 demolished. (b) Both planes (only two aboard during action) damaged. one beyond repair, suitable only for dismantling for spare parts; and one requiring major overhaul at shore base. Engines were undamaged. (c) Left gun port buckler of turret 2 split athwartships for about six feet on top and left side due to blast from turret 1 firing at about 6° elevation on relative bearing 145. Range finder bloomers in turret 2 pulled loose from securing rings. (d) 1.1/75 caliber Battery. (1) 45 director 2 will not track with stick in neu- tral. (2) Mk. 45 director 5 hatch cover hinges damaged. Note: None of the three Mk.45 directors, ships No. 1, 2, and 5, were in commission prior to the firing so that actual extent damage duo to own gun blast cannot be definitely ascertained. (3) Mounts 5 and 6 lost power due to knife switch jar- ring open. (4) Mount 6 developed leaks at fresh water inlet connec- tions and at couplings at tank. (e) 20 m/m Battery. (1) 6 Mk. 2 ring sights damaged beyond repair. (2) 22 Magazines damaged but repaired by ship's force. (3) Trigger (O.E. 1220 ) missing. (4) 1 Securing pin (O.E. 2188) sheared off. (5) 2 - Hand grips (O.E. 1061) sheared. (6) 1 Strap securing shieled broken at shield. (7) 1 Mk. 14-2 gun sight torn off gun at brocket bolt (Tested, found satisfactory and resecured). (f) Two dome-fronts on 24" searchlight were broken. This is an old trouble, and has not yet been corrected in this vessel. (g) The door of the 1MC transmitter on the bridge was left open, and the armature of tho transmitter was moved off center by gun blasts, putting it out of action. (h) The general alarm sounded twice during the action, set off by blows against the contact-maker in the 0.0.D. booth. (i) Several lamp bulbs in the fighting-lights came loose in their sockets. (i) Casualties to Personnel. None. (j) Gunnery Casualties Turret Gun Estim. or or Salvos Cal. Mount Unit Brief Description Missed 16" Dir. 1 Temporary loss of radar antenna elev- ation due to hand crank jumping from 0 automatic to hand position. 16" Dir. 2 Temporary loss of level input to radar antennae due to adjusting screw 0 of micro-switch (Sk. 271394) on looking pin working loose. 16" T-1 C Plug difficult to open due to canting 1 T-2 C of thrust bearing retainer for 2 counter-balance spring when retainer ring (Drwg. 56463-10) jumped out of place. 16" T-1 L Plug latch spring (Drwg. 66444-3) 0 T-2 C broke preventing plug from being 3 latched in open position automatically. 16" T-3 L Oil seal in projectile hoist reduction 0 gear housing on A-end side backed out causing loss of lubrication oil. 16" T-3 C Gun jumped in elevation making it 5 difficult to hold on loading position or match pointers. Shock of gunfire and recoil caused spring for ball check on replenishing valve in B-end to get between ball and valve seat (Drwg. 268501-20) thereby losing pressure. 16" T-3 C Misfire. Primer failed on primary and 2 battery. Delay in repriming. 16" T-3 C Sticky tube pawl permitted one pro- 1 jectile to lower back on the nose of next below making necessary to lower one flight to place on proper pawls. 5" Dir. 3 Plate leads jarred loose, grounded 0 and blew an indicator fuse. 5" Stable El. 3 Cross-level switch jarred sufficiently 0 to cut cross level out of automatic. 5" Mount 1 R Projectile hoist jammed on starting 8 pawl due to shearing 1 ug from shell which dropped to bottom of fuse pot. 5" Mount 3&9 - Oscillated in automatic train necessi- 0 tating matching in "hand. Believed to be due to overheating of motors which had been running over an hour. 5" Mount 3&9 - Loss of gas ejection air pressure due 0 to automatic cut-out valves in Machin- ery Spaces closing due to shock of gun- fire. 5" Mount 3 - Elevation motor cut out 8 Trainer failed to match correctly in train after training motor cut out causing mount to train wild. Elevation due to damaged thermal over- 16 load relay; train undetermined other than shock of gunfire. Plot failed to shift communications when this mount was shifted to Director 3. 5" Mount 5 R Rammer stopped due to knife switch on 6 rammer control box in UHR opening from concussion of 16" firing. 5" Mount 7 L Powderman placed cartridge in tray be- 1 Mount 9 L fore spade was back clue to insufficient light. 6. Commendations. (a) The entire ship's company, officers and men, dis- played commendable coolness and performed their duties with speed and precision. (b) For the high standard of training and maintenance, and for the excellent performance of gunnery and engineering personnel, commendation is due the following officers: Commander A.D. AYRAULT, USN Executive Officer Commander H.T. WALSH, USN Gunnery Officer Lieut-Comdr. J.A. STROTHER, DE-V-(G), USNR Engineer Officer Lieut-Comdr. E.B. HOOPER, USN Asst. Gunnery Officer Lieut-Comdr. H.W. SEEY, USN Spot One. Lieut-Comdr. R.T. SIMPSON, DE-V-(G), USNR Asst. for Main Engines. 