BB-56 U.S.S. WASHINGTON
War Diary and Action Reports November 1942,
File NO. BB56/A12-1/ (TS133) lo-whp
U.S.S. WASHINGTON
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California
30 Dec 1942
From: The Commanding Officer.
To: The Chief of Naval Operations,
(Office of Naval Records and Library).
Subject: (A) War Diary U.S.S. WASHINGTON, For
Period from November 1, 1942 to
December 1, 1942.
1. In accordance with Cominch File FF1/A12-1(7),
Serial 291/A12-1 (420222) of February 22, 1942, enclosure
(A) is forwarded herewith.
G. B. DAVIS
Copy to:
COMBATDIV SIX
W A R D I A R Y
U. S. S. WASHINGTON
From: 0000 November 1, 1942 To: 0000 December 1, 1942
WAR DIARY
U.S.S. WASHINGTON
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
From: 0000 Sunday, November 1 to 2400 Tuesday,
November 10. Zone: minus 11.
Anchored in Dumbea Bay, Noumea, New Caledonia,
protected by anti-torpedo net. Ships present ARGONNE (SOPA),
WASHINGTON (COMMANDER BATTLESHIPS DIVISION SIX), SOUTH
DAKOTA, ENTERPRISE (COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN), PENSACOLA,
NORTHAMPTON, PORTLAND, JUNEAU SAN DIEGO, SAN JUAN, WHIPPLE,
CUSHING, PRESTON, SMITH, MAHAN, STACK, HUGHES, ANDERSON,
MUSTIN, RUSSELL, MORRIS, NICHOLAS, LANSDOWNE, WHITNEY, LASSEN,
ALDEBARAN, SOLACE, VESTAL, ALHENA ANTARES, WILLIAM WARD
BURROWS, ZEILIN, MC CAWLEY, WRIGHT, HOVEY, SABINE and other
ships and craft.
Fueled from CHESTER SUN on November 1 and 2. Went
to General Quarters and prepared for emergency sortie morning
of November 4 due to unidentified carrier sighted off
Royalty Island. Unverified. Secured on orders from SOPA.
WAR DIARY
U.S.S. WASHINGTON
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
From: 0000 to 2400 Wednesday, November 11, 1942.
Zone: minus 11.
minus 12 after 1800.
2000: 22-26-00 S
165-47-30 E
Course made good from 0800 November 11 to
0800 November 12 - 301°
Speed made good from 0800 November 11 to
0800 November 12 - 9 kts.
Anchored as before. Underway at 1210 and went
to General Quarters for sortie with TASK FORCE SIXTEEN
composed of U.S.S. ENTERPRISE (COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN
and OFFICER IN TACTICAL COMMAND), WASHINGTON (COMMANDER BAT-
TLESHIPS DIVISION SIX), SOUTH DAKOTA, NORTHAMPTON, SAN DIEGO
HUGHES, ANDERSON, MUSTIN, RUSSELL, WALKE, MORRIS, CLARK and
BENHAM. WASHINGTON (COMMANDER BATTLESHIP DIVISION SIX),
SOUTH DAKOTA and NORTHAMPTON designated Surface Attack Group
16.3. Standard speed 20 knots. Received the following
visual from COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN "This force is
proceeding west of Poppy to Latitude 14-00, Longitude 161-30,
to arrive 0800 Friday to be in position to strike Guadalcanal
area."
WAR DIARY
U.S.S. WASHINGTON
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
From: 0000 to 2400 Thursday, November 12, 1942.
Zone: minus 12.
0800: 20-21-30 S
162-59-00 E
1200: 19-41-05 S
162-48-00 E
2000: 18-01-00 S
161-48-00 E
Course made good from 0800 November 12 to
0800 November 13 - 345°.
Speed made good from 0800 November 12 to
0800 November 13 - 16 kts.
Steaming in formation with TASK FORCE SIXTEEN
zigzagging according to plan during daylight hours. U.S.S.
PENSACOLA, GWIN AND PRESTON joined the Task Force at 0940.
Received the following message during the day:
Visual 120145 - From COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN - "We
will pass through enemy sub line tonight X
Be especially alert"
Visual 120205 - From COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN - "When
under attack speed will be 25 or 27 knots
and turn will be made with full rudder X
It is probable full circle will be turned X
All ships must be alert"
WAR DIARY
U.S.S. WASHINGTON
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
From: 0000 to 2400 Friday, November 13, 1942.
Zone: minus 12.
0800: 14-21-30 S
161-17-30 E
1200: 13-52-00 S
161-39-00 E
2000: 13-59-00 S
161-52-00 E
Course made good from 0800 November 13 to
0800 November 14 - 336°.
Speed made good from 0800 November 13 to
0800 November 14 - 10 kts.
Steaming as before. Held regular dawn General
Quarters. At 1046 SOUTH DAKOTA reported torpedo wake. Ex-
ecuted emergency turn left to 285(T) and increased speed
to 25 knots. BENHAM left the formation to investigate but
failed to make contact. Unidentified aircraft sighted at
1148 bearing 292(T) 15 miles. Disappeared at 1155. (See
COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN visual 130230). At 1915
changed standard speed to 24 knots and COMMANDER BATTLE-
SHIPS DIVISION SIX in WASHINGTON with SOUTH DAKOTA, WALKE,
GWIN, BENHAM and PRESTON left TASK FORCE SIXTEEN in accord-
ance with COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN's visual. COMMANDER
BATTLESHIP DIVISION SIX designated COMMANDER TASK FORCE
SIXTY FOUR.
130230 from COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN: We were
sighted and reported by a seaplane which our VF shot down
about noon. We are proceeding to cover our forces retiring
from Cactus.
130654 from COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN to COM-
MMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTY FOUR: Proceed north with both BBs
and your four DDs at best speed. Proceed vicinity east of
Savo Island only if directed by COMSOPAC. Rejoin at morning
rendezvous if not otherwise directed.
132000 from COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTY FOUR to TASK
FORCE SIXTY FOUR: This force designated TASK FORCE SIXTY FOUR
is operating to southward of Solomons. Objective enemy transport
force from Faisi or those encountered. Be alert for an attack.
Our carrier to southeastward.
WAR DIARY
U.S.S. WASHINGTON
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
From: 0000 to 2400 Friday, November 14, 1942.
Zone: minus 12.
0800: 10-41-30 S
159-35-30 E
1200: 10-29-00 S
159-17-30 E
2000: 09-45-00 S
159-22-00 E
Course made good from 0800 November 14 to November
15 (0800) - 095°.
Speed made good from 0800 November 14 to November
15 (0800) - 2.5 kts.
Steaming with TASK FORCE SIXTY FOUR on course 000(T).
Sky overcast to mainly cloudy with rainsqualls during day.
Went to General Quarters at 0527. Sighted Guadalcanal 25
miles distant bearing 000(T) to 035(T) at 0625. Numerous
radar unidentified plane contacts made during the day. TASK
FORCE SIXTY FOUR give rendezvous for next morning in event
of separation. Changed course at 1739 to 320° passing through
channel between Russel Island and Guadalcanal. See Action
Report, Night of November 14-15 (Enclosure a).
WAR DIARY
U.S.S. WASHINGTON
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
From: 0000 to 2400 Friday, November 15, 1942.
Zone: minus 12.
0800: 10-47-00 S
160-42-00 E
1200: 11-10-30 S
159-17-30 E
2000: 12-36-00 S
162-47-00 E
Course made good from 0800 November 15 to
0800 November 16 - 141° 30".
Speed made good from 0800 November 15 to
0800 November 16 - 15 kts.
At 0016 engaged enemy (see Action Report, Night of
November 14-15). Retired southward independently at 0216.
Sky overcast all morning with rain beginning at
noon and continuing all day. Wind up to 23 knots.
Secured from General Quarters at 0649. Ordered by
COMMANDER SOUTH PACIFIC FORCE to proceed toward Button to ren-
dezvous with fully fueled destroyers and operate so as to reach
Savo Island by 2200 love 15th At 0951 sighted the SOUTH DAKOTA
bearing 2690(T) 17.5 miles. Received the visual: "We are not ef-
fective. Turret 3 out X Fire control badly damaged X Only one
radar operative X Fuel tank holed." At 1105 eight unidentified
planes sighted on port beam 12 miles distant. Went to General
Quarters. Five unidentified planes sighted fifteen minutes later.
No further contacts made. Received orders from COMMANDER SOUTH
PACIFIC FORCE to proceed directly to Noumea. At 2240 U.S.S. DALE,
STACK and LARDNER joined the formation and formed anti-submarine
screen.
WAR DIARY
U.S.S. WASHINGTON
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
From: 0000 to 2400 Friday, November 16, 1942.
Zone: minus 12.
after 1400 minus 11.
0800: 15-25-00 S
164-15-30 E
1200: 16-34-00 S
162-59-30 E
2000: 18-54-00 S
162-08-30 E
Course made good from 0800 November 16 to
0800 November 17 - 174°.
Speed made good from 0800 November 16 to
0800 November 17 - 17 kts.
Steaming as before. Standard speed 24 kts. Sky
mostly cloudy to overcast with winds up to 20 knots during
the day. Held regular dawn and sunset General Quarters.
Went to General Quarters at 1435 to unload 16" guns through
the muzzle in offset firing practice on the SOUTH DAKOTA.
Expended 9 rounds of 16" ammunition.
WAR DIARY
U.S.S. WASHINGTON
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
From: 0000 to 2400 Friday, November 17, 1942.
Zone: minus 11.
0800: 22-13-S
164-58-E
1200: 22-33-00 S
166-15-30 E
Course made good from 0800 November 17 to
0800 November 18 - 119° 30".
Speed made good from 0800 November 17 to
0800 November 18 - 9.3 kts.
Steaming as before. Held regular dawn General
Quarters. Radar contacted New Caledonia 0200 bearing 090(T)
at 56 miles. Made radar contacts with friendly planes dur-
ing morning. Went to General Quarters for entrance and an-
chored at 1420 in Dumbea Bay, Noumea, New Caledonia.
Ships present: ARGONNE (SENIOR OFFICER PRESENT
AFLOT), WASHINGTON (COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTY FOUR), ENTER-
PRISE (COMMANDER TASK FORCE SIXTEEN), SOUTH DAKOTA, SAN DIEGO,
DALE, MAHAN, LAMON, CONYNGHAM, DUNLAP, STACK, HUGHES, GRAYSON,
CLARKE, LARDNER, RUSSELL, VIERO, WHITNEY, WRIGHT, PROMETHEUS,
VESTAL, ARD 2, BARNETT, HUNTER LIGGETT, KENMORE, MC KEAN,
PLATTE, LACKAWANNA, ALCHEBE, ANTARES, LASSEN, ALDEBAAN,
ROAMER, MATSONIA, E. J. HENRY, and other ships and craft.
WAR DIARY
U.S.S. WASHINGTON
c/o Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, Calif.
From: 0000 November 18 to 2400 November 30, 1942.
Zone: minus 11.
Anchored as before with anti-torpedo net around
ship.
Received 16" and 5" ammunition from USS LASSEN
on November 19. SOUTH DAKOTA, ALYWIN and DALE stood out
on November 25.
CONFIDENTIAL U.S.S. WASHINGTON 11-JR
BB56/A16-3(0133)
c/o Fleet Post Office,
San Francisco, California.
November 27, 1942.
From: The Commanding Officer.
To : The Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet.
Via : The Commander Task Force 64 (ComBatDiv 6).
Subject: Action Report, Night of November 14-15, 1942.