7. Lessons Learned and Recommendations. (a) Radar has forced the Captain or O.T.C. to base a greater part of his actions in a night engagement on what he is told rather than what he can see. This ship was not hit but examination of the USS SOUTH DAKOTA revealed completeness with which bridge structure may be riddled by shells and splinters which penetrate 1" STS bulk- heads. The enemy may be counted upon to spot to hit foremast superstructure. Recommendation: The Captain and Navigator should be in Conn. Recommendation: An experienced officer other than the Navigator should be O.O.D. and should filter for the Captain the tremendously numerous reports received at the Conning Station over the various telephone circuits. (b) Although excessive and duplicate reports had been anticipated and although much drill had been held in battle problems toward eliminating undesirable reports there were excessive reports and many cases of initial reports being caught at various stations and rebroadcast repeatedly over first one circuit and then another. This echo and re-echo effect must be guarded against. (c) Vision from platform aft of Battle 2 does not make up for loss of vision ahead from inside the station caused by radar on Secondary Battery Director 1. It would be desirable also to be able to see aft over the stacks from Battle 2. Recommendation: Raise Battle 2 one level and provide all around platform outside. Raise Forward Surface Lookout Station one level to the former Concentration Dial Station. (d) The SG radar was invaluable. It was found difficult for Radar Plot Officer to pass along the contacts on the P.P.I. verbally to ship and fire control particularly in the case of the former in which it was passed through talkers in both Radar Plot and Bridge. Our doctrine provided that the Radar Plot Officer be on the JR, cross-jacked with the 2JD, for Main Battery action and in this way the directors, Control, and Plot obtained first hand reports. However, due to the difficulty of resolving ship contacts from land signals, and to multiplicity of targets in groups and on various bearings, it was difficult for Conn and Control to maintain the picture el early. In addition, since the SOUTH DAKOTA was astern or sharp on the quarter, during the firing phase, it was impossible to keep continuous track of her with the SG radar. This handi- capped Control since it could not give Bridge absolute assurance that we were not trained on the USS SOUTH DAKOTA after Bridge had lost visual contact with her. The CXAM was used on stern and quarter bearings but could not be depended upon due to land inter- ference. The crossing of the JR-2JD circuits caused heavy traffic on the Main Battery Control circuit but this can be reduced by continued training. Recommendation: A P.P.I scope should be placed in Conn and Control, and if practicable in Flag Plot, so that these vital stations may have a continuous picture of enemy and friendly contacts. Desirable but less important would be an additional scope in plot. (e) Pending installation of P.P.I. scope from the SC, the following procedure will be tried out. Conn and Control maintain a rough mooring board plot of contacts as reported with notations as to time. In Conn and Control this will require a small portable board with a dry cell light attached to make visible to Captain and Control Officer while shielded sufficiently to prevent showing light outside these stations. (f) Recommendation: Surface ships should have radar means of recognition. (g) The obscuring by the mast of the SG radar line of sight through an angle of about 60° across the stern is very un- desirable. Recommendation: Installation of additional SG or re- location of present SG in order to cover this blind sector. (h) During the night of the engagement no interference from other radars was encountered. (i) The tactical situation was greatly affected by the presence of islands and the necessity of fighting in comparatively restricted waters. As noted previously the radar screens had many land echoes. For a surface engagement under reduced visi- billity and especially in restricted waters a navigational plot should be maintained in Radar Plot for fully effective use of the radar. If this vessel were to keep such a plot more space would be required. An expansion of Radar Plot appears justified. (j) The picture presented by the SG radar is not a true plan view. Radar operators must be given concentrated training in areas surrounded by land in distinguishing between land and ships. During a previous sweep by this vessel around Russell Island at night, numerous false reports of surface targets were received from the fire control radars that turned out to be land more than 100,000 yards away. During the night of the engagement only one such report was received. Recommendation: Receptions in the 100 to 200 thousand yard band should be eliminated in fire control radars if practicable. (k) Recommendations: (1) The replacement of one of the present Mark I computers with one having starshell attachment is necessary to facilitate control of starshell. (2) The illumination correctors on the Sky Control Platform should transmit to the starshell mount as well as to searchlights. The Main Battery director could then transmit direct to a starshell mount without necessity of desig- nating to and using a Secondary Battery director. (l) Recommendation: The firing of starshell duels as ordered by recent Cincpac instructions is highly desirable. (m) The value of spot coordination fire control drills for the Main Battery, every day when practicable, was apparent. (n) This Ship has had no opportunity for any target practices since July, except for machine gun practices on sleeves towed by small planes. An offset Calibration Practice has been fired since then using service projectiles. This ship has never fired at a drone or held Main Battery Local Control or Auxiliary Practices. While Offset Practices are of inestimatable value, this ship needs practice against drones and towed targets, both surface and air. Recommendation: Target ammunition, drones, and target facilities should be provided at