Reference: (a) U.S.N.R., 1920 Article 712 and 874(6).
(b) Pacflt conf. ltr. 24 CL-42.
Enclosure: (A) Track Chart.
(B) Report of Executive Officer.
1. Summary of outstanding; evens and general comment.
(a) On the night of November 14-15 WASHINGTON was
flagship of Commander Task Force 64 (Combatdiv 6). In column,
with 4 DDs ahead and SOUTH DAKOTA astern, she stood north be-
tween Russell and Guadalcanal, then east and southeast, pass-
ing north of Savo, to a point 13.5 miles 116°t. from the south
point of Savo. Standing west from this point, first radar
contact was made at 0001 with enemy ships east of Savo. From
0016 to 0019 fired 42 rounds 16", opening at 18,500 yards, at
large cruiser or BB which it is believed was sunk. From 0016
to 0017 fired. 100 rounds 5" at ranges 12 to 13,000 yards at
enemy cruiser or large DD which was also engaged by SOUTH
DAKOTA and was left burning. Standing on northwesterly courses
fired 133 rounds 5" from 0025 to 0034 at ranges about 10,000
yards at light craft close to southeast shore of Savo which
were engaging our DDs; all were silenced and one left burn-
ing. From 0100 to 0107 fired 75 rounds 16" and 107 rounds
5" at ranges from 8,400 to 12,650 yards, at BB northwest of
Savo which was firing at SOUTH DAKOTA. This BB was silenced.
and was subsequently tracked by radar through a 500° turn.
From 0100 to 0107 fired 120 rounds 5", at ranges from 7,400
to 9,500 yards, in succession at 3 enemy cruisers illuminating
and engaging SOUTH DAKOTA and also under her fire; they were
silenced. Sighted several torpedo wakes, presumably from
MTBs, while retiring on southerly courses near east end of
Russell.
(b) By the time our 5" fire on light craft close to
southeast shore of Savo had ceased, 1 of our DDS was sunk,
1 was hopelessly afire (he exploded and sank a few minutes
later), and the other 2 were put out of action (they retired
to southward). Subsequently, and before we opened fire on
ships northwest of Savo, the SOUTH DAKOTA was seen to the
eastward between this ship and Savo on a course to northward
of WASHINGTON course. What appeared to be the SOUTH DAKOTA
was seen at about 0121 at a considerable distance to the
southeastward between this ship and Guadalcanal on a southerly
course.
(c) From radar tracking and visual observation of
enemy ships, there were:
(1) Fired upon by this ship and apparently sunk:
1 large cruiser or BB (WASH only).
2 large cruisers (S.D. plus WASH 5").
1 DD (our DDs plus WASH. 5").
(2) Fired upon by this ship and apparently damaged:
1 14" BB silenced and out of control (WASH.
only).
1 DD burning (WASH. 5").
5-9 lightcraft silenced (our DDS plus WAS. 5"
plus S.D.).
(d) There was no melee.
(e) This ship was undamaged.
(f) Comment. The following comments are submitted:
(1) Our radar is effective for accurate gun fire at
long ranges at night. Japanese radar aboard ships
present, if any, is not effective for surface targets.
(2) Japanese are sufficiently familiar with radar and
aware of our use of it to make full use of land cover
both between them end ourselves and closely backing
them up.
(3) Our optical vision is superior to Japanese.
(4) Our fire control and the effectiveness of our pro-
jectiles meet or exceed our expectations.
accordingly, (5) We should seek rather than avoid night action,
opening at ranges as great as satisfactory solutions
can be obtained.
(6) Surface craft need an effective means of radar
identification urgently.
(7) For full effectiveness in night firing we need/ radar
means of spotting in deflection.
2. Preliminary Operations.
(a)(1) Enemy forces had shelled our positions in Guadalcanal on
the previous night. The enemy was known to be making most
strenuous efforts to reinforce his position in Guadalcanal.
(2) Enemy forces as reported on November 14th:
Time Position
(Zone-12) Composition (Lat.S)(Long.E) Course-Speed Remarks
0355 Enemy Ships Vicinity Savo Island --- --= Operating
_____________________________________________________________________
0800 1 BB - 2 CA 150 mi. from Guadal- 120 15 *
4 DD - 1 CV canal Brg. 300_________________________
0815 2 BB - 1 CL 300°150 mi. from 130 25 *
11 DD Guadalcanal____________________________
0830 12 AP 07-55; 157-45 --- --
_____________________________________________________________________
1010 1 CC - 1 DD Brg. 080 Marau Sound --- -- Unidenti-
Guadalcanal fied_____
1015(TOR) 4 CA - 3 DD 170 mi. from Guadal- --- 16 1 CA
canal bearing 280 burning__
1035 2 CL - 2 DD 08-00; 156-20 350 25
_____________________________________________________________________
1036(TOR) 5 ships 07-00; 160-20 340 -- 1 ship
damaged__
1050 2 CV 08-16; 158-43 --- --
_____________________________________________________________________
1104(TOR) 25 ships in- 08-15; 158-43 130 --
cluding 2 CV(?)____________________________________________
1105 2 CB - 3 CC 09-00; 157-15 310 25
6 DD_______________________________________________________
1600 12 AP plus sev- 80 mi. from Guadal- --- --
eral small canal bearing 311.
vessels.___________________________________________________
1600 1 CA - 1 CL 08-40; 159-00 --- -- No CV
6 DD - 4 AP observed_
1700 11 AP - several 60 mi. NW Savo Milling 6 AP
DD Island around seriously
damaged__
1700 4 CA - 1 CL 06-52; 160-00 165 17
10 DD._____________________________________________________
1757 Enemy forces 60 mi. NW Savo --- --
Island_________________________________
1835(TOR) 2 AP burning 70 mi. from Guadal- 305 -- 3 of the 5
5 AP underway canal smoking._
* Reported as possibly being same force.
1836 1 BB - 1 CC - 09-50; 159-30 350 10 Probably
4 DD our own
force____
1845 9 AP - DD - CC - 80 mi. Brg. 315 from 2 AP 3 AP dead
1 large unident- Guadalcanal Course N in water;
ified. 2 AP 2 AP burn-
course NE ing_
1848 AP's - CL - DD 08-20; 159-10 --- --
_____________________________________________________________________
1920 11 vessels in- 08-25; 158-15 --- -- Engaged in
cluding 1 CL surface
battle; 3
burning._
2000 Position enemy (Refers to 1848 302 --
AP's unchanged; report)
1 CL, several
DD's same posi-
tion.______________________________________________________
2010(TOR) 1 CL - 1 DD Cove in Savo --- 0
Island_________________________________
2110 unknown 09-10; 158-45 --- -- Naval bat-
tle in
progress__
0006 3 ships just rounded north --- --
of Savo headed west_____________________
(3) From contact reports, radar tracking, and visual observa-
tions of enemy ships there were apparently present:
2 BB, 6 CA or CL, 5 large unidentified, 7-14 DD's and
MTB's.
(b) Our Operations. (Time Zone-12)
(1) Approached on northerly course about nine (9) miles to
the westward of Guadalcanal.
(2) At 2100 in position Lat. 9-19-50 S, Long. 159-26-45E, on
course 020°T, at 23 kts.
(3) At 2135 TASK FORCE 64 was disposed in column, as follows:
WALKE, BENHAM, PRESTON, GWIN, WASHINGTON, SOUTH DAKOTA.
(4) At 2209 this ship changed course to 090, following DDs,
and passed Northernmost point of Savo Island abeam to tar-
board at 2245 distant 22,000 yards.
(5) At 2249 this ship c/c to 150 degrees following DDS.
(6) At 2330 changed formation speed to 17 knots.
(7) At 2352 this ship c/ c to 270 degrees following DDS.
(8) Track during remainder of approach, and during action
and retirement shown on tracing (Enclosure "A")
(9) Current: On approach to Guadalcanal in Coral Sea current
of 1 Kt. to the eastward was noted. In passage between
Florida and Savo Islands the current was westerly 1 Kt.
(10) Piloting: No lighted navigational landmarks. No diffi-
culty was experienced during moonlight. After moonset
landmarks were obscure at distances greater than 5 miles.
(c) Weather:
(1) temperature 83 degrees.
(2) Wind: From 170 (T) 7 kts.
(3) Clouds: Scattered Cirrus Cumulus, tenths, none over-
head.
(4) Visibility: Prominent landmarks seen at distances as
great as 25 miles during moonlight. After moonset
prominent landmarks could be seen at 12 miles distance.
(5) Sea: Flat, calm.
(6) Moonset: 0058, 15 November 1942.
3. CHRONOLOGICAL LOG OF BATTLE.
TIME EVENT
2058 Message from plane to another, intercepted, that 1 cruiser
and 1 destroyer were in a cove at Savo Island.
About Many reports of gunfire over the horizon North and North-
2100 west of Russell I glands. Glows such as of ship afire, glows
to flaring up such as by explosions. A large explosion on the
2318 Port beam reported during this period.
2125 Slowed to 20 knots.
2131 Something burning wag reported as 2 points forward of the
port beam (about 310° T).
2135 Increased speed to 23 knots.
2145 Unidentified plane bearing 080, range 8,400, flashed sig-
na1 appeared to be numeral "9" plane on southerly course.
2150 This force commenced a change of course in succession from
the van to 090°T.
2202 A glow was reported at 270° relative (290°T).
2209 On course 090°T.
2215 Gunfire was reported at 202° relative (292°T).
2249 Changed course to 150°T.
2317 Dull light on eastern part of Savo Island about half way
up hill.
2319 A red rocket wag reported at 10° relative.
2332 Changed speed to 17 knots.
2352 Changed course to 270° T,
0000 Light bearing 245 relative (115°T) range 19,600.
0001 Target bearing 340 degrees True, and range 18,000 yards
picked up simultaneously by Radars 2 (SG) and 4 (FC).
Main Battery Director 2 tracked for 2 minutes and then
lost it because of land interference. In this location
land signals were being received on the fire control and
search (CXAM) radar screens at almost the game position on
the screen as the target. Some of these echoes came from
Santa Isabel, over a hundred thousand yards away ( the
sweep frequency is such that a repeat is made every hun-
dred thousand yards); others were Bide lobes from Savo
Island.
0003 Reports of floating objects in the water ahead and smell of
oil.
0005 S.B. Director 1 reported a radar contact 070 degrees rela-
tive (340°T), range 19,600. There were probably 3 to 8
ships in the two groups East of Savo.
0006 Report received from Guadalcanal Control that 3 ships just
rounded the North of Savo headed West.
0008 During this period Radar Plot was reporting two ships on
the same bearing, 1 at 15,000 and 1 at 18,000 yards. Float-
ing objects reported in water.
0010 Two radar targets reported by S.B., 18,000 and 18,400 (no
bearing given).
Full Condition ZED set; C02 on gasoline and paint stowages.
Secondary Battery Director 3 reported as being on target.
MB Plot shifted to Rangekeeper 1 to train from SB director
in order to designate to the main battery directors. The
train wag too erratic to be reliable.
0011 Shifted to M.B. Director 1 In train.
0012 M.B. Director 1 picked up the further target optically and
checked it to be the one on which the radar wag ranging
(described by all radars as the largest target). Described
by Spot 1 as possibly a TENRYU class CL. A closer Ship was
seen slightly to the left.
0013 Started getting Main Battery Radar ranges.
0014 SOUTH DAKOTA given permission by TBS to open fire.
0015 SOUTH DAKOTA reported by TBS a surface contact 345°T dis-
tance 16,300 yards.
0016 Main Battery opened fire on target at a range of 18,500
yards. S.B. opened fire on closer targets possibly DDs,
groups 1 and 3 firing (2 mounts each). Probably about
15,000 yards range, possibly less. S.B. Group 1 Officer
stated that there appeared to be 3 DD in the group at which
he fired.
0016 M.B. Spotters blinded by S.B. opening at time of splash.
First salvo observed "over" by Radar 3 (FC), spotted "Down".
Radar 3 lost target after the second salvo, but could still
see splashes. Second salvo observed to be a straddle by
Radar 4(FC). Radar operator reported "Following the second
salvo the indication appeared to drop down and finally dis-
appeared from the screen." M.B. Director lost target op-
tically. Radar 2 (SG) Officer reported that the second or
third salvo landed on the target which caused the signal to
flicker. A sweep was made and then only a fuzzy flickering
indication could be found, where previous indication had
been. Previous signal was very strong; signal from other
ships continued strong.
0017 SOUTH DAKOTA opened fire on target to the left and closer
(near one of the S.B. targets).
Heavy black smoke from M.B. target and a nearer vessel re-
ported as obscuring the target, possibly a smoke screen.
Results of S. B. fire undetermined.
Three Secondary Battery Radars (FD's 7, 9 and 10) reported
that the first M.B. salvo straddled the target. It is be-
lieved that what they saw was the first salvo of the SOUTH
DAKOTA. Second M.B. salvo was fired with radar train, re-
mainder in generated.
0019 M.B. ceased firing as the result of losing the target.
Changed course to 300°T.
0020 Reports of: Own DD's opening fire; own DD's bearing 020
relative (320°) have opened fire; green flare on starboard
bow; enemy firing on us; SOUTH DAKOTA still firing Main
Battery; white lights on port bow and beam. Changed speed
to 23 knots.
0022 Green light reported bearing 115° relative (055°T).
0024 Report of: Being fired on from island (decided subsequently
to be from ships this side of island); our DD's returning
fire.
0025 Secondary Battery opened fire on "shore batteries" which
were apparently ships. S.B. Director 3 in control of mounts
1,3,5, and 7. Group 3 fired at about 6 "shore batteries"
(ships) in turn until each stopped firing. A fire was
started on one at the right tangent of Savo which burned for
a long time.
0026 WALKE reported opening fire on target 020° relative (320°T).
M.B. ceased tracking and shifted to the end of Savo Island.
Bridge reported a target broad on the starboard bow. M.B.
Directors were so blinded by 5' fire that they could not
find a point of aim.
0027 Radar (CXAM) picked up target bearing 040 relative (340°T),
range 9,700.
0028 A ship reported by Radar plot as bearing 356°T moving around
the end of the island. Other contacts following indicate
that there were a number of other ships rimming the southern
side of Savo (6 to 10 ships).
0029 Reports of: Ships on the starboard bow firing at us; fire
started on beach (ship close to Savo); M.B. Director 1 on
target, bearing 056° relative (356°T).
0031 3 excellent optical ranges were obtained on this burning
ship at 10,200 yards by Range 1 (the coincidence range-
finder in Turret 1.)
0032 Reports of target on starboard beam; one of our destroyers
has been hit.
0033 Two of our destroyers were hit at about this time, the
WALKE burned badly, the PRESTON exploded having possibly
been hit by a torpedo. Reports of: men in water dead a-
head; think 1 of DD's sinking; rafts ordered to be put over
as we went by; all enemy fire ceased.
0034 "Cease firing" for 5" Battery given as a result of Mount 3
firing wild (Training motor kicked out and the pointers
were not matched). It was feared the mount might endanger
own destroyers. Explosions as of depth charges possibly
from a DD of ours that had been hit. Changed speed to 26
knots. All S.B. targets lost.
0035 Changed course to 282°T. to place burning DD between us
and the enemy.
Radar (SC) reported 4 ships bearing 330 degrees true. Radar
Plot coached the Main Battery on to one reported to be
larger than the others. These targets had been obscured by
Savo up to this time. M.B. started tracking. Reports of
vibration starboard side, frame 95; we may have hit some
submerged wreckage. PRESTON wag passed about 200 yards
abeam submerged but with stack showing.
0041 Passed wreckage of burning DD (WALKE). Launched two life
rafts.
0044 BENHAM reported she was O.K., 1 hit in fireroom.
0046 Burning enemy ship bearing 150 relative (072°T) sank -
reported by 2 sources as a cruiser but was probably a DD.
0048 Van Destroyers ordered to retire.
0050 Course 290°T.
0054 TF 64 received a report from the SOUTH DAKOTA that she
was O.K.
SOUTH DAKOTA reported as shearing to starboard.
Enemy ship that the Main Battery wag tracking started a
change of course to the right, reversal completed by 0057.
0058 Moon set.
0059 "Transports" were reported on the starboard bow (evidently
the ships already being tracked).
Enemy ship on starboard beam opened search lights.
0100 "Open Fire".
Main Battery opened fire bearing 008°T, range 8,400 yards
on target, apparently BB.
S.B. opened fire. Director 1 with Mounts 1 and 3 on M.B.
target. Director 3 with mounts 5 and 7 firing on ship
(probably a CA) with searchlights trained on SOUTH DAKOTA.
Director 4 provided starshell illumination with Mount 9
for the main battery.
The Main Battery hit the Battleship with at least 3 salvos
with projectiles exploding.
0102 Green light reported on port beam.
Group 3 hit the ship that had searchlights on SOUTH DAKOTA
until the lights went out, then shifted to 2 others in
turn until their lights were out. Fires were started on
ship which SOUTH DAKOTA was hitting.
0102½ "Cease Firing". Given by Control on receipt of erroneous
report that target was sunk.
0103 Reports that enemy was still firing at us apparently with
3 turrets. Believed to have fired 2 salvos in the minute
and a half during which fire was ceased.
0104 Bridge, "If you can see anything to shoot at, go ahead".
Main Battery resumed fire. Salvo 2 reported as a short
straddle. More hits obtained. Jap BB continued fire with
only 1 turret (aft). Warning given to keep a good look-
out for enemy DD's on both bows.
0107 Green light reported on port bow.
Control reported that the forward group was getting to its
limit of train (148)".
The Main Battery target was burning, and heading away.
Enemy BB ceased firing. The Main Battery continued to
track the burning ship for ten minutes. During this time
she made a turn of at least 500°.
0114 A report was made by Spot 1 "Looks like someone opening
fire on us on the starboard quarter". Order to train
turrets 150° relative.
0117 Main Battery shifted to track new target bearing 120 rela-
tive (049°T), 13,800 yards. The target tracked was the
leading vessel of a group of 5. Its type was unrecognized.
The other ships were reported as freighters but they made
26 to 29 knots during the 22 minutes the leading ship was
tracked by the Main Battery. They are all believed to have
been DDs. At the time of shifting, the previous target
(BB) appeared to be steading on a Westerly course, speed
about 18 knots.
0119 Firing reported on the starboard quarter. Doubt existed
as to location of South Dakota.
0120 Changed course to 340°T.
0121 Control reported a good solution on the target Main Battery
was tracking bearing 068 relative (048°T). Targets re-
ported at 326°T and also at 147°T, 13,000 yards.
0123 Sky Control reported flares on starboard quarter.
0127 Radar reports 4 targets bearing 260 relative (Russell ls.?).
0132 Leading ship that Main Battery was tracking lad smoke
screen that laid well.
0133 Changed course to right to 180°. Slowed to 20 knots.
0137 Heavy explosion at 245 relative (095°T).
0140 Changing course to 210°T.
0142 Sky Control reported green light on port quarter.
Increased speed to 26 knots.
0144 Sky Control reported a ship signaling on port quarter.
Control reported someone firing from dead astern. A splash
150 to 200 feet high landed about 200 yards astern 190°
relative. Bridge reported a target ahead. Dull flashes
were seen in this direction.
0145 Bridge ordered Turrets train 020 relative. Turrets 1 and 2
were trained 020 relative. The main battery continued to
track the 5 unidentified vessels with director 2.
0147 Reports of flashing light on port quarter believed to be
firing.
0148 Torpedo reported on port quarter. From this time until 0219
seventeen torpedoes were reported; some reports were of
course duplications; some were actually light streaks from
stars; from 3 to 5 are believed to have been torpedoes, all
fired from abaft the beam.
0152 Report of light bearing 200 relative.
0154 Several reports were received of motor torpedo boats for
some time. At least most of these were undoubtedly false.
Control reported two targets 040 degrees T, 16,000.
0155 Making full power.
0157 Main Battery shifted control between Directors 1 and 2 during
maneuvers to avoid torpedoes.
0208 S.B. Director 4 reported high speed targets 237 relative,
1600 yards and 194 relative, 2600 yards. Cannot see target.
NOTE:- Such targets as these were probably our own bow wakes
and stern waves meeting during maneuvers.
0220 Radar contact on large target 165°T, 16,000 yards.
0222 Main Battery Ceased tracking the 5 unidentified vessels to
the North. M.B. started tracking large target, 165°T by
radar.
0228 Report that the above Radar target appeared to be SOUTH
DAKOTA, speed 27 knots. It may have been the GWIN.
0235 S.B. Director 3 tracked target bearing 320°T, 13,300 yards.
0236 Radar 2 (SG) reported 3 faint targets approaching from a-
stern bearing 305°T, 10,750 yards, probably the targets that
S.B. Director 3 had. For 10 minutes these targets appeared
to maneuver back and forth across our wake at high speed.
The closest ranges were about 9,000 yards. These are be-
lieved to have been phantoms.
0240 (About) - Three explosions as of depth charges were felt, be-
lieved to have been torpedoes detonating at end of
run.
0244 On course 180°T.
0245 S.B. Director 3 and Radar 2 both lost the 3 targets. The
large target (SOUTH DAKOTA or GWIN) was tracked for a long
period of time; at 0340 it was at 060°T, 25,000 yards.
0247 Fire by the end of Guadalcanal wag reported as bursting into
flame. For a long period of time during the retirement a
strong glow, flaring up as by explosions was seen by many
observers over the Northwestern tip of Guadalcanal. Some
observers thought that there may have been some gunfire
flashes.
4. Special Comments on Enemy Forces.
(a) Number, types. tactics - Ships and planes.
(1) No enemy aircraft were involved in the engagement.
(2) Contact reports November 13-14 indicated the probable
proximity of the following: 3 BB, 8-10 cruisers, 12
or more DD, 4 AK and 5 transports. Study of reports of
visual and radar observations; sizes of guns as indi-
cated by gun flashes, explosions and splashes; target
speeds; and density of fire indicated the following:
(a) East of Savo Island:-
5-8 ships. Probably 1 BB, 2-3 CA(CL), 3-4 DD.
(b) Southwest of Savo Island:-
6-10 ships, - DDs and possibly large MTBs.
(c) West of Savo Island:-
9 ships. Some could have been east of Savo during
first phase. Probable types were 1 BB, 3 CA(CL),
5 large unidentified.
(3) A recapitulation of the above indicates that there were
present at the scene of the action the following: from
20 to 27 ships, 2 BB, 6 CA-CL, 5 large unidentified,
and 7-14 DDs and MTBs; of these possibly 4 ships, first
observed east of Savo, may have later joined the force
west of the Island. This would make the total 16 to
23 Ships.
(4) No MTBs were actually identified although the wake of
MTBs were reported by several observers. Automatic fire
from south of Savo on many bearings from which no larger
caliber fire was observed indicates that large MTBs may
have been in this area. It appears clearly established
that there were 3-5 fast small vessels in our vicinity
during retirement.