advanced bases for use of ships in the battle zone. (o) Flashes of the Japanese guns appeared smaller and less bright than would have been expected unless some form of flash retardant or flash hiders were used by them. Our own fleshes, both 16" and 5" hindered observation of own fire by spotters and control officers. Ship control was also blinded at times which would have hampered station keeping had we been in column astern of another ship. Recommendation: That the subject of flash reduction be re-examined even if it means some addition to smoke. (p) Spot 1 and 2 found it necessary to use 7 X 50 binoculars through the overhead hatch of the Main Battery directors for several periods during the engagement. This would have been facilitated by wind protection and a seat at this hatch. As soon as facilities are available lenses should be coated so as to minimize reflection. This vessel has one pair of "night" 10 X 50 binoculars that is highly satisfactory in this respect. (q) In Main and Secondary Battery directors it is fre- quently desirable to shift quickly from optical train to radar train and vice versa. It is frequently desirable to check one against the other. Director trainers are hampered in these shifts by changes in light accommodation and focus. The expedient of having the pointer observe optically and coach in train yields only a slight improvement. Recommendation: Main and Secondary Battery directors should be altered to provide additional stations for radar training, and, in Secondary Battery directors, for radar pointing as well. A possible solution is to locate the radar train and elevation indicators below the directors, perhaps by suspended seats. Another is to locate fixed stations below to control in "automatic" ana "local" when desired, and, by means of a synchro transmitter, to transmit indication so that directors may follow in manual. (r) The difficulty of exchanging verbal information within Secondary Battery Directors during gun fire was again brought out. (s) Several telephone headsets were knocked off of the wearers by Main Battery gunfire concussion. In action all hands should wear telephone chin straps. (t) Use of true bearings in all reports except from lookouts and in all orders except those to turrets and Secondary Battery is in effect. It would facilitate control to be able to use true bearing with the Secondary Battery Directors. In present installation, bearing indicator and gyro repeater are separate instruments. This requires conversion. In a night action with contacts on numerous bearings at short ranges and large and frequent changes of own course, use of true bearings wherever gyro repeaters can be installed is desirable. Recommendation: Indicators should be installed in Secondary Battery Directors to show the true bearing on which that director is trained. (u) The difficulty of telling what and how many ships were present indicates a desirability of infra-red photographic equip- ment on board ship. G. B. DAVIS. DISTRIBUTION: Original and 1 copy to CinCPac via CTF 64. 1 copy to CTF 64. 1 copy to ComSoPac. 1 copy to ComAirSoPc. 1 copy with copy of War Diary. 1 copy with Original of War Diary (to be kept aboard ship). CONFIDENTIAL U.S.S. WASHINGTON 11-Mr BB56/TS-133 November 19, 1942. From: The Executive Officer. To: The Commanding Officer. Subject: Report of noteworthy incidents within ship during action from 0016 to 0107, November 15, 1942. Reference: (a) U.S.N.R. 1920, Article 948. 1. This ship was commissioned 18 months ago. She has fired only 2 night practices, a N.S.P. and a N.B.P., in January, 1942. She was in action for the first time from 0016 to 0107, November 15, 1942. 2. The ship's company performed their duties with keen intelligence and unhurried, rapid precision. With 2 brief except- ions, no wild shots or missed salvos were brought about by person- nel failures. There were only 2 injuries: a punctured ear drum, and an abrasion on the back of a man's hand. 3. The temperature of machinery spaces was excessive. No means exist for quick-closing ventilation during Condition 1 to personnel at below deck repair stations and battle dressing stations, but about 10 minutes ventilation each 90 minutes was given them until shortly before the action. From November 11. un- til before dawn November 14 the ship's company had been standing watch in 3. During the 19 hours before the action they had been in Condition 1, modified in that ventilation was provided as in- dicated above; certain personnel were not required to remain alert; certain others were allowed to sleep at their stations; and 3 hot meals were served in shifts during this period in the mess com- partments, keeping at least two-thirds of the ship's company at their stations, and fully manning all stations between shifts. I believe this procedure contributed importantly to the coolness, alertness, and precision with which all hands functioned. 4. I believe that the Gunnery Officer, Commander H.T. Walsh, the assistant Gunnery Officer, Lieutenant Commander E.B. Hooper, and Spot One, Lieutenant Commander Seely deserve commendation for the sound and thorough training of the Gunnery Department person- nel, for their excellent control of main battery fire, and for the eminently successful use of both search and gunnery radars. I believe that the Engineer Officer, Lieutenant Commander Strother, and the Assistant for Main Engines, Lieutenant Commander Simpson, deserve commendation for the excellent performance of the Engineering Depart- ment under extreme and prolonged high power and for the high standard of training and maintenance which made it possible. I believe that both the Engineering Department and the Damage Control organization would have functioned most creditably had damage been received. A.D. AYRAULT. ENCLOSURE (B)

Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
U.S.S. WASHINGTON BB-56 The eighth Washington (BB-56) was laid down on 14 June 1938 at the Philadelphia Navy Yard; launched on 1 June 1940; sponsored by Miss Virginia Marshall, of Spokane, Wash., a direct descendant of former Chief Justice Marshall; and commissioned at the Philadelphia Navy Yard on 15 May 1941, Capt. Howard H. J. Benson in command. Her shakedown and underway training ranged along the eastern seaboard and into the Gulf of Mexico and lasted through American entry into World War II in December 1941. Sometimes operating in company with her sistership North Carolina (BB-55) and the new aircraft carrier Hornet (CV-8), Washington became the flagship for Rear Admiral John W. Wilcox, Commander, Battleship Division (ComBatDiv) 6, and Commander, Battleships, Atlantic Fleet. Assigned duty as flagship for Task Force (TF) 39 on 26 March 1942 at Portland, Maine, Washington again flew Admiral Wilcox' flag as she sailed for the British Isles that day. Slated to reinforce the British Home Fleet, the battleship, together with the carrier Wasp (CV-7) and the heavy cruisers Wichita (CA-45) and Tuscaloosa (CA-37), headed for Scapa Flow, the major British fleet base in the Orkney Islands. While steaming through moderately heavy seas the following day, 27 March, the "man overboard" alarm sounded on board Washington, and a quick muster revealed that Admiral Wilcox was missing. Tuscaloosa, 1,000 yards astern, maneuvered and dropped life buoys while two destroyers headed for Washington's wake to search for the missing flag officer. Planes from Wasp, despite the foul weather, also took off to aid in the search. Lookouts in the destroyer Wilson (DD-408) spotted Wilcox' body in the water, face down, some distance away, but could not pick it up. The circumstances surrounding Wilcox being washed overboard from his flagship have never been fully explained to this day; one school of thought has it that he had suffered a heart attack. At 1228 on the 27th, the search for Wilcox was abandoned, and command of the task force devolved upon the next senior officer, Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen, whose flag flew in the cruiser Wichita. On 4 April, the task force reached Scapa Flow, joining the British Home Fleet under the overall command of Sir John Tovey, whose flag flew in the battleship HMS King George V. Washington engaged in maneuvers and battle practice with units of the Home Fleet, out of Scapa Flow, into late April, when TF 39 was redesignated as TF 99 with Washington as flagship. On the 28th, the force got underway to engage in reconnaissance for the protection of the vital convoys running lend lease supplies to Murmansk in the Soviet Union. During those operations, tragedy befell the group. On 1 May 1942, HMS King George V collided with a "Tribal" class destroyer. HMS Punjabi, cut in two, sank quickly directly in the path of the oncoming Washington. Compelled to pass between the halves of the sinking destroyer, the battleship proceeded ahead, Punjabi's depth charges exploding beneath her hull as she passed. Fortunately for Washington, she suffered no major hull damage nor developed any hull leaks from the concussion of the exploding depth charges. She did, however, sustain damage to some of her delicate fire control systems and radars; and a diesel oil tank suffered a small leak. Two destroyers, meanwhile, picked up Punjabi's captain, four other officers and 182 men; HMS King George V then proceeded back to Scapa Flow for repairs. Washington and her escorts remained at sea until 5 May, when TF 99 put into the Icelandic port of Hvalfjordur to provision from the supply ship Mizar (AF- 12). While at Hvalfjordur, the American and Danish ministers to Iceland called upon Admiral Giffen and inspected his flagship on 12 May. Task Force 99 subsequently sortied on the 15th to rendezvous with units of the Home Fleet and returned to Scapa Flow on 3 June. The next day, Admiral Harold R. Stark, Commander, Naval Forces, Europe, came on board and broke his flag in Washington, establishing a temporary administrative headquarters on board. The battleship played host to His Majesty, King George VI, at Scapa Flow on the 7th, when the King came on board to inspect the ship. Soon after Admiral Stark left Washington, the battleship resumed her operations with the Home Fleet, patrolling part of the Allied shipping lanes leading to Russian ports. On 14 July 1942, Admiral Giffen hauled down his flag in the battleship at Hvalfjordur and shifted to Wichita. That same day, Washington, with a screen of four destroyers, upped anchor and put to sea, leaving Icelandic waters in her wake. She reached Gravesend Bay, N.Y., on 21 July; two days later, she shifted to the New York Navy Yard, Brooklyn, N.Y., for a thorough overhaul. Upon completion of her refit, Washington sailed for the Pacific on 23 August, escorted by three destroyers. Five days later, she transited the Panama Canal and, on 14 September, reached Nukualofa Anchorage, Tongatabu, Tonga Island. On that day, Rear Admiral Willis A. "Ching" Lee, Jr., broke his flag in Washington as Commander, Battleship Division (BatDiv) 6, and Commander, Task