(5) During the approach to the scene of battle, fires
and explosions and possibly gun fire were sighted
northwest of Russell Islands over the horizon.
They may have come from transports set afire by
planes earlier in the day; Japanese forces from
North and South of Georgia may have engaged each
other in error; Japanese may have been sinking
abandoned ships which had been damaged November 14.
(6) Fires and explosions observed over the northwestern
tip of Guadalcanal during retirement may have been
burning ships left in that area and abandoned ships
being destroyed. Again it is possib1e that some
Japanese ships fought among themselves as a result
of confusion.
Tactics
(7) The four heavy ships Northwest of Savo Island may
have been covering the 4 auxiliaries which were
beached on Guadalcanal about 0330, November 15,
and which may have remained north of Savo during
the action.
(8) Japanese ships were probably using Savo Island to
prevent detection by radar or silhouette effect.
During the approach and initial phase of the engage-
ment the radars were unable to resolve the ships on
the Southeast side of Savo. These ships could not
be seen until they moved away from Savo.
(9) Searchlights were used by the enemy 3 times but were
left on for only short periods. The Illumination
apparently wag effective. No Javanese starshells
were observed.
(10) Except for the initial movements of the groups East
of Savo and the vessels rimming Savo, all vessels
tracked made at least 26 knots.
(b) Communication, homing. PDF.
No Comment.
(c) (1) Use of smoke, camouflage, deception.
Twice during the entire engagement the
Japanese used smoke screens. These screens
were rapidly laid, and effectively hid sub-
sequent movements of the ships screened from
visual observation. No difficulty was found
in tracking the obscured ships by Radar.
From our viewpoint the chief effectiveness
of the use of smoke lay in preventing pos-
itive identification of enemy vessels and
damage inflicted.
(2) Camouflage.
None observed.
(3) Deception.
None observed.
(d) Effectiveness of Gunnery.
(1) This ship was fired on only sporadically.
She was not Illuminated. No hits were sustained
and the nearest miss noted was the splash
apparently of a major caliber shell about 200
yards on the port quarter. Observers who wit-
nessed other ships of our force under concentrated
fire reported the Japanese gunnery to be accurate.
Enemy ships close to Savo fired automatic
weapons accurately not our DDs. The Japanese
ships were apparently not equipped with Radar.
Their searchlights provided excellent illum-
ination of the SOUTH DAKOTA but attracted our
fire and provided a point of aim.
(2) The flashes of the Japanese guns appeared smaller
and less bright than would have been expected without
some form of flash retardant or flash hider.
(3) No torpedoes were seen to explode and no wakes
were seen until some time after the gun action.
Wakes seen during retirement were not accompanied by
explosions, but explosions wore felt about 20 minutes
later.
(e) Estimated material and personnel casualties.
(1) Material.
Fired upon by this ship and apparently sunk:
1 large cruiser or BB (WASH. only)
2 large cruisers (S.D. plus WAS. 5")
1 DD (our DDs plus WAS. 5")
Fired upon by this ship and apparently damaged:
1 14" BB silenced and out of control (WASH.
only)
1 DD Burning (WASH. 5")
5-9 light craft silenced (our DDs plus WASH.
"5 plus S.D.)
(2) Personnel. No estimate.
5. Special Comments on Own Forces.
(a)(1) 90 minutes before engaging, a friendly plane was sighted
to the eastward on a southerly course.
(2) Night contact scouting from a small plane where the duties
of observer, navigator, pilot, and radio operator cannot be
performed by 4 separate individuals is a difficult task. Re-
ports from such scouting might be more misleading than help-
ful. On the other hand, it is believed that the experience
and skill of our aviation personnel permits dependable night
contact scouting in a large plane where these 4 functions can
be separately performed by well qualified individuals. Even
without radar such a plane, could, it is believed scout
effectively in the excellent visibility conditions which ob-
tained shortly before and during this action. No use of
flares is contemplated. If such procedure is practicable the
information obtained would be invaluable under conditions
similar to this action.
(b) Communications, homing RDF. No comment.
(c) Use of, smoke, camouflage, deception. No comment.
(d) Effectiveness of Gunnery.
(1) Main Battery.
(a) This ship's gunnery appeared highly effective. Fire
was opened with a gun range of 18,500 yards initially
by this vessel using radar ranges and optical train
and hits were definitely obtained by the third salvo.
It is believed target wag stopped and sinking after
third salvo. 42 rounds were fired.
(b) In second phase target had been tracked by radar
ranges and bearing and later by optical train. Fire
was opened at 8,400 yards and a hit was probably
obtained on firs salvo and certainly on the second.
Fire was rapid, on one turret ready light, for about
2 minutes 39 seconds, firing about 39 rounds. It
was interrupted for 1½ minutes due to an erroneous
report that target was sunk, and resumed for 2
minutes and 45 seconds, during which time 36 rounds
were fired. A total of 75 rounds were fired on this
target which was believed to be an old type battle-
ship. Starshell illumination was used on this phase
after about the second salvo, 62 rounds being fired.
(c) According to the best date available overall SPGPM
was 1.30 and 5 guns had 1.8 average. Fire discipline
was excellent.
(d) The normal fire control set-up of this vessel was
used throughout, namely: -
Collective Fire, Director one controlling
in train.
Group one controlling in Plot.
Director 4 (Stable Vertical 1) controlling
in continuous level and cross level.
Director 4 controlling firing circuit (Plot).
Radar ranges by indicating and voice.
(e) Turret pointers were matched during phases in which
the director was being trained on the visual tar-
get. During the times when the visual target was
obscured, whether training by radar or generated,
a turret spread in deflection wag fired.
(f) The selected train firing key was used in plot
to insure that the firing pointer could see the
light that indicates when the director train
is on target. It has been standard practice
for this vessel to use that key at night when
visual or radar train indications are accurate,
shifting to generated bearing only in case of
poor train indication or obscured target.
(g) Against the first main battery target, 18,500
yards, radar range was used in conjunction
with visual train. The target became obscured
after the second salvo. The target wag lost by
all radars after this salvo. As a result the
last salvos went out in what amounted to gener-
ated. That is, the present range wag let ride
and the director being in automatic remained on
the generated train.
(h) On the second main battery target the tracking
was done entirely by radar for at least 5
minutes. When the target finally carne into
view optically, checks given by the pointer
indicated that the radar was exactly on. In
this connection it is noted that a consider-
able period of time is taken to adopt the
trainer's eyes to the telescope at either
night or day after looking at the radar scope
(train indicator). The reverse is also true.
As a result of this difficulty, Main Battery
Director 2 found it desirable to let the
trainer keep track by radar and the pointer
observe by telescope. Such a system is made
possible by the fact that the director is trained
automatically by generated bearing. Therefore
small corrections only are necessary and such
corrections can be made by coaching from a
pointer's station.
(i) Radar spots were used against the first target
while the target echo wag pre gent. It is of
interest to note that against the second target
(BB) "overs" as well as "shorts" could be seen
optically. Salvos were walked back and forth
across the target.
(j) The fire control switchboards on this ship provide for
a secondary battery director to furnish target bearing
to a main battery range keeper. Thus, it can also be
used to designate to a main battery director. At the
time of first contact both main batter directors lost
the target and the shift was made for designation, but
the SB director had not yet settled down and its
designation was not used. In the meantime, M.B.
Director 1 had again picked up the target and target
bearing was shifted back to it.
(2) Secondary Battery
(a) Secondary Battery fire control used radar ranges
throughout. During Phase 1 radar train wag used. In Phases IA and
2 optical train was used. Level for the basis of gun elevation
order was obtained from the Stable Element with dip-range being set
on the synchronized elevation knob in accordance with advance range.
Firing circuits were controlled by director pointers. Group 1 used
rapid continuous fire. On the other hand, Group 3 soon shifted to
salvo fire, 4 second interval, to facilitate spotting.
(b) In the first phase the effectiveness of the Secondary
Battery was undetermined. Group 1 and Group 3 each controlled 2
mounts in firing at surface targets at ranges between 13,000 and
15,000 yards. The control of the groups was by radar, range and
training. Group 3 used 400 yard rocking ladder in 200 yard steps.
No radar spots were obtained and there was no observation of the
fall of shot.
(c) Phage 1A consisted of shooting at what at first
appeared to be shore batteries on Savo Island but later identified
as surface craft. Initially both groups opened fire on these
targets. In view of the fact that Group 1 appeared to be shooting
"over", Mounts 1 and 3 were switched over to Director 3 which
continued the fire. Group 3 opened fire initially at the target
near the right tangent of the island, aiming at the gun flashes,
using a 200 yard rocking ladder based on the closest radar range
with target speed set on zero. The first target was set on fire,
many observers reporting that a stream of 5" tracers poured into the
target which immediately burst into flames. A range of 10,200 yards
on the burning ship from the Main Battery coincidence rangefinder
was within 100 yards of the range set on the computer. Fire was
shifted successively to the left using gunfire flashes as points of
aim, and was continued against gunfire flashes until each gun ceased
firing. Apparently another target on bearing near the center of
Savo Island was set on fire. These targets may have been DD's) or
large MTB's.
(d) In Phase 2 (the third Secondary Battery Phase) the
Secondary Battery again opened with divided fire. Group 1 fired on
Main Battery target and Group 3 on target whose searchlights were
illuminating the SOUTH DAKOTA. Twice during the firing group 1 was
hitting, apparently starting fires in the upper works. When search-
lights on another ship were seen to be turned on, Secondary Battery
Director 3 used them as a point of aim. On this target, which was
apparently a heavy cruiser, also engaged by the SOUTH DAKOTA's 5",
Group 3 fired with a 200-yard rocking ladder. The first salvo
landed short and was spotted "up 400". Fires were started. At
about the fourth salvo the searchlights went out. Director 3
continued with about eight or ten more salvos, at which time another
group of searchlights was seen to come on. The point of aim was
shifted to these searchlights and fire continued until they went
out. Another set of searchlights came on and fire was again shifted
to them. The last searchlights were turned off about the time of
cease firing. No hits were definitely observed on the last two
targets.
(e) In only one cage was fire discipline less than desired.
Mount 3 had a training casualty apparently as the result of the
training motor kicking out. Fire ghoul d have been ceased
immediately but it appears that the mount trainer failed to note
that his pointers were not matched. He may have been looking through
the telescope and blinded go that dial observation wag difficult.
As long as the primary system is functioning properly the pointer
and trainer should observe their dials to see that they are
continuously matched. Observation of the target can be made by
means of the Mount Captain's periscope.
(3) Starshell Illumination
(a) Starshell Illumination was employed against the Main
Battery Target in Phage 2. It was not initiated until Main battery
had opened fire but was of assistance when established. Fires
started on the opposing battleship during the first or second salvo
gave illumination that would have been sufficient In itself.
Director 4 was used for control or the starshell Illumination using
Mount 9. The director was uncertain as to which target the Main
Battery was trained on. As a result a 2-degree spread was used.
Director 4 was blinded to a considerable extent by the flash of Main
and Secondary Battery gun fire. The starshells came short of the
target about two salvos after the Main Battery resumed fire. This
may have been caused by failure to allow properly for the range rate
of the target. The Main Battery spotters were blinded for about two
salvos but it is believed the short stars had no effect on the fir-
ing since the Main Battery salvos were hitting both before and after
this incident. It is possible that after fires were started on the
enemy vessel, Mount 9 could have been used more properly to fire
common projectiles at Japanese ship. It is evident that more star-
shell training is needed. The only night practices fired by this
vessel were Night Spotting and Night Battle Practices, fired last
January.