Group 12.2. The next day, 15 September, Washington put to sea bound for a rendezvous with TF 17, the force formed around the aircraft carrier Hornet. Washington then proceeded to Noumea, New Caledonia, and supported the ongoing Solomons campaign, providing escort services for various reinforcement convoys proceeding to and from Guadalcanal. During those weeks, the battleship's principal bases of operation were Noumea and Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides. By mid-November, the situation in the Solomons was far from good for the Allies, who were now down to one aircraft carrier Enterprise (CV-6)-after the loss of Wasp in September and Hornet in October, and Japanese surface units were subjecting Henderson Field on Guadalcanal to heavy bombardments with disturbing regularity. Significantly, however, the Japanese only made their moves at night, since Allied planes controlled the skies during the day. That meant that the Allies had to move their replenishment and reinforcement convoys into Guadalcanal during the daylight hours. Washington performed those vital duties into mid-November of 1942. On 13 November, she learned that three groups of Japanese ships -one consisting of about 24 transports, with escort were steaming toward Guadalcanal. One enemy force sighted that morning was reported as consisting of two battleships, a light cruiser, and 11 destroyers. At sunset on the 13th, Rear Admiral Lee took Washington, South Dakota (BB-57), and four destroyers and headed for Savo Island- the scene of the disastrous night action of 8 and 9 August-to be in position to intercept the Japanese convoy and its covering force. Lee's ships, designated as TF 64, reached a point about 50 miles south by west from Guadalcanal late in the forenoon on the 14th and spent much of the remainder of the day trying unsuccessfully to avoid being spotted by Japanese reconnaissance planes. Approaching on a northerly course, nine miles west of Guadalcanal, TF 64-reported by the Japanese reconnaissance planes as consisting of a battleship, a cruiser, and four destroyers-steamed in column formation. Walke (DD-416) led, followed by Benham (DD-397), Preston (DD-377), Gwin (DD-433), and the two battleships, Washington and South Dakota. As the ship steamed through the flat calm sea beneath the scattered cirrus cumulus clouds in the night sky, Washington's radar picked up a contact, bearing to the east of Savo Island, at 0001 on 15 November. Fifteen minutes later, at 0016, Washington opened fire with her 16-inch main battery. The fourth battle of Savo Island was underway. The Japanese force proved to be the battleship Kirishima, the heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, the light cruisers Sendai and Nagara, and a screen of nine destroyers escorting four transports. Planning to conduct a bombardment of American positions on Guadalcanal to cover the landing of troops, the Japanese force ran head on into Lee's TF 64. For the next three minutes, Washington's 16-inchers hurled out 42 rounds, opening at 18,500 yards range, her fire aimed at the light cruiser Sendai. Simultaneously, the battleship's 5-inch battery was engaging another ship also being engaged by South Dakota. As gun flashes split the night and the rumble of gunfire reverberated like thunder off the islands nearby, Washington continued to engage the Japanese force. Between 0025 and 0034, the ship engaged targets at 10,000 yards range with her 5-inch battery. Most significantly, however, Washington soon engaged Kirishima, in the first head to head confrontation of battleships in the Pacific war. In seven minutes, tracking by radar, Washington sent 75 rounds of 16-inch and 107 rounds of 5-inch at ranges from 8,400 to 12,650 yards, scoring at least nine hits with her main battery and about 40 with her 5-inchers, silencing the enemy battleship in short order. Subsequently, Washington's 5-inch batteries went to work on other targets spotted by her radar "eyes." The battle, however, was not all one sided. Japanese gunfire proved devastating to the four destroyers of TF 64, as did the dreaded and effective "long lance" torpedoes. Walke and Preston both took numerous hits of all calibers and sank; Benham sustained heavy damage to her bow, and Gwin sustained shell hits aft. South Dakota had maneuvered to avoid the burning Walke and Preston but soon found herself the target of the entire Japanese bombardment group. Skewered by searchlight beams, South Dakota boomed out salvoes at the pugnacious enemy, as did Washington which was proceeding, at that point, to deal out severe punishment upon Kirishima one of South Dakota's assailants. South Dakota, the recipient of numerous hits, retired as Washington steamed north to draw fire away from her crippled sister battleship and the two crippled destroyers, Benham and Gwin. Initially, the remaining ships of the Japanese bombardment group gave chase to Washington but broke off action when discouraged by the battleship's heavy guns. Accordingly, they withdrew under cover of a smokescreen. After Washington skillfully evaded torpedoes fired b" the retiring Japanese destroyers in the van of the enemy force, she joined South Dakota later in the morning, shaping course for Noumea. In the battleship action, Washington had done well and had emerged undamaged. South Dakota had not emerged unscathed, however, sustaining heavy damage to her superstructure; 38 men had died; 60 lay wounded. The Japanese had lost the battleship Kirishima. Left