(e) Summary of Ammunition Expended
(1) Main Battery
Phase 1 - 42 rounds
Phase 2 - _75 rounds
TOTAL -- 117
(2) Secondary Battery
Phase 1 - A.A. Com. 100 rounds
Phase 1A - A.A. Com. 133 rounds
Phase 2 - A.A. Com. 227 rounds
TOTAL -- 460 rounds
Phase 2 - Illum. _62 rounds
GRAND TOTAL -- 522 rounds
(f) Radar Search
(1) Radar searching was mainly accomplished by the SG radar
(Radar 2). The Radar Plot Officer was located so that he could
observe the Plan Position Indicator of this radar. In accordance
with the doctrine of this vessel Radar Plot Officer vas wearing the
JR phone which was tied into 2JD-2JE phone so that he could give a
description of the appearance of the screen to the Gunnery Officer
and the Main Battery Plotting Room. Since the director trainers
are also on this circuit, target designation is made quite easy.
This is made possible by the true bearing dials of the Main Battery
Directors. Against the first Main Battery target this system
placed the Main Battery on the largest enemy vessel. During Phase
1A the Main Battery was placed on the correct bearing of a target
pulling out from Savo Island but the Main Battery director was
unable to distinguish the radar signal from land echoes, and was so
blinded that targets could not be picked out visually.
(2) The four vessels north of Savo Island were picked up as
soon as they ceased being obscured by the island. The appearance
has been described by the Radar Plot Officer as that of a part of
the island being pulled out and then separating into "drops"
similar to the effect of planes taking off from a carrier. The
Main Battery was promptly placed on the largest target because the
SG radar could distinguish its size. This radar kept accurate
track of own destroyers in the screen but could not keep track of
the SOUTH DAKOTA because the foremast structure blanks off this
radar through a sector of about 60 degrees astern.
(3) The CXAM was not particularly effective because
innumerable land echoes were present from land over 100 thousand
yards away and there also were many confusing side lobes from
nearby land and from ships. The fire control radars were not used
for general search, but were used for the examination of certain
areas.
(4) Since it had been reported by Guadalcanal that a cruiser
and a destroyer were lurking in a cove off Savo Island,
particularly close examination was made of it by the fire control
radars. The after Main Battery radar picked up the initial contact
at about the game time as the SG radar.
(5) The necessity of a navigational plot on a chart in Radar
Plot is very apparent when a night action is fought in restricted
waters. It is possible that if such a plot had been maintained in
the Radar Plotting Room the ship control stations could have been
given a more satisfactory picture of the situation. At present,
space for a navigation plot is not available in Radar Plot.
(6) During the first Main Battery phase the fall of shot could
be observed by both fire control radars and the SG. However, the
SG was used primarily for search since other targets were expected.
During the second phage no splashes were observed by the FC
operators even though a particular attempt was made to do so. The
reason for this is not known. It may have been that the battleship
signal was so strong that receiver sensitivity had been cut too low
to see the splashes. On the other hand, the other near-by targets
may have confused the signals.
(g)(1) Engineering.
(a) The Main Propulsion Plant functioned perfectly through
out the action. There were no casualties of any descrip-
tion.
(b) The speed during the greater part of the action was
26 knots. From O135 to 0302, it was increased to emer-
gency full power, which proved to be 26.6 knots by Pito-
meter Log. This speed, with throttles wide open, could
not be exceeded. The temperature of the Injection was
87°, and the tonnage of the ship was 44,500,
(c) Personnel performed excellently throughout, in spite
of the high temperature (112 at the Main Control throttle
Station) in which the men had to work for the twenty-
nine hours that they were at their battle stations before
and after the action. Drinking water, furnished contin-
uously to the engine rooms by periodically pumping up the
second deck pressure tanks, proved necessary in quantities
far beyond the capacity of portable fountains provided.
These unprotected tanks might be shot away or become con-
taminated.
Recommendation: That tanks be provided in each machinery
space for supplying the regular machinery space scuttle-
butts during General Quarters.
(2) Damage Control.
(a) Personnel at below deck repair stations and at battle
dressing stations were given 10 minutes ventilation at
intervals of about 90 minutes during the 19 hours at Con-
dition I before the engagement. These stations were divi-
ded into 3 groups for this purpose. With the limited
personnel available it required 15 minutes to open up the
ventilation for a group and 5 minutes to insure shutting
the ventilation to a group. Each of these stations should
be equipped for independent ventilation capable of being
shut completely within one minute by controls and reach-
rods at that station.
(b) While meals were served in shifts in certain messing
compartments during condition one, only sufficient access
was kept open to permit the shift eating to man its sta-
tions quickly. Heads adjacent to messing compartments
were opened while each shift ate.
(3) Supply Department.
(a) The cafeteria system lends itself well to serving meals
to the crew in shifts from Condition 1 stations. During
the 19 consecutive hours at Condition 1 before the en-
gagement, three regular hot meals were served in certain
messing compartments with at least 2/3 of the ship always
fully manned, with all stations fully manned after each
shift had eaten. Three main shifts and a small fourth
shift were used. Overall time per meal about 3 hours.
(4) Medical Department.
(a) The 10 minutes ventilation supplied every 90 minutes
to personnel at repair stations and battle dressing sta-
tions was inadequate to maintain at a satisfactory level
the alertness and energy of personnel at those stations.
(b) It is believed that the 19 hours at Condition I before
the engagement would have left the ships company below
par to an important degree had meals been carried to sta-
tions. Serving the guns for 117 rounds of 16" and 522
rounds of 5" resulted in only 1 injury, a minor skin
abrasion. The accurate, unhurried rapidity with which
the ships company functioned is believed to confirm the
soundness of using regular messing compartments to serve
hot meals to the crew in shifts from Condition I stations
when circumstances permit.
(h) Summary of Damage.
(1) No Damage by enemy.
(2) Damage from blast of own guns.
(a) Bulkhead from frame 65 to 68, starboard, pushed in.
O.O.D. booth and stateroom A-101 demolished.
(b) Both planes (only two aboard during action) damaged.
one beyond repair, suitable only for dismantling for spare
parts; and one requiring major overhaul at shore base.
Engines were undamaged.
(c) Left gun port buckler of turret 2 split athwartships
for about six feet on top and left side due to blast from
turret 1 firing at about 6° elevation on relative bearing
145. Range finder bloomers in turret 2 pulled loose from
securing rings.
(d) 1.1/75 caliber Battery.
(1) 45 director 2 will not track with stick in neu-
tral.
(2) Mk. 45 director 5 hatch cover hinges damaged.
Note: None of the three Mk.45 directors, ships No. 1,
2, and 5, were in commission prior to the firing so
that actual extent damage duo to own gun blast cannot
be definitely ascertained.
(3) Mounts 5 and 6 lost power due to knife switch jar-
ring open.
(4) Mount 6 developed leaks at fresh water inlet connec-
tions and at couplings at tank.
(e) 20 m/m Battery.
(1) 6 Mk. 2 ring sights damaged beyond repair.
(2) 22 Magazines damaged but repaired by ship's force.
(3) Trigger (O.E. 1220 ) missing.
(4) 1 Securing pin (O.E. 2188) sheared off.
(5) 2 - Hand grips (O.E. 1061) sheared.
(6) 1 Strap securing shieled broken at shield.
(7) 1 Mk. 14-2 gun sight torn off gun at brocket bolt
(Tested, found satisfactory and resecured).
(f) Two dome-fronts on 24" searchlight were broken. This
is an old trouble, and has not yet been corrected in this
vessel.
(g) The door of the 1MC transmitter on the bridge was left
open, and the armature of tho transmitter was moved off
center by gun blasts, putting it out of action.
(h) The general alarm sounded twice during the action,
set off by blows against the contact-maker in the 0.0.D.
booth.
(i) Several lamp bulbs in the fighting-lights came loose
in their sockets.
(i) Casualties to Personnel. None.
(j) Gunnery Casualties
Turret Gun Estim.
or or Salvos
Cal. Mount Unit Brief Description Missed
16" Dir. 1 Temporary loss of radar antenna elev-
ation due to hand crank jumping from 0
automatic to hand position.
16" Dir. 2 Temporary loss of level input to
radar antennae due to adjusting screw 0
of micro-switch (Sk. 271394) on
looking pin working loose.
16" T-1 C Plug difficult to open due to canting 1
T-2 C of thrust bearing retainer for 2
counter-balance spring when retainer
ring (Drwg. 56463-10) jumped out of
place.
16" T-1 L Plug latch spring (Drwg. 66444-3) 0
T-2 C broke preventing plug from being 3
latched in open position automatically.
16" T-3 L Oil seal in projectile hoist reduction 0
gear housing on A-end side backed out
causing loss of lubrication oil.
16" T-3 C Gun jumped in elevation making it 5
difficult to hold on loading position
or match pointers. Shock of gunfire
and recoil caused spring for ball
check on replenishing valve in B-end
to get between ball and valve seat
(Drwg. 268501-20) thereby losing
pressure.
16" T-3 C Misfire. Primer failed on primary and 2
battery. Delay in repriming.
16" T-3 C Sticky tube pawl permitted one pro- 1
jectile to lower back on the nose of
next below making necessary to lower
one flight to place on proper pawls.
5" Dir. 3 Plate leads jarred loose, grounded 0
and blew an indicator fuse.
5" Stable El. 3 Cross-level switch jarred sufficiently 0
to cut cross level out of automatic.
5" Mount 1 R Projectile hoist jammed on starting 8
pawl due to shearing 1 ug from shell
which dropped to bottom of fuse pot.
5" Mount 3&9 - Oscillated in automatic train necessi- 0
tating matching in "hand. Believed
to be due to overheating of motors
which had been running over an hour.
5" Mount 3&9 - Loss of gas ejection air pressure due 0
to automatic cut-out valves in Machin-
ery Spaces closing due to shock of gun-
fire.
5" Mount 3 - Elevation motor cut out 8
Trainer failed to match correctly in
train after training motor cut out
causing mount to train wild.
Elevation due to damaged thermal over- 16
load relay; train undetermined other
than shock of gunfire. Plot failed to
shift communications when this mount
was shifted to Director 3.
5" Mount 5 R Rammer stopped due to knife switch on 6
rammer control box in UHR opening from
concussion of 16" firing.
5" Mount 7 L Powderman placed cartridge in tray be- 1
Mount 9 L fore spade was back clue to insufficient
light.
6. Commendations.
(a) The entire ship's company, officers and men, dis-
played commendable coolness and performed their duties with speed
and precision.
(b) For the high standard of training and maintenance, and
for the excellent performance of gunnery and engineering personnel,
commendation is due the following officers:
Commander A.D. AYRAULT, USN Executive Officer
Commander H.T. WALSH, USN Gunnery Officer
Lieut-Comdr. J.A. STROTHER, DE-V-(G),
USNR Engineer Officer
Lieut-Comdr. E.B. HOOPER, USN Asst. Gunnery Officer
Lieut-Comdr. H.W. SEEY, USN Spot One.
Lieut-Comdr. R.T. SIMPSON, DE-V-(G),
USNR Asst. for Main
Engines.
7. Lessons Learned and Recommendations.
(a) Radar has forced the Captain or O.T.C. to base a greater
part of his actions in a night engagement on what he is told rather
than what he can see. This ship was not hit but examination of the
USS SOUTH DAKOTA revealed completeness with which bridge structure
may be riddled by shells and splinters which penetrate 1" STS bulk-
heads. The enemy may be counted upon to spot to hit foremast
superstructure.
Recommendation: The Captain and Navigator should be in Conn.
Recommendation: An experienced officer other than the
Navigator should be O.O.D. and should filter for the Captain the
tremendously numerous reports received at the Conning Station over
the various telephone circuits.
(b) Although excessive and duplicate reports had been
anticipated and although much drill had been held in battle problems
toward eliminating undesirable reports there were excessive reports
and many cases of initial reports being caught at various
stations and rebroadcast repeatedly over first one circuit and then
another. This echo and re-echo effect must be guarded against.
(c) Vision from platform aft of Battle 2 does not make up
for loss of vision ahead from inside the station caused by radar
on Secondary Battery Director 1. It would be desirable also to be
able to see aft over the stacks from Battle 2.
Recommendation: Raise Battle 2 one level and provide all
around platform outside. Raise Forward Surface Lookout Station
one level to the former Concentration Dial Station.
(d) The SG radar was invaluable. It was found difficult
for Radar Plot Officer to pass along the contacts on the P.P.I.
verbally to ship and fire control particularly in the case of the
former in which it was passed through talkers in both Radar Plot
and Bridge. Our doctrine provided that the Radar Plot Officer be
on the JR, cross-jacked with the 2JD, for Main Battery action and
in this way the directors, Control, and Plot obtained first hand
reports. However, due to the difficulty of resolving ship contacts
from land signals, and to multiplicity of targets in groups and on
various bearings, it was difficult for Conn and Control to maintain
the picture el early. In addition, since the SOUTH DAKOTA was astern
or sharp on the quarter, during the firing phase, it was impossible
to keep continuous track of her with the SG radar. This handi-
capped Control since it could not give Bridge absolute assurance
that we were not trained on the USS SOUTH DAKOTA after Bridge had
lost visual contact with her. The CXAM was used on stern and
quarter bearings but could not be depended upon due to land inter-
ference. The crossing of the JR-2JD circuits caused heavy traffic
on the Main Battery Control circuit but this can be reduced by
continued training.
Recommendation: A P.P.I scope should be placed in Conn
and Control, and if practicable in Flag Plot, so that these vital
stations may have a continuous picture of enemy and friendly
contacts. Desirable but less important would be an additional
scope in plot.
(e) Pending installation of P.P.I. scope from the SC, the
following procedure will be tried out. Conn and Control maintain
a rough mooring board plot of contacts as reported with notations
as to time. In Conn and Control this will require a small portable
board with a dry cell light attached to make visible to Captain
and Control Officer while shielded sufficiently to prevent showing
light outside these stations.
(f) Recommendation: Surface ships should have radar means of
recognition.
(g) The obscuring by the mast of the SG radar line of
sight through an angle of about 60° across the stern is very un-
desirable.
Recommendation: Installation of additional SG or re-
location of present SG in order to cover this blind sector.
(h) During the night of the engagement no interference
from other radars was encountered.
(i) The tactical situation was greatly affected by the
presence of islands and the necessity of fighting in comparatively
restricted waters. As noted previously the radar screens had
many land echoes. For a surface engagement under reduced visi-
billity and especially in restricted waters a navigational plot
should be maintained in Radar Plot for fully effective use of the
radar. If this vessel were to keep such a plot more space would be
required. An expansion of Radar Plot appears justified.
(j) The picture presented by the SG radar is not a true
plan view. Radar operators must be given concentrated training
in areas surrounded by land in distinguishing between land and
ships. During a previous sweep by this vessel around Russell
Island at night, numerous false reports of surface targets were
received from the fire control radars that turned out to be land
more than 100,000 yards away. During the night of the engagement
only one such report was received.
Recommendation: Receptions in the 100 to 200 thousand
yard band should be eliminated in fire control radars if
practicable.
(k) Recommendations: (1) The replacement of one of the
present Mark I computers with one having starshell attachment is
necessary to facilitate control of starshell.
(2) The illumination correctors on
the Sky Control Platform should transmit to the starshell mount
as well as to searchlights. The Main Battery director could then
transmit direct to a starshell mount without necessity of desig-
nating to and using a Secondary Battery director.
(l) Recommendation: The firing of starshell duels as
ordered by recent Cincpac instructions is highly desirable.
(m) The value of spot coordination fire control drills for
the Main Battery, every day when practicable, was apparent.
(n) This Ship has had no opportunity for any target
practices since July, except for machine gun practices on sleeves
towed by small planes. An offset Calibration Practice has been
fired since then using service projectiles. This ship has never
fired at a drone or held Main Battery Local Control or Auxiliary
Practices. While Offset Practices are of inestimatable value,
this ship needs practice against drones and towed targets, both
surface and air.
Recommendation: Target ammunition, drones, and target
facilities should be provided at advanced bases for use of ships
in the battle zone.
(o) Flashes of the Japanese guns appeared smaller and less
bright than would have been expected unless some form of flash
retardant or flash hiders were used by them. Our own fleshes,
both 16" and 5" hindered observation of own fire by spotters and
control officers. Ship control was also blinded at times which
would have hampered station keeping had we been in column astern
of another ship.
Recommendation: That the subject of flash reduction be
re-examined even if it means some addition to smoke.
(p) Spot 1 and 2 found it necessary to use 7 X 50
binoculars through the overhead hatch of the Main Battery directors
for several periods during the engagement. This would have been
facilitated by wind protection and a seat at this hatch. As soon
as facilities are available lenses should be coated so as to
minimize reflection. This vessel has one pair of "night" 10 X 50
binoculars that is highly satisfactory in this respect.
(q) In Main and Secondary Battery directors it is fre-
quently desirable to shift quickly from optical train to radar
train and vice versa. It is frequently desirable to check one
against the other. Director trainers are hampered in these shifts
by changes in light accommodation and focus. The expedient of
having the pointer observe optically and coach in train yields
only a slight improvement.
Recommendation: Main and Secondary Battery directors should
be altered to provide additional stations for radar training, and,
in Secondary Battery directors, for radar pointing as well. A
possible solution is to locate the radar train and elevation
indicators below the directors, perhaps by suspended seats.
Another is to locate fixed stations below to control in "automatic"
ana "local" when desired, and, by means of a synchro transmitter,
to transmit indication so that directors may follow in manual.
(r) The difficulty of exchanging verbal information within
Secondary Battery Directors during gun fire was again brought out.
(s) Several telephone headsets were knocked off of the
wearers by Main Battery gunfire concussion. In action all hands
should wear telephone chin straps.
(t) Use of true bearings in all reports except from
lookouts and in all orders except those to turrets and Secondary
Battery is in effect. It would facilitate control to be able to
use true bearing with the Secondary Battery Directors. In present
installation, bearing indicator and gyro repeater are separate
instruments. This requires conversion. In a night action with
contacts on numerous bearings at short ranges and large and
frequent changes of own course, use of true bearings wherever
gyro repeaters can be installed is desirable.
Recommendation: Indicators should be installed in Secondary
Battery Directors to show the true bearing on which that director
is trained.
(u) The difficulty of telling what and how many ships were
present indicates a desirability of infra-red photographic equip-
ment on board ship.
G. B. DAVIS.
DISTRIBUTION:
Original and 1 copy to CinCPac
via CTF 64.
1 copy to CTF 64.
1 copy to ComSoPac.
1 copy to ComAirSoPc.
1 copy with copy of War Diary.
1 copy with Original of War Diary
(to be kept aboard ship).
CONFIDENTIAL U.S.S. WASHINGTON 11-Mr
BB56/TS-133 November 19, 1942.
From: The Executive Officer.
To: The Commanding Officer.
Subject: Report of noteworthy incidents within ship during
action from 0016 to 0107, November 15, 1942.
Reference: (a) U.S.N.R. 1920, Article 948.
1. This ship was commissioned 18 months ago. She has
fired only 2 night practices, a N.S.P. and a N.B.P., in January,
1942. She was in action for the first time from 0016 to 0107,
November 15, 1942.
2. The ship's company performed their duties with keen
intelligence and unhurried, rapid precision. With 2 brief except-
ions, no wild shots or missed salvos were brought about by person-
nel failures. There were only 2 injuries: a punctured ear drum,
and an abrasion on the back of a man's hand.
3. The temperature of machinery spaces was excessive.
No means exist for quick-closing ventilation during Condition 1
to personnel at below deck repair stations and battle dressing
stations, but about 10 minutes ventilation each 90 minutes was
given them until shortly before the action. From November 11. un-
til before dawn November 14 the ship's company had been standing
watch in 3. During the 19 hours before the action they had been
in Condition 1, modified in that ventilation was provided as in-
dicated above; certain personnel were not required to remain alert;
certain others were allowed to sleep at their stations; and 3 hot
meals were served in shifts during this period in the mess com-
partments, keeping at least two-thirds of the ship's company at
their stations, and fully manning all stations between shifts. I
believe this procedure contributed importantly to the coolness,
alertness, and precision with which all hands functioned.
4. I believe that the Gunnery Officer, Commander H.T.
Walsh, the assistant Gunnery Officer, Lieutenant Commander E.B.
Hooper, and Spot One, Lieutenant Commander Seely deserve commendation
for the sound and thorough training of the Gunnery Department person-
nel, for their excellent control of main battery fire, and for the
eminently successful use of both search and gunnery radars. I
believe that the Engineer Officer, Lieutenant Commander Strother, and
the Assistant for Main Engines, Lieutenant Commander Simpson, deserve
commendation for the excellent performance of the Engineering Depart-
ment under extreme and prolonged high power and for the high standard
of training and maintenance which made it possible. I believe that
both the Engineering Department and the Damage Control organization
would have functioned most creditably had damage been received.
A.D. AYRAULT.
ENCLOSURE (B)
Information U.S.S. WASHINGTON BB-56
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
U.S.S. WASHINGTON BB-56
Washington BB-56
The eighth Washington (BB-56) was laid down on 14 June 1938 at
the Philadelphia Navy Yard; launched on 1 June 1940; sponsored
by Miss Virginia Marshall, of Spokane, Wash., a direct
descendant of former Chief Justice Marshall; and commissioned at
the Philadelphia Navy Yard on 15 May 1941, Capt. Howard H. J.
Benson in command.
Her shakedown and underway training ranged along the eastern
seaboard and into the Gulf of Mexico and lasted through American
entry into World War II in December 1941. Sometimes operating in
company with her sistership North Carolina (BB-55) and the new
aircraft carrier Hornet (CV-8), Washington became the flagship
for Rear Admiral John W. Wilcox, Commander, Battleship Division
(ComBatDiv) 6, and Commander, Battleships, Atlantic Fleet.
Assigned duty as flagship for Task Force (TF) 39 on 26 March
1942 at Portland, Maine, Washington again flew Admiral Wilcox'
flag as she sailed for the British Isles that day. Slated to
reinforce the British Home Fleet, the battleship, together with
the carrier Wasp (CV-7) and the heavy cruisers Wichita (CA-45)
and Tuscaloosa (CA-37), headed for Scapa Flow, the major British
fleet base in the Orkney Islands.
While steaming through moderately heavy seas the following day,
27 March, the "man overboard" alarm sounded on board Washington,
and a quick muster revealed that Admiral Wilcox was missing.
Tuscaloosa, 1,000 yards astern, maneuvered and dropped life buoys
while two destroyers headed for Washington's wake to search for
the missing flag officer. Planes from Wasp, despite the foul
weather, also took off to aid in the search.