burning and exploding, she later had to be abandoned and scuttled. The other enemy casualty was the destroyer Ayanami, scuttled the next morning. Washington remained in the South Pacific there after, basing on New Caledonia and continuing as flagship for Rear Admiral "Ching" Lee. The battleship protected carrier groups and task forces engaged in the ongoing Solomons campaign until late in April of 1943, operating principally with TF 11, which included the repaired Saratoga (CV-3), and with TF 16, built around Enterprise. Washington departed Noumea on 30 April 1943, bound for the Hawaiian Islands. While en route, TF 16 joined up; and, together, the ships reached Pearl Harbor on 8 May. Washington, as a unit of, and as flagship for, TF 60, carried out battle practice in Hawaiian waters until 28 May 1943, after which time she put into the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard for overhaul. Washington resumed battle practice in the Hawaiian operating area upon conclusion of those repairs and alterations and joined a convoy on 27 July to form Task Group (TG) 56.14, bound for the South Pacific. Detached on 5 August, Washington reached Havannah Harbor, at Efate, in the New Hebrides, on the 7th. She then operated out of Efate until late in October, principally engaged in battle practice and tactics with fast carrier task forces. Departing Havannah Harbor on the last day of October, Washington sailed as a unit of TG 53.2- four battleships and six destroyers. The next day, the carriers Enterprise, Essex (CV-9), and Independence (CVL-22), as well as the other screening units of TG 53.3, joined TG 53.2 and came under Rear Admiral Lee. The ships held combined maneuvers until 5 November, when the carriers departed the formation. Washington, with her escorts, steamed to Viti Levu, in the Fiji Islands, arriving on the 7th. Four days later, however, the battleship was again underway, with Rear Admiral Lee-by that point Commander, Battleships, Pacific-embarked, in company with other units of BatDivs 8 and 9. On the 15th, the battlewagons and their screens joined Rear Admiral C. A. "Baldy" Pownall's TG 50.1, Rear Admiral Pownall flying his two starred flag in Yorktown (CV-10), the namesake of the carrier lost at Midway. The combined force then proceeded toward the Gilbert Islands to join in the daily bombings of Japanese positions in the Gilberts and Marshalls softening them up for impending assault. On the 19th, the planes from TG 50.1 attacked Mili and Jaluit in the Marshalls, continuing those strikes through 20 November, the day upon which Navy, Marine, and Army forces landed on Tarawa and Makin in the Gilberts. On the 22d, the task group sent its planes against Mili in successive waves; subsequently, the group steamed to operate north of Makin. Washington rendezvoused with other carrier groups that composed TF 50 on 25 November and, during the reorganization that followed, was assigned to TG 50.4, the last carrier task group under the command of Hear Admiral Frederick C. "Ted" Sherman. The carriers comprising the core of the group were Bunker Hill (CV-17) and Monterey (CVL-26); the battleships screening them were Alabama (BB-50) and South Dakota. Eight destroyers rounded out the screen. The group operated north of Makin, providing air, surface, and antisubmarine protection for the unfolding unloading operations at Makin, effective on 26 November. Enemy planes attacked the group on the 27th and 28th but were driven off without inflicting any damage on the fast carrier task forces. As the Gilbert Islands campaign drew to a close, TG 50.8 was formed on 6 December, under Rear Admiral Lee, in Washington. Other ships of that group included sistership North Carolina (BB-55), Massachusetts (BB-59), Indiana (BB-58), South Dakota, and Alabama (BB-60) and the Fleet carriers Bunker Hill and Monterey. Eleven destroyers screened the heavy ships. The group first steamed south and west of Ocean Island to take position for the scheduled air and surface bombardment of the island of Nauru. Before dawn on 8 December, the carriers launched their strike groups while the bombardment force formed in column; 135 rounds of 16-inch fire from the six battleships fell on the enemy installations on Nauru; and, upon completion of the shelling, the battleships' secondary batteries took their turn; two planes from each battleship spotted the fall of shot. After a further period of air strikes had been flown off against Nauru, the task group sailed for Efate, where they arrived on 12 December. On that day, due to a change in the highest command echelons, TF 57 became TF 37. Washington tarried at Efate for less than two weeks. Underway on Christmas Day, flying Rear Admiral Lee's flag, the battleship sailed in company with her sister-ship North Carolina and a screen of four destroyers to conduct gunnery practice, returning to the New Hebrides on 7 January 1944. Eleven days later, the battleship departed Efate for the Ellice Islands. Joining TG 37.2-carriers Monterey and Bunker Hill and four destroyers-en route, Washington reached Funafuti, Ellice Islands, on 20 January. Three days later, the battleship, along with the rest of the task group, put to sea to make rendezvous with elements of TF 58, the fast carrier task force under the overall command of Vice Admiral Marc A. "Pete" Mitscher. Becoming part of TG 58.1, Washington screened the fast carriers in her group as they launched air strikes on Taroa and Kwajalein in the waning days of January 1944. Washington, together with Massachusetts and Indiana, left the formation with four destroyers as screen and shelled Kwajalein Atoll on the 30th. Further air strikes followed the next day. On 1 February, however, misfortune reared her head; Washington, while maneuvering in the inky darkness, rammed Indiana as she cut across Washington's bow while dropping out of formation to fuel escorting destroyers. Both battleships retired for repairs; Washington having sustained 60 feet of crumpled bow plating. Both ships put into the lagoon at Majuro the next morning. Subsequently, after reinforcing the damaged bow, Washington departed Majuro on 11 February, bound for the Hawaiian Islands. With a temporary bow fitted at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard, Washington continued on for the west coast of the United States. Reaching the Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash., the battleship received a new bow over the weeks that followed her arrival. Joining BatDiv 4 at Port Townsend, Wash., Washington embarked 500 men as passengers and sailed for Pearl Harbor, reaching her destination on 13 June and disembarking her passengers. Arriving back at Majuro on 30 May, Washington again flew Admiral Lee's flag as he shitted on board the battleship soon after her arrival. Lee, now a vice admiral, rode in the battleship as she headed out to sea again, departing Majuro on 7 June and joining Mitscher's fast carrier TF 58. Washington supported the air strikes pummeling enemy defenses in the Marianas on the islands of Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Pagan. Task Force 58's fliers also attacked twice and damaged a Japanese convoy in the vicinity on 12 June. The following day, Vice Admiral Lee's battleship destroyer task group was detached from the main body of the force and conducted shore bombardment against enemy installations on Saipan and Tinian. Relieved on the 14th by two task groups under Rear Admirals J. B. Oldendorf and W. L. Ainsworth, Vice Admiral Lee's group retired momentarily. On 15 June, Admiral Mitscher's TF 58 planes bombed Japanese installations on Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands and Chichi Jima and Haha Jima in the Bonins. Meanwhile, marines landed on Saipan under cover of intensive naval gunfire and carrier based planes. That same day, Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, commanding the main body of the Japanese Fleet, was ordered to attack and destroy the invasion force in the Marianas. The departure of his carrier group, however, came under the scrutiny of the submarine Redfin (SS-272), as it left Tawi Tawi, the westernmost island in the Sulu Archipelago. Flying Fish (SS-229) also sighted Ozawa's force as it entered the Philippine Sea. Cavalla (SS-244) radioed a contact report on an enemy refueling group on 16 June and continued tracking it as it headed for the Marianas. She again sighted Japanese Combined Fleet units on 18 June. Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commanding the 5th Fleet, had meanwhile learned of the Japanese movement and accordingly issued his battle plan. Vice Admiral Lee's force formed a protective screen around the vital fleet carriers. Washington, six other battleships, four heavy cruisers, and 14 destroyers deployed to cover the flattops; on 19 June, the ships came under attack from Japanese carrier based and land based planes as the Battle of the Philippine Sea commenced. The tremendous firepower of the screen, however, together with the aggressive combat air patrols flown from the American carriers, proved too much for even the aggressive Japanese. The heavy loss of Japanese aircraft, sometimes referred to as the "Marianas Turkey Shoot," caused serious losses in the Japanese naval air arm. During four massive raids, the enemy launched 373 planes-only 130 returned. In addition, 50 land based bombers from Guam fell in flames. Over 300 American carrier planes were involved in the aerial action; their losses amounted to comparatively few: 23 shot down and six lost operationally without the loss of a single ship in Mitscher's task force. Only a few of the enemy planes managed to get through the barrage of flak and fighters, one scoring a direct hit on South Dakota-killing 27 and wounding 23. A bomb burst over the flight deck of the carrier Wasp (CV-18), killing one man, wounding 12, and covering her flight deck with bits of phosphorus. Two planes dove on Bunker Hill, one scoring a near miss and the other a hit that holed an elevator, knocking put the hanger deck gasoline system temporarily; killing three and wounding 73. Several fires started were promptly quenched. In addition, Minneapolis (CA-36) and Indiana also received slight damage. Not only did the Japanese lose heavily in planes; two of their carriers were soon on their way to the bottom Taiho, torpedoed and sunk by Albacore (SS-218); and Shokaku, sunk by Cavalla. Admiral Ozawa, his flagship, Taiho, sunk out from under him, transferred his flag to Zuikaku. As the Battle of the Philippine Sea proceeded to a close, the Japanese Mobile Fleet steamed back to its bases, defeated. Admiral Mitscher's task force meanwhile retired to cover the invasion operations proceeding in the Marianas. Washington fueled east of that chain of islands and then continued her screening duties with TG 58.4 to the south and west of Saipan, supporting the continuing air strikes on islands in the Marianas, the strikes concentrated on Guam by that point. On 25 July, aircraft of