Lookouts in the destroyer Wilson (DD-408) spotted Wilcox' body
in the water, face down, some distance away, but could not pick
it up. The circumstances surrounding Wilcox being washed
overboard from his flagship have never been fully explained to
this day; one school of thought has it that he had suffered a
heart attack.
At 1228 on the 27th, the search for Wilcox was abandoned, and
command of the task force devolved upon the next senior officer,
Rear Admiral Robert C. Giffen, whose flag flew in the cruiser
Wichita. On 4 April, the task force reached Scapa Flow, joining
the British Home Fleet under the overall command of Sir John
Tovey, whose flag flew in the battleship HMS King George V.
Washington engaged in maneuvers and battle practice with units
of the Home Fleet, out of Scapa Flow, into late April, when TF
39 was redesignated as TF 99 with Washington as flagship. On the
28th, the force got underway to engage in reconnaissance for the
protection of the vital convoys running lend lease supplies to
Murmansk in the Soviet Union.
During those operations, tragedy befell the group. On 1 May
1942, HMS King George V collided with a "Tribal" class destroyer.
HMS Punjabi, cut in two, sank quickly directly in the path of
the oncoming Washington. Compelled to pass between the halves of
the sinking destroyer, the battleship proceeded ahead, Punjabi's
depth charges exploding beneath her hull as she passed.
Fortunately for Washington, she suffered no major hull damage
nor developed any hull leaks from the concussion of the
exploding depth charges. She did, however, sustain damage to
some of her delicate fire control systems and radars; and a
diesel oil tank suffered a small leak.
Two destroyers, meanwhile, picked up Punjabi's captain, four
other officers and 182 men; HMS King George V then proceeded
back to Scapa Flow for repairs. Washington and her escorts
remained at sea until 5 May, when TF 99 put into the Icelandic
port of Hvalfjordur to provision from the supply ship Mizar (AF-
12). While at Hvalfjordur, the American and Danish ministers to
Iceland called upon Admiral Giffen and inspected his flagship on
12 May.
Task Force 99 subsequently sortied on the 15th to rendezvous with
units of the Home Fleet and returned to Scapa Flow on 3 June.
The next day, Admiral Harold R. Stark, Commander, Naval Forces,
Europe, came on board and broke his flag in Washington,
establishing a temporary administrative headquarters on
board. The battleship played host to His Majesty, King George
VI, at Scapa Flow on the 7th, when the King came on board to
inspect the ship.
Soon after Admiral Stark left Washington, the battleship resumed
her operations with the Home Fleet, patrolling part of the
Allied shipping lanes leading to Russian ports. On 14 July 1942,
Admiral Giffen hauled down his flag in the battleship at
Hvalfjordur and shifted to Wichita. That same day, Washington,
with a screen of four destroyers, upped anchor and put to sea,
leaving Icelandic waters in her wake. She reached Gravesend Bay,
N.Y., on 21 July; two days later, she shifted to the New York
Navy Yard, Brooklyn, N.Y., for a thorough overhaul.
Upon completion of her refit, Washington sailed for the Pacific
on 23 August, escorted by three destroyers. Five days later, she
transited the Panama Canal and, on 14 September, reached
Nukualofa Anchorage, Tongatabu, Tonga Island. On that day, Rear
Admiral Willis A. "Ching" Lee, Jr., broke his flag in Washington
as Commander, Battleship Division (BatDiv) 6, and Commander, Task
Group 12.2.
The next day, 15 September, Washington put to sea bound for a
rendezvous with TF 17, the force formed around the aircraft
carrier Hornet. Washington then proceeded to Noumea, New
Caledonia, and supported the ongoing Solomons campaign,
providing escort services for various reinforcement convoys
proceeding to and from Guadalcanal. During those weeks, the
battleship's principal bases of operation were Noumea and
Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides.
By mid-November, the situation in the Solomons was far from good
for the Allies, who were now down to one aircraft carrier
Enterprise (CV-6)-after the loss of Wasp in September and Hornet
in October, and Japanese surface units were subjecting
Henderson Field on Guadalcanal to heavy bombardments with
disturbing regularity. Significantly, however, the Japanese
only made their moves at night, since Allied planes controlled
the skies during the day. That meant that the Allies had to move
their replenishment and reinforcement convoys into Guadalcanal
during the daylight hours.
Washington performed those vital duties into mid-November of
1942. On 13 November, she learned that three groups of Japanese
ships -one consisting of about 24 transports, with escort
were steaming toward Guadalcanal. One enemy force sighted that
morning was reported as consisting of two battleships, a light
cruiser, and 11 destroyers.
At sunset on the 13th, Rear Admiral Lee took Washington, South
Dakota (BB-57), and four destroyers and headed for Savo Island-
the scene of the disastrous night action of 8 and 9 August-to
be in position to intercept the Japanese convoy and its covering
force. Lee's ships, designated as TF 64, reached a point about
50 miles south by west from Guadalcanal late in the forenoon on
the 14th and spent much of the remainder of the day trying
unsuccessfully to avoid being spotted by Japanese
reconnaissance planes.
Approaching on a northerly course, nine miles west of
Guadalcanal, TF 64-reported by the Japanese reconnaissance
planes as consisting of a battleship, a cruiser, and four
destroyers-steamed in column formation. Walke (DD-416) led,
followed by Benham (DD-397), Preston (DD-377), Gwin (DD-433),
and the two battleships, Washington and South Dakota.
As the ship steamed through the flat calm sea beneath the
scattered cirrus cumulus clouds in the night sky, Washington's
radar picked up a contact, bearing to the east of Savo Island,
at 0001 on 15 November. Fifteen minutes later, at 0016,
Washington opened fire with her 16-inch main battery. The
fourth battle of Savo Island was underway.
The Japanese force proved to be the battleship Kirishima, the
heavy cruisers Atago and Takao, the light cruisers Sendai and
Nagara, and a screen of nine destroyers escorting four
transports. Planning to conduct a bombardment of American
positions on Guadalcanal to cover the landing of troops, the
Japanese force ran head on into Lee's TF 64.
For the next three minutes, Washington's 16-inchers hurled out
42 rounds, opening at 18,500 yards range, her fire aimed at the
light cruiser Sendai. Simultaneously, the battleship's 5-inch
battery was engaging another ship also being engaged by South
Dakota.
As gun flashes split the night and the rumble of gunfire
reverberated like thunder off the islands nearby, Washington
continued to engage the Japanese force. Between 0025 and 0034,
the ship engaged targets at 10,000 yards range with her 5-inch
battery.
Most significantly, however, Washington soon engaged Kirishima,
in the first head to head confrontation of battleships in the
Pacific war. In seven minutes, tracking by radar, Washington
sent 75 rounds of 16-inch and 107 rounds of 5-inch at ranges
from 8,400 to 12,650 yards, scoring at least nine hits with her
main battery and about 40 with her 5-inchers, silencing the enemy
battleship in short order. Subsequently, Washington's 5-inch
batteries went to work on other targets spotted by her radar
"eyes."
The battle, however, was not all one sided. Japanese gunfire
proved devastating to the four destroyers of TF 64, as did the
dreaded and effective "long lance" torpedoes. Walke and Preston
both took numerous hits of all calibers and sank; Benham
sustained heavy damage to her bow, and Gwin sustained shell
hits aft.
South Dakota had maneuvered to avoid the burning Walke and
Preston but soon found herself the target of the entire Japanese
bombardment group. Skewered by searchlight beams, South Dakota
boomed out salvoes at the pugnacious enemy, as did Washington
which was proceeding, at that point, to deal out severe
punishment upon Kirishima one of South Dakota's assailants.
South Dakota, the recipient of numerous hits, retired as
Washington steamed north to draw fire away from her crippled
sister battleship and the two crippled destroyers, Benham and
Gwin. Initially, the remaining ships of the Japanese bombardment
group gave chase to Washington but broke off action when
discouraged by the battleship's heavy guns. Accordingly, they
withdrew under cover of a smokescreen.
After Washington skillfully evaded torpedoes fired b" the
retiring Japanese destroyers in the van of the enemy force, she
joined South Dakota later in the morning, shaping course for
Noumea. In the battleship action, Washington had done well and
had emerged undamaged. South Dakota had not emerged unscathed,
however, sustaining heavy damage to her superstructure; 38 men
had died; 60 lay wounded. The Japanese had lost the battleship
Kirishima. Left burning and exploding, she later had to be
abandoned and scuttled. The other enemy casualty was the
destroyer Ayanami, scuttled the next morning.
Washington remained in the South Pacific there after, basing on
New Caledonia and continuing as flagship for Rear Admiral
"Ching" Lee. The battleship protected carrier groups and task
forces engaged in the ongoing Solomons campaign until late in
April of 1943, operating principally with TF 11, which included
the repaired Saratoga (CV-3), and with TF 16, built around
Enterprise.
Washington departed Noumea on 30 April 1943, bound for the
Hawaiian Islands. While en route, TF 16 joined up; and,
together, the ships reached Pearl Harbor on 8 May. Washington,
as a unit of, and as flagship for, TF 60, carried out battle
practice in Hawaiian waters until 28 May 1943, after which time
she put into the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard for overhaul.
Washington resumed battle practice in the Hawaiian operating
area upon conclusion of those repairs and alterations and joined
a convoy on 27 July to form Task Group (TG) 56.14, bound for
the South Pacific. Detached on 5 August, Washington reached
Havannah Harbor, at Efate, in the New Hebrides, on the 7th.
She then operated out of Efate until late in October, principally
engaged in battle practice and tactics with fast carrier task
forces.
Departing Havannah Harbor on the last day of October,
Washington sailed as a unit of TG 53.2- four battleships and
six destroyers. The next day, the carriers Enterprise, Essex
(CV-9), and Independence (CVL-22), as well as the other
screening units of TG 53.3, joined TG 53.2 and came under Rear
Admiral Lee. The ships held combined maneuvers until 5
November, when the carriers departed the formation. Washington,
with her escorts, steamed to Viti Levu, in the Fiji Islands,
arriving on the 7th.
Four days later, however, the battleship was again underway,
with Rear Admiral Lee-by that point Commander, Battleships,
Pacific-embarked, in company with other units of BatDivs 8 and
9. On the 15th, the battlewagons and their screens joined Rear
Admiral C. A. "Baldy" Pownall's TG 50.1, Rear Admiral Pownall
flying his two starred flag in Yorktown (CV-10), the namesake of
the carrier lost at Midway. The combined force then proceeded
toward the Gilbert Islands to join in the daily bombings of
Japanese positions in the Gilberts and Marshalls softening
them up for impending assault.
On the 19th, the planes from TG 50.1 attacked Mili and Jaluit in
the Marshalls, continuing those strikes through 20 November,
the day upon which Navy, Marine, and Army forces landed on
Tarawa and Makin in the Gilberts. On the 22d, the task group
sent its planes against Mili in successive waves; subsequently,
the group steamed to operate north of Makin.
Washington rendezvoused with other carrier groups that composed
TF 50 on 25 November and, during the reorganization that
followed, was assigned to TG 50.4, the last carrier task group
under the command of Hear Admiral Frederick C. "Ted" Sherman.
The carriers comprising the core of the group were Bunker Hill
(CV-17) and Monterey (CVL-26); the battleships screening them
were Alabama (BB-50) and South Dakota. Eight destroyers
rounded out the screen.
The group operated north of Makin, providing air, surface, and
antisubmarine protection for the unfolding unloading operations
at Makin, effective on 26 November. Enemy planes attacked the
group on the 27th and 28th but were driven off without
inflicting any damage on the fast carrier task forces.