TG 58.4 conducted air strikes on the Palaus and on enemy shipping in the vicinity, continuing their schedule of strikes through 6 August. On that day, Washington, with Iowa (BB-61), Indiana, Alabama, the light cruiser Birmingham (CL-62), and a destroyer screen, was detached from the screen of TG 58.4, forming TG 58.7, under Vice Admiral Lee. That group arrived at Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshalls to refuel and replenish on 11 August and remained there for almost the balance of the month. On 30 August, that group departed, headed for, first, the Admiralty Islands, and ultimately, the Palaus. Washington's heavy guns supported the taking of Peleliu and Angaur in the Palaus and supported the carrier strikes on Okinawa on 10 October, on northern Luzon and Formosa from 11 to 14 October, as well as the Visayan air strikes on 21 October. From 5 November 1944 to 17 February 1945, Washington, as a vital unit of the fast carrier striking forces, supported raids on Okinawa, in the Ryukyus; Formosa; Luzon; Camranh Bay, French Indochina; Saigon, French Indochina; Hong Kong; Canton; Hainan Island; Nansei Shoto; and the heart of the enemy homeland-Tokyo itself. From 19 to 22 February 1945, Washington's heavy rifles hurled 16-inch shells shoreward in support of the landings on Iwo Jima. In preparation for the assault, Washington's main and secondary batteries destroyed gun positions, troop concentrations, and other ground installations. From 23 February to 16 March, the fast battleship supported the unfolding invasion of Iwo Jima, including a carrier raid upon Tokyo on 25 February. On 18, 19, and 29 March, Washington screened the Fleet's carriers as they launched air strikes against Japanese airfields and other installations on the island of Kyushu. On 24 March, and again on 19 April, Washington lent her support to the shelling's of Japanese positions on the island of Okinawa. Anchoring at San Pedro Bay, Leyte, on 1 June 1945 after an almost ceaseless slate of operations, Washington sailed for the west coast of the United States on 6 June, making stops at Guam and Pearl Harbor before reaching the Puget Sound Navy Yard on 23 June. As it turned out, Washington would not participate in active combat in the Pacific theater again. Her final wartime refit carried on through V-J Day in mid-August of 1945 and the formal Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay on 2 September. She completed her post repair trials and conducted underway training out of San Pedro, Calif., before she headed for the Panama Canal, returning to the Atlantic Ocean. Joining TG 11.6 on 6 October, with Vice Admiral Frederick C. Sherman in overall command, she soon transited the Panama Canal and headed for Philadelphia, the place where she had been "born." Arriving at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard on 17 October, she participated in Navy Day ceremonies there on the 27th. Assigned to troop transport duty on 2 November 1945 as part of the "Magic Carpet" operations- Washington went into dockyard hands on that day, emerging on the 15th with additional bunking facilities below and a crew that now consisted of only 84 officers and 835 men. Sailing on 15 November for the British Isles, Washington reached Southampton, England, on 22 November. After embarking 185 army officers and 1,479 enlisted men, Washington sailed for New York. She completed that voyage and, after that brief stint as a transport, was placed out of commission, in reserve, on 27 June 1947. Assigned to the New York group of the Atlantic Reserve Fleet, Washington remained inactive through the late 1950's, ultimately being struck from the Navy list on 1 June I960. The old warrior was sold on 24 May 1961 to the Lipsett Division, Luria Bros., of New York City, and was scrapped soon thereafter. Washington (BB-56) earned 13 battle stars during World War II in operations that had carried her from the Arctic Circle to the western Pacific.

North Carolina Class BB-55 North Carolina BB-56 Washington Dimensions: Displacements: 35,000 tons(stand) 47,500 tons(Mean War Service) Length: 729' (oa) Beam: 35' (max) Armament: 9 16"/45 20 5"/38 DP 15 40 mm quads 48-67 20 mm Propulsion: Speed: 26.8 knots (max) Max. cruising radius: 5,740 miles @ 25knots 16,320 @ 15 knots Horsepower: 121,000 (shafts) Drive: 4 screws; geared turbine Fuel: 7,554 tons oil (max) Aircraft: 3 SC-1 Remarks First of the modern American fast battleships, the NORTHCAROLINA and WASHINGTON were designed to a treaty displacement of 35,000 tons, standard. Progress in marine engineering and the use of partly welded construction permitted greater speed without sacrifices in armament and protection. The disposition of the main battery in three triple turret follows the practice established in all American heavy cruisers built since the PESACOLA Class. The tower foremast, and all dual- purpose, turreted secondary battery for American capital ships were introduced in this class. Like most contemporary foreign battleships, these ships were given a flush-deck hull; considerable sheer forward assures adequate freeboard near the bow. In general design and appearance the NORTH CAROLINA represents a radical departure from older battleships. The only salient feature carried over from pre-naval conference capital ships is the triple 16" turret, which was at one time intended for the six unis of the former SOUTH DAKOTA Class (BB49-54) scrapped under the terms of the

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