As the Gilbert Islands campaign drew to a close, TG 50.8 was
formed on 6 December, under Rear Admiral Lee, in Washington.
Other ships of that group included sistership North Carolina
(BB-55), Massachusetts (BB-59), Indiana (BB-58), South Dakota,
and Alabama (BB-60) and the Fleet carriers Bunker Hill and
Monterey. Eleven destroyers screened the heavy ships.
The group first steamed south and west of Ocean Island to take
position for the scheduled air and surface bombardment of the
island of Nauru. Before dawn on 8 December, the carriers
launched their strike groups while the bombardment force formed
in column; 135 rounds of 16-inch fire from the six battleships
fell on the enemy installations on Nauru; and, upon completion
of the shelling, the battleships' secondary batteries took
their turn; two planes from each battleship spotted the fall of
shot.
After a further period of air strikes had been flown off
against Nauru, the task group sailed for Efate, where they
arrived on 12 December. On that day, due to a change in the
highest command echelons, TF 57 became TF 37.
Washington tarried at Efate for less than two weeks. Underway on
Christmas Day, flying Rear Admiral Lee's flag, the battleship
sailed in company with her sister-ship North Carolina and a
screen of four destroyers to conduct gunnery practice,
returning to the New Hebrides on 7 January 1944.
Eleven days later, the battleship departed Efate for the Ellice
Islands. Joining TG 37.2-carriers Monterey and Bunker Hill and
four destroyers-en route, Washington reached Funafuti, Ellice
Islands, on 20 January. Three days later, the battleship, along
with the rest of the task group, put to sea to make rendezvous
with elements of TF 58, the fast carrier task force under the
overall command of Vice Admiral Marc A. "Pete" Mitscher. Becoming
part of TG 58.1, Washington screened the fast carriers in her
group as they launched air strikes on Taroa and Kwajalein in
the waning days of January 1944. Washington, together with
Massachusetts and Indiana, left the formation with four
destroyers as screen and shelled Kwajalein Atoll on the 30th.
Further air strikes followed the next day.
On 1 February, however, misfortune reared her head; Washington,
while maneuvering in the inky darkness, rammed Indiana as she
cut across Washington's bow while dropping out of formation to
fuel escorting destroyers. Both battleships retired for
repairs; Washington having sustained 60 feet of crumpled bow
plating. Both ships put into the lagoon at Majuro the next
morning. Subsequently, after reinforcing the damaged bow,
Washington departed Majuro on 11 February, bound for the
Hawaiian Islands.
With a temporary bow fitted at the Pearl Harbor Navy Yard,
Washington continued on for the west coast of the United States.
Reaching the Puget Sound Navy Yard, Bremerton, Wash., the
battleship received a new bow over the weeks that followed her
arrival. Joining BatDiv 4 at Port Townsend, Wash., Washington
embarked 500 men as passengers and sailed for Pearl Harbor,
reaching her destination on 13 June and disembarking her
passengers.
Arriving back at Majuro on 30 May, Washington again flew
Admiral Lee's flag as he shitted on board the battleship soon
after her arrival. Lee, now a vice admiral, rode in the
battleship as she headed out to sea again, departing Majuro on
7 June and joining Mitscher's fast carrier TF 58.
Washington supported the air strikes pummeling enemy defenses
in the Marianas on the islands of Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota,
and Pagan. Task Force 58's fliers also attacked twice and
damaged a Japanese convoy in the vicinity on 12 June. The
following day, Vice Admiral Lee's battleship destroyer task
group was detached from the main body of the force and
conducted shore bombardment against enemy installations on
Saipan and Tinian. Relieved on the 14th by two task groups
under Rear Admirals J. B. Oldendorf and W. L. Ainsworth, Vice
Admiral Lee's group retired momentarily.
On 15 June, Admiral Mitscher's TF 58 planes bombed Japanese
installations on Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands and Chichi
Jima and Haha Jima in the Bonins. Meanwhile, marines landed on
Saipan under cover of intensive naval gunfire and carrier based
planes.
That same day, Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, commanding the main body
of the Japanese Fleet, was ordered to attack and destroy the
invasion force in the Marianas. The departure of his carrier
group, however, came under the scrutiny of the submarine Redfin
(SS-272), as it left Tawi Tawi, the westernmost island in the
Sulu Archipelago.
Flying Fish (SS-229) also sighted Ozawa's force as it entered
the Philippine Sea. Cavalla (SS-244) radioed a contact report
on an enemy refueling group on 16 June and continued tracking
it as it headed for the Marianas. She again sighted Japanese
Combined Fleet units on 18 June.
Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, commanding the 5th Fleet, had
meanwhile learned of the Japanese movement and accordingly
issued his battle plan. Vice Admiral Lee's force formed a
protective screen around the vital fleet carriers. Washington,
six other battleships, four heavy cruisers, and 14 destroyers
deployed to cover the flattops; on 19 June, the ships came under
attack from Japanese carrier based and land based planes as
the Battle of the Philippine Sea commenced.
The tremendous firepower of the screen, however, together with
the aggressive combat air patrols flown from the American
carriers, proved too much for even the aggressive Japanese. The
heavy loss of Japanese aircraft, sometimes referred to as the
"Marianas Turkey Shoot," caused serious losses in the Japanese
naval air arm. During four massive raids, the enemy launched 373
planes-only 130 returned.
In addition, 50 land based bombers from Guam fell in flames.
Over 300 American carrier planes were involved in the aerial
action; their losses amounted to comparatively few: 23 shot down
and six lost operationally without the loss of a single ship in
Mitscher's task force.
Only a few of the enemy planes managed to get through the
barrage of flak and fighters, one scoring a direct hit on South
Dakota-killing 27 and wounding 23. A bomb burst over the flight
deck of the carrier Wasp (CV-18), killing one man, wounding 12,
and covering her flight deck with bits of phosphorus. Two planes
dove on Bunker Hill, one scoring a near miss and the other a
hit that holed an elevator, knocking put the hanger deck
gasoline system temporarily; killing three and wounding 73.
Several fires started were promptly quenched. In addition,
Minneapolis (CA-36) and Indiana also received slight damage.
Not only did the Japanese lose heavily in planes; two of their
carriers were soon on their way to the bottom Taiho, torpedoed
and sunk by Albacore (SS-218); and Shokaku, sunk by Cavalla.
Admiral Ozawa, his flagship, Taiho, sunk out from under him,
transferred his flag to Zuikaku.
As the Battle of the Philippine Sea proceeded to a close, the
Japanese Mobile Fleet steamed back to its bases, defeated.
Admiral Mitscher's task force meanwhile retired to cover the
invasion operations proceeding in the Marianas. Washington
fueled east of that chain of islands and then continued her
screening duties with TG 58.4 to the south and west of Saipan,
supporting the continuing air strikes on islands in the
Marianas, the strikes concentrated on Guam by that point.
On 25 July, aircraft of TG 58.4 conducted air strikes on the
Palaus and on enemy shipping in the vicinity, continuing their
schedule of strikes through 6 August. On that day, Washington,
with Iowa (BB-61), Indiana, Alabama, the light cruiser
Birmingham (CL-62), and a destroyer screen, was detached from
the screen of TG 58.4, forming TG 58.7, under Vice Admiral Lee.
That group arrived at Eniwetok Atoll in the Marshalls to refuel
and replenish on 11 August and remained there for almost the
balance of the month. On 30 August, that group departed, headed
for, first, the Admiralty Islands, and ultimately, the Palaus.
Washington's heavy guns supported the taking of Peleliu and
Angaur in the Palaus and supported the carrier strikes on
Okinawa on 10 October, on northern Luzon and Formosa from 11 to
14 October, as well as the Visayan air strikes on 21 October.
From 5 November 1944 to 17 February 1945, Washington, as a
vital unit of the fast carrier striking forces, supported
raids on Okinawa, in the Ryukyus; Formosa; Luzon; Camranh Bay,
French Indochina; Saigon, French Indochina; Hong Kong; Canton;
Hainan Island; Nansei Shoto; and the heart of the enemy
homeland-Tokyo itself.
From 19 to 22 February 1945, Washington's heavy rifles hurled
16-inch shells shoreward in support of the landings on Iwo Jima.
In preparation for the assault, Washington's main and secondary
batteries destroyed gun positions, troop concentrations, and
other ground installations. From 23 February to 16 March, the
fast battleship supported the unfolding invasion of Iwo Jima,
including a carrier raid upon Tokyo on 25 February. On 18,
19, and 29 March, Washington screened the Fleet's carriers as
they launched air strikes against Japanese airfields and other
installations on the island of Kyushu. On 24 March, and again
on 19 April, Washington lent her support to the shelling's of
Japanese positions on the island of Okinawa.
Anchoring at San Pedro Bay, Leyte, on 1 June 1945 after an
almost ceaseless slate of operations, Washington sailed for
the west coast of the United States on 6 June, making stops at
Guam and Pearl Harbor before reaching the Puget Sound Navy
Yard on 23 June.
As it turned out, Washington would not participate in active
combat in the Pacific theater again. Her final wartime refit
carried on through V-J Day in mid-August of 1945 and the formal
Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay on 2 September. She completed
her post repair trials and conducted underway training out of
San Pedro, Calif., before she headed for the Panama Canal,
returning to the Atlantic Ocean. Joining TG 11.6 on 6
October, with Vice Admiral Frederick C. Sherman in overall
command, she soon transited the Panama Canal and headed for
Philadelphia, the place where she had been "born." Arriving at
the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard on 17 October, she
participated in Navy Day ceremonies there on the 27th.
Assigned to troop transport duty on 2 November 1945 as part of
the "Magic Carpet" operations- Washington went into dockyard
hands on that day, emerging on the 15th with additional bunking
facilities below and a crew that now consisted of only 84
officers and 835 men. Sailing on 15 November for the British
Isles, Washington reached Southampton, England, on 22
November.
After embarking 185 army officers and 1,479 enlisted men,
Washington sailed for New York. She completed that voyage and,
after that brief stint as a transport, was placed out of
commission, in reserve, on 27 June 1947. Assigned to the New
York group of the Atlantic Reserve Fleet, Washington remained
inactive through the late 1950's, ultimately being struck from
the Navy list on 1 June I960. The old warrior was sold on 24
May 1961 to the Lipsett Division, Luria Bros., of New York City,
and was scrapped soon thereafter.
Washington (BB-56) earned 13 battle stars during World War II
in operations that had carried her from the Arctic Circle to
the western Pacific.
North Carolina Class
BB-55 - North Carolina
Completed - July 1941
BB-56 - Washington
Completed - July 1941
Dimensions
Displacement(tons):
35,000 (Full load)
Length: 729’ (oa)
Beam: 108’ 6"
Draft: 35’ (max)
Armament
9 16"/45
20 5"/38 DP
15 40 mm quads
48-67 20 mm
Propulsion
Speed: 26.8 knots (max)
Max. crusing radius:
5,700 miles @ 25 knots
16,320 miles @ 15 knots
Horsepower: 121,000 (shaft)
Drive: 4 screws geared turbine
Fuel: 7,554 tons oil (max)
Aircraft
3 SC-1
Links to other web-sites with information on the
U.S.S. WASHINGTON
To learn more about the U.S.S. WASHINGTON BB-56 Please visit these
Web-site
USS Washington (BB 56)
Home Page Has information of BB-56
NavSource Online
Has photos of BB-56
Home
Mail any comments or questions to Scott Davis All right reserved
© Copyright 1997